

JPRS-NEA-85-134

28 October 1985

Near East/South Asia Report

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

28 October 1985

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

Turkish Reaction to UN Subcommittee Vote on Genocide Issue (MARMARA, 31 Aug 85).....	1
Intensification of Armenian 'Armed Struggle' Advocated (GAMK, 7 Sep 85).....	3
Athens Paper Chronology of Armenian Genocide Report (AZAT OR, 5 Sep 85).....	6
Difficulties Confronting Armenian Schools in Iran Discussed (GAMK, 8/9 Sep 85).....	9

ARAB AFRICA

ALGERIA

Consumers, Speculators Queue Up for Meat at Controlled Prices (Abdelkader Hammouche; ALGERIE ACTUALITE, 15 Aug 85).....	13
--	----

EGYPT

Peace Process, U.S. Role Discussed (Ibrahim Nafi'; AL-AHRAM, 20 Sep 85).....	15
New Cabinet Advised To Gain People's Confidence (Rajab al-Banna; AL-AHRAM, 12 Oct 85).....	21

Present Leadership of Parties Seen as Autocratic (Usamah al-Ghazali Harb; AL-AHRAM, 12 Oct 85).....	23
--	----

LIBYA

Al-Qadhdhafi Interviewed by Egyptian Opposition Figures (Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi Interview; AL-RA'Y, 23 Aug 85).....	26
Muhammad Ahmad al-Amari Expresses Solidarity With Mozambique (NOTICIAS, 31 Aug 85).....	29

ARAB EAST/ISRAEL

BAHRAIN

Briefs	
Oil Revenue Increase	31

ISRAEL

Progressive List for Peace Convention Resolutions (THE JERUSALEM POST, 25 Aug 85).....	32
Teachers' Seminars on Jewish-Arab Coexistence Begun (Nili Mendler; HA'ARETZ, 31 Jul 85).....	33
Transportation Minister Corfu Talks on Current Issues (THE JERUSALEM POST, 20 Sep 85).....	37
IDF Internal Review of the Lebanon War (Alex Fishman; 'AL HAMISHMAR, 5 Jun 85).....	41
Increase in Exports to Latin America Noted (HA'ARETZ, 31 Jul 85).....	54
Impact of Defense Cuts on Unemployment (Macabee Dean; THE JERUSALEM POST, 19 Sep 85).....	55
IDF Engineering Corps Chief Interviewed (Yitzhak Oked; THE JERUSALEM PSOT, 22 Aug 85).....	57
IDF Training Chief Interviewed (THE JERUSALEM POST, 20 Sep 85).....	59
Commentary on Income Inequality (Yosef Goell; THE JERUSALEM POST, 13 Sep 85).....	62
Hydrogeologist Assesses Water Resources in 'Avara (THE JERUSALEM POST, 15 Sep 85).....	66

Briefs		
Second Muslim Congress Demands		68
Agricultural Export Figures		68
SAUDI ARABIA		
Requirements of Serious Industrialization Reviewed		
(AL-RIYAD, 31 Jul 85).....		69
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES		
Abu Dhabi Expenditures		
(Ahmed Hassan; KHALEEJ TIMES, 18 Sep 85).....		89
Dubayy Imports Fall		
(KHALEEJ TIMES, 23 Sep 85).....		90
PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN		
Briefs		
Gold Discovery in Hadramawt		91
New Exploratory Oil Wells		91
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC		
Briefs		
Agreement With Netherlands		92
Arab Fund Loan		92
Netherlands Agreement		92
SOUTH ASIA		
AFGHANISTAN		
Soviets Pulling Back After Heavy Fighting in East		
(KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 8 Sep 85).....		93
Mujahidin Launch Counter Offensive		
(KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 10 Sep 85).....		95
Briefs		
Pakistani Village Bombed		96
BANGLADESH		
Swedish Agency Halting Aid to Population Control Project		
(Peter Bratt; DAGENS NYHETER, 11 Sep 85).....		97

INDIA

HINDU Analyst Scores Center's Approach to Security (THE HINDU, 8 Sep 85).....	99
Delhi Plans Expose of Pakistan Extremist Training (G. K. Reddy; THE HINDU, 11 Sep 85).....	102
British Handling of Terrorist Arrests Questioned (K. N. Malik; THE TIMES OF INDIA, 7 Sep 85).....	104
Paper Reports, Delhi Denies Frank Camper Claim (THE TIMES OF INDIA, 10, 11 Sep 85).....	105
Camper: Bomb Warning Given	105
Delhi Denial Reported	106
Briefs	
Sikhs in North America	107

IRAN

Commentary Recognizes 'Anti-Zionist' Resurgence (KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, 12 Sep 85).....	103
Paper Supports Prosecutor General's Fight Against Mini-Satans (Tehran Domestic Service, 3 Oct 85).....	110
Chief Justice Discusses Impounded Property (Tehran Domestic Service, 6 Oct 85).....	112
Editor of New Daily Comments on Policies (TEHRAN TIMES, 19 Sep 85).....	114

PAKISTAN

Article Examines Corruption in Public Services (N. Nawaz Khan; DAWN, 24 Sep 85).....	115
Official Talks About Development Benefits of Kalabagh Dam (DAWN, 25 Sep 85).....	119
Several Publications Forfeited (DAWN, 25 Sep 85).....	121
Official Talks About Project To Check Waterlogging (DAWN, 24 Sep 85).....	122
Briefs	
Creation of 12 Provinces Demanded	123
Ban on NDP Leader	123

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

TURKISH REACTION TO UN SUBCOMMISSION VOTE ON GENOCIDE ISSUE

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 31 Aug 85 pp 1,4

[Text] The UN Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities which had recently been working in Geneva on its primary agenda item, British expert Benjamin Whitaker's report on the Armenian question, approved the report in its yesterday's session thus acknowledging that "the Armenians were subjected to a genocide in 1915."

The Whitaker report on "genocide crimes" was approved by a vote of 14 to 1. The Soviet Union cast the sole negative vote, and Bangladesh, Cuba, Jordan and Morocco abstained.

After the voting, the Turkish representative at the UN, Ercument Yavuzalp declared that the allegations made in the report are false and that the subcommission's decision is unjust.

On the other hand, the UN subcommission declined to send the report to the UN Human Rights Commission which will meet in Geneva in the winter. Thus, according to political observers, although Whitaker's report has been approved by the subcommission, it will remain only within that framework and will not be presented before higher bodies. It is also pointed out, however, that this is the first time that the Armenian question has been officially discussed by a UN agency and that a majority has voted in favor [of the Armenians].

The subcommission's session chairman, Greek delegate Erika (Dres), announced the result of the voting and said that "the majority of the subcommission members are convinced that a genocide was perpetrated against the Armenians in 1915-1916." She added that she personally agrees with the views expressed in the Whitaker report.

As it has been pointed out, with the endorsement of the Whitaker report, which discusses an alleged genocide that has been committed in the past, the UN has for the first time discussed Armenian allegations. On the other hand, it appears that this issue will not be discussed by the UN ever again given the fact that a majority of subcommission members voted against a motion to send the report to a higher UN agency, the UN Human Rights Commission.

Ankara's Viewpoint

The subcommission's vote has had its repercussions in Foreign Ministry circles. Foreign Ministry spokesman Yavuz Eralp said in this regard that the report presented to the UN Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities is completely unacceptable. Eralp noted that the subcommission itself found it proper only to record the issue without seeing any need to send it to a higher body. Eralp added that the resolution in connection with the report makes reference to the fact that there are opposing views on the issue and that subcommission members themselves have widely differing viewpoints. Eralp pointed out that the subcommission did not find it necessary to circulate the report more widely, even though that is the general procedure at the UN, which shows that there is a desire to keep it confined to a more restricted framework.

Eralp noted that there was no actual voting on the said resolution and that the members sufficed by expressing "mutual agreement" with the report. In response to a reporter's question about what he thought about the issue, Eralp said that the fact that the report will remain blocked is a sign of rejection and added that the report is condemned to remain in the minutes of the subcommission only.

When asked about his views on a second resolution related to the genocide issue, Eralp replied: "Yes, there was a second resolution related to this issue. But after serious examination by several experts, the resolution was withdrawn. The resolution contained proposals for measures to prevent genocide."

9588

CSO: 4605/225

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

INTENSIFICATION OF ARMENIAN 'ARMED STRUGGLE' ADVOCATED

Paris GAMK in Armenian & French 7 Sep 85 p 5

[Text] [Editor's note:] While we do not share some of the assertions and conclusions of the following article we have received, we publish it to foster free and unfettered expression of views and ideas and because we find in it issues which are of current interest and which are a subject of concern not only for the Armenians in all corners of the world but also for the entire world public opinion and a worrisome issue for the politicians of both the West and the East.

Several articles have recently appeared in the Armenian press examining the issue of the Armenian armed struggle. These articles have raised several issues which warrant further examination.

First issue: Is Armenian terrorism an armed struggle or is it not?

With respect to this issue we must first ask why some people are so concerned with definitions and why they play with words. Those who want to slow down or to halt the Armenian liberation struggle can attain their goal if they can convince others that Armenian terrorism is only a means of propaganda. Because if the only purpose of terrorism is propaganda and the propaganda needed has been waged, then terrorism has fulfilled its purpose and therefore there is no need for more armed operations.

However, if we accept that Armenian terrorism is not just propaganda, but only a phase in the Armenian liberation struggle it becomes evident that terrorism must continue and must be intensified.

Second issue: Has the Armenian liberation struggle achieved its goals in the last decade?

We have frequently heard about the successes achieved by the Armenian armed struggle. The Armenian armed struggle obliterated the wall of silence that stood before us. It also shocked, awakened and revolutionized part of the Armenian people.

Here, one can also mention other points. Firstly, if one of the goals of the Armenian armed struggle was the promotion of the Armenian cause among foreigners, then the struggle must continue for a lengthy period of time because there is a very large body of people who are not only unfamiliar with

the Armenian cause but who do not know what an "Armenian" or where "Armenia" is. Perhaps the German people know about Armenians, but, for example, a large number of Americans and Canadians do not.

The second point is related to the highly publicized "iron ladle." The Armenian armed struggle furnished an "iron ladle" to the Armenian revolutionaries. Today, if Armenian revolutionaries want to find collaborators and allies--for example, if they wish to collaborate with the Kurds, the Palestinians, Turkish leftists or other groups--they can do so because they represent a power and because they have arms in their hands. And the Armenian revolutionary must keep his weapons at hand so that he can be respected and taken seriously.

Third issue: Are we ready to "benefit politically" from the Armenian armed struggle?

To this day, American reporters write that the goal of the Armenian fighters is to take revenge. It is obvious that Armenian fighters have failed to make their goals clear to the foreign public and to "benefit politically" from the armed struggle to the maximum possible extent.

The weakness of the Armenian fighters stems from the following: When the Armenian Revolutionary Army or the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide assassinate a Turkish envoy, there is no official spokesman or body who can call a press conference and explain clearly that the purpose of the fighters is not to take revenge but to secure the return of the Armenian people to their lands, which are currently occupied by Turkey, and to restore their right of self-determination.

The Irish Republican Army [IRA] has an official political arm, the Sinn Fein, which acts as the IRA's mouthpiece. If Armenian revolutionaries want to "benefit politically" from the armed struggle to the maximum possible extent, they must set up non-secret bodies which can act as official spokesmen for the Armenian fighters--just like the Irish have done. Of course, the life and the future of these spokesmen would be in constant jeopardy, but if Armenian fighters can sacrifice their own lives and can produce forces for any kind of sacrifice, they can surely find spokesmen.

Fourth issue: Has the armed struggle gone through a complete phase during the past decade?

It is true that the Armenian armed struggle gives the impression of having completed a phase in the last decade. But it is categorically wrong to say that since the first phase seems to have been completed additional armed operations can only have a negative effect.

In the next phase, in addition to strikes against Turkish targets in the diaspora armed operations must intensify within Turkey itself, because the ultimate goal of the Armenian nation is to liberate the Armenian lands occupied by Turkey. Consequently, it would be natural to expand the Armenian armed struggle on to those lands. Given that there is no large Armenian population in Turkey, Armenian fighters must receive assistance from the local populace. Today, the Armenian fighters can expect assistance only from the Kurds and some leftist Turkish elements.

Consequently, in order to intensify the Armenian armed struggle in Turkey, the Armenian revolutionaries must work to establish links and cooperation with Kurds and Turkish leftists.

Fifth, various issues:

a) Is the effort to weaken the West related to the Armenian question? Is the weakening of the West in the interests of the Armenian cause?

There are American and NATO military bases in Turkish Armenia. Therefore, the United States will oppose and fight any force that tries to upset the stability of that region and to change the status quo. In other words, to liberate the Armenian lands we will have to deal not only with the Turkish government but also the Atlantic alliance and the United States. We must understand clearly that the territory of Turkish Armenia does not belong to Turkey alone. Those lands also belong indirectly to the United States. As the THE WALL STREET JOURNAL has written, "the lands of eastern Turkey are one of NATO's most valuable assets."

Anyone who organizes an insurgence in Turkish Armenia must expect a strong response from the United States. When the Armenian liberation struggle intensifies, the U.S. government will impose tighter restrictions on the "freedom" of Armenians inside and outside the United States and will employ every possible means to crush the Armenian liberation struggle. Either we give up the dream of liberating the Armenian lands and appease Turkey and the United States, or we fight to liberate the Armenian lands and upset Turkey, NATO and the United States.

When Turkey is weakened the likelihood of resolving the Armenian question is increased. Similarly, a weakened NATO and a weakened United States would make it easier to liberate the Armenian lands.

Thus, the weakening of the West is not only related to the Armenian question, but would contribute directly to its resolution. If we take a wider perspective we see that the weakening of the United States, in addition to helping the Armenian liberation struggle, would help free the Third World from the yoke of American imperialism and would contribute to the cause of the Third World peoples.

b) Should the Armenian fighters lay down their arms temporarily to carry on the struggle with experts, money, cunning and in more comfortable conditions and resort to arms only when they see that peaceful means do not achieve any results?

Absolutely not. The Armenian fighters must not lay down their arms. We cannot wait because the Armenians of the diaspora have no time to wait. Armenians in Europe and the Americas in particular are being assimilated very rapidly. We either die fighting and have some hope of liberating the Armenian lands, or we fade away by getting assimilated in the comfortable conditions of the diaspora.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ATHENS PAPER CHRONOLOGY OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE REPORT

Athens AZAT OR in Armenian 5 Sep 85 pp 1,4

[Text] In 1984, the United Nations endorsed a genocide convention which essentially defined the term "genocide" in accordance with international law and declared it a crime whose perpetrators must be punished.

Later, a Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities was formed in affiliation with the UN Human Rights Commission. The functions assigned to this new body included finding ways of preventing genocide.

The members of the subcommittee are, by regulation, experts and are supposed to be free of any obligation to promote the policies of their governments. Despite this requirement, however, governments with various motives have been able to pressure their nationals to endorse their own views. Nevertheless, the members of the subcommittee are representatives of their governments, and their views are their own alone.

In 1971 the UN Human Rights Commission approved a proposal by the subcommittee to appoint a reporter to prepare a report about the prevention of genocide and the punishment of its perpetrators. The reporter selected was (Nicodem Ruhashiankiko) of Rwanda.

In 1971, (Ruhashiankiko) drafted a report part of which chronologized acts of genocide. Paragraph 30 in that section said: "In modern times, it is possible to verify the existence of a relatively complete set of documents with regard to the Armenian massacres which have been described as the 'first genocide of the 20th century.'"

From August through September 1972 arguments were exchanged about the preliminary report. It was decided to examine the historical record and to cite only those incidents whose authenticity could be verified.

In June 1973, the preliminary report was presented. The reporter expressed the opinion that the examination of the historical record should be limited to a brief overview of genocide examples.

In September 1973 the debates resumed about the historical perspective of the preliminary report. A motion to delete Paragraph 30 did not receive the support of the majority of the members.

In December 1973 the UN Human Rights Commission endorsed a resolution approving the preliminary report and requesting the reporter to take account of the opinions expressed--in particular to reexamine Paragraph 30 in order not to disregard the opinion of the Turkish government.

In 1974, the Turkish delegate in the Human Rights Commission managed with the support of the representatives of Pakistan, Italy, Iraq, France, Tunisia, Nigeria, the United States, Austria, Iran and Romania to have the commission to recommend to the reporter to delete the references about the Armenians from the final report.

In January 1975, the subcommission stressed the indispensability of historical facts in connection with the issue of genocide and the need for the representation of all views which was considered not to be the case in Paragraph 30.

At a subcommission meeting in February 1976, an interjection by a British expert, Benjamin Whitaker, attracted attention. He asserted that the three reasons given as objections to the preliminary report did not apply to the Armenian case because firstly the authenticity of the events had been verified by such impartial observers as Toynbee and Nansen, secondly no government had been named and lastly the past must not be buried. The Turkish observer, Arim, intervened and reiterated Osman Olca's views as Turkey's official position. This time, however, an Armenian was also present: Professor Shavarsh Torikian, who attended the meeting as the representative of the International Council of Churches, defended the Armenian views for the first time before an international body.

In 1978, (Ruhashiankiko) presented his final report with Paragraph 30 deleted.

In September 1978, Jules Wolf intervened on behalf of the International Federation of Human Rights and demanded that a paragraph be added to the report underscoring the need to commemorate the tragic events in which Armenians perished in 1915, that the Armenian genocide is a prime example for various reasons and that it must be included in the report. Professor Torikian reiterated his views. Mrs (Cestieau), the French expert, took a different position from that of the French delegate, Juvinerie. The insistence of certain members to reinclude the paragraph in the report prompted other delegates to demand that a decision be taken on this issue.

In 1979, the report was reviewed by the Human Rights Commission. This time, representatives of Austria, France, the United States, Cyprus, Australia and Canada recommended to the reporter on behalf of the commission that Paragraph 30 be reinserted in the report. However, (Ruhashiankiko) disappeared and the issue remained unresolved.

In meetings held by the subcommission in 1982 and by the commission in 1983, it was decided to appoint a new reporter with the responsibility to review and to complete the said report.

In 1983, the subcommission appointed one of its members, Mr Benjamin Whitaker, as the reporter.

In subcommission meetings in 1984 Whitaker disclosed that he intends to cite the Armenian genocide in his report. Delegates of Argentina, France and Greece expressed support for Whitaker's stance.

In August 1985, Whitaker presented his report at the subcommission meeting at the UN headquarters in Geneva. The report contains direct references to the Armenian genocide.

Whitaker's report was put to a vote. Fourteen delegates voted in favor, 1 voted against and 4 abstained.

In Whitaker's report the section about Armenians is included in Paragraph 24 which says verbatim:

Paragraph 24

In the 20th century, Toynbee defined the characteristics of the development of genocide as follows: that genocide is committed in cold blood and in a premeditated manner or at the instruction of the ruling political authorities and that the perpetrators of genocide use all organizational and technological means for complete and systematic extermination. The Nazi atrocities have unfortunately not been the only instance in the 20th century.

Other instances can also be mentioned such as the massacre of (?Herans) by the Germans in 1904, the massacre of the Armenians by the Ottoman government in 1915-1916, the massacre of Jews by Ukrainians in 1919, the massacre of Hutus by Tutsis in Burundi in 1965 and 1972, the massacre of Achi Indians by the Paraguayan government in 1974, the massacre of Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge in 1975-1978 and the present massacre of Bahais by the Iranians. Racial discrimination has been separately mentioned in paragraphs 43 and 47. Still other instances can also be mentioned. The legal classification of some mass murders as non-genocide can seem to be absurd. Furthermore, any attempt to discount genocide by limiting its definition can produce effects contrary to what is desired.

9588

CSO: 4605/227

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING ARMENIAN SCHOOLS IN IRAN DISCUSSED

Paris GAMK in Armenian & French 8/9 Sep 85 p 5

[Text] The first day of school generally evokes the feeling of resuming work with renewed energy and enthusiasm and the determination to work without interruption for a whole year.

The first day of school evokes this feeling in all social structures and domains, but particularly in schools which pursue the general goal of training new generations and laying the foundations of future society.

This meaning of the first day of school is also understood in the Armenian school which is additionally burdened with the task of overcoming the numerous difficulties that confront our communities in the diaspora.

It is clear that the Armenian school in the diaspora, in addition to its regular educational and tutoring mission, is entrusted with the formidable task of keeping alive the Armenian spirit in young people who are far away from their homeland and who are deprived of the breath of life that a country can give and preventing the flame of revolution from fading.

For the Armenian school this is the fundamental meaning of the first day of school. For the Armenian student and parent the first day of school means congregating at a center of collective struggle and mobilization of forces. This became particularly evident in the last decade in those Armenian communities of the diaspora where social and political instabilities emerged as a result of wars or various internal events. In such situations the goal of preserving our national structures became an especially pressing concern and prompted us to focus all of our energies on that goal.

The political changes that have come about in Iran in the last 5 years and the consequences of the war that has ensued has naturally affected the life of the Iranian-Armenian community.

In the face of these difficulties, the Iranian-Armenian community rose as a united front to defend and to protect the Armenian school and the general interests of our nation knowing full well that its own well being and interests could be jeopardized.

The Iranian-Armenian student and parent, who must be regarded as a valuable asset for the preparation of future generations for our liberation struggle,

had the practical experience of collectively defending our rights and collectively overcoming difficulties.

In order to prepare this article about the difficulties of the Armenian schools in Iran, we had a meeting with a well-informed source, Mrs Gidush Arzuyan, an administrative official of the theater association of Tehran's Ararat Armenian Cultural Organization, who is in Paris by a timely coincidence.

When we talk with Mrs Arzuyan about the collective struggle waged by Armenian students, parents and teachers in recent years, we get the impression that each and every day of the academic year has become a first day of school for the Armenian student body. Mrs Arzuyan says: "The act of standing side by side in the school yard to sing national liberation songs before entering classes every day became a widespread custom in all schools. The song 'Sardarabad' eventually became an anthem for the students--as if to remind ourselves every day that we are ready, we are alert and we will continue to resist."

And, indeed, results have been achieved. All 46 Armenian schools in Iran (35 of which are in Tehran) continue to operate without exception. Nearly 30,000 Armenian students attend these schools where courses in Armenian are taught 2 to 5 hours a day (depending on the grade), including Armenian language, grammar, literature, history and religion.

The schools operate at the kindergarten, primary and middle school levels. Students are taught Armenian from the earliest possible age, that is in kindergarten.

Pledge for Collective Struggle to Preserve Our Schools

Mrs Arzuyan says: "Perhaps it is a natural instinct or a lesson we have learned from history that we regard so highly the need to work together to achieve something when our collective interests are threatened. An example of that is the work of the Iranian-Armenian community in recent years to preserve the viability of the Armenian school."

Mrs Arzuyan also states: "In working for this goal, our national authorities and parents' associations were joined earnestly by our cultural organizations which gave strength to the struggle with their organizational and moral efforts."

While conducting their usual activities, athletic and cultural associations contributed greatly to educational work, in particular with their extracurricular classes in the summers.

For the last 2 years half-day extracurricular classes have been held (in addition to the regular activities organized by the associations), where special efforts are made to contribute to the schools' collective national goals.

The extracurricular classes mainly concentrate on instilling organizational, collective and moral values in young Armenian generations. To that end, in recent years additional impetus was given to developing the love of reading in children and teenagers.

In pursuance of the same goal, a special program has been initiated to encourage new publications, in particular books that may be used for the national education of our children.

The Armenian Parent: A Cornerstone

The Armenian parent has played an indispensable role in all this work and the struggle that is being waged. Fully aware of the threat to our schools, the educational base of our future generations, the Armenian parents, with their determined participation, fortified the resolution of the student body to fight for the Armenian school in recent years.

It is an indisputable fact that the Armenian students turned their slogan of "not a single concession" into action with more self-confidence thanks to the encouragement they received from their parents' participation in all collective activities, including rallies and strikes.

As an example let us recall the difficulties created last year in connection with the reopening of Armenian schools. The resumption of classes in Armenian schools for the academic year 1984-1985 was postponed for one month.

This delay naturally had its adverse effects on the schools' educational programs, and that could have prompted some parents to register their children in foreign schools. The Armenian parents, however, persevered, and with their awareness for defending our collective interests they did not yield in the face of the conditions that had been created.

The Armenian parent became one of the supporting pillars of the Armenian school.

First Day of School: Just New Stationery?

There is a considerable number of Armenian families from Iran--as well as from several other communities in the diaspora--who have come and settled in France. This situation automatically makes one think about their everyday life and the changes that have emerged in their collective and social lives.

With these thoughts in mind we met Iranian-Armenian parents who have settled in France with their children. We talked with them about the beginning of the school year, about school in general and the Armenian school in particular.

When we talked to their children (aged 10 to 15) about their feelings in these first days of school, they spoke with marked cheerfulness about meeting old friends, finding new friends and expressed eagerness to resume work with new books, notebooks and uniforms. They spoke about the same pleasures that all schoolchildren experience everywhere on the first day of school and the first month thereafter.

The children did not forget, however, to underscore how they are attached to their teachers and their principal [in Iran] with whom they have kept contact even after their emigration. They felt the existence of an unbreakable bond which was created in the course of their joint efforts in the atmosphere of struggle in recent years.

When we talked about the first day of school in Armenian schools in Iran the students stated that they had a completely new experience by participating in a collective effort and by waging a collective struggle.

These feelings, which encompass a mixture of joy and concerns caused by uncertainty, convey a new attitude of going to school with a new responsibility and a determination to preserve that collective center with renewed forces.

It is true that an environment necessitating struggle and perseverance every day may be tiring and exhausting, but the younger generations who are deeply aware of and who believe in our national collective struggle cannot be broken by such exhaustion. Indeed, they did not out of the belief that by keeping the Armenian school alive they would be keeping erect an indispensable pillar of strength for our national liberation struggle.

9588

CSO: 4605/224

ALGERIA

CONSUMERS, SPECULATORS QUEUE UP FOR MEAT AT CONTROLLED PRICES

Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French 15 Aug 85 p 13

[Article by Abdelkader Hammouche: "Supply and Demand"]

[Text] A great crowd formed the "line" which extended right out to the street. Many women. But also men and children. All were gesticulating, crowding each other, and even shouting abuse at each other in a crowd like at a big market day at the Souk El Fellah. One woman told us she came from the town of Annassers. Someone else lives at Bab-El-Oued. A teen-age boy comes from Belcourt. Not only honest clients are attracted to Alger-Viande because of the reasonable prices offered: 36 DA for a kilo of lamb, 34 for beef, 19 for brisket of beef. These prices cannot be compared to those in private butcher shops: 92 DA for lamb, 90 for beef. That is why many restaurant keepers and downright speculators slipped into the "chain" which began to form as early as 5 o'clock in the morning. The state thus unwillingly fills the pockets of shady businessmen who think the general welfare is a mere joke. Others, truly deprived citizens, often must put up with seeing people of this kind, favored with priorities, go out carrying whole sheep. For all that, M Chenoufi, manager of the establishment, complains of the recrudescence of a number of "interventions," and not merely technical ones: "Many people come armed with work-related documents and demand to be served on a priority basis. If we refuse to do so, then threats erupt from all quarters. Sometimes we give in and then the public, itself, is not at all pleased," this leader reports. A moment earlier in the manager's office, four persons loaded with heavy packages vanished as soon as we showed our journalist's card.

Once again, is this an abuse of authority? Everything seems to indicate that certain government officials--with matters aggravated by the shortages--do not succeed in curbing their instincts.

The manager of the establishment considers "This situation is a result of the fact that first, the quotas we receive--about 70 to 100 sheep per day--remain well below the demand; and secondly, this product, which is in short supply, is not available in a number of neighborhoods. Inhabitants of the latter then turn to us." Why try to hide it: the economic crisis has not only affected the western countries. Developing countries are not spared, either. Algeria is no exception, although for us the impact was softened by a certain number of measures taken by the government. The facts are there. For the moment at

least, considering the financial resources of the country, it is impossible to "drown" the national market with imported meat. That would force us to cut down oil imports and other strategic commodities whose prices are already subsidized by the state. Of course, the most logical solution would be to increase national production. However, 2 months ago prices suddenly rose as a result of cattleraisers' reducing their slaughter cycles. To tell the truth, it is far from being a coincidence. Quite the contrary: the latter, or at least most of them, noting that this year was rich in hay and water, calculated it would be "juicier" for them to keep their cattle in order to sell them on the hoof at good prices rather than slaughter them. The meat becomes scarce, prices show a very noticeable increase. As can be seen, shortages were not provoked exclusively, as some believe, by reducing our imports. Our speculator cattleraisers thus found there was an unexpected chance to increase their blackmail. In the current economic situation can Alger-Viande by itself, perhaps, satisfy an endlessly increasing demand? One may well doubt it, considering, after all, the limited means it has. This is demonstrated by the fact that its 10 delivery trucks remain parked all day long for lack of produce to sell. For its part, the ENAPAL, [expansion unknown given] which supplies Alger-Viande and the Galeries Algeriennes, is unable to provide that organization with the larger quotas it requests.

Will this situation continue?

In our view it must be understood that our country cannot withstand such situations, which are so detrimental to its economic development. Do not the experts foresee a considerable increase in petroleum prices as early as 1986? Perhaps matters will as a result then return to normal. That being said, and it cannot be repeated too often: so long as we depend on foreign sources, dislocations of this kind will continue to arise. The one and only solution remains self-sufficiency in food. But that is another matter. Quite another matter.

9772

CSO: 4519/195

EGYPT

PEACE PROCESS, U.S. ROLE DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 20 Sep 85 pp 1, 3

[Commentary by Editor-in-chief Ibrahim Nafi': "We, the Palestinian Issue and Dialogue with Our American Friend"]

[Text] President Mubarak believes that any issue that loses momentum to impose itself on the interested and affected parties is destined to stagnate, no matter how just or important the issue may be.

President Mubarak's new political movement comes within the context of this belief. In the course of it, he will meet with President Reagan of the United States and with the leaders and heads of France, Spain and Portugal and of a large number of African and nonaligned nations during the UN session in New York.

Certainly, President Mubarak's coming visit to the United States will take on special importance in all its aspects--political, economic and military.

On the political side, I think that President Mubarak's conversations with the American president and the makers of American policy will be more than candid in emphasizing that the setting of preconditions that impede the dynamic of the peace process does not serve the cause of peace and does not further efforts to reach a solution to the problem. If, for example, the United States believes that American dialogue with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation must necessarily lead to direct negotiations with Israel and imposes acceptance of this as a precondition to dialogue, this will be, in my opinion, an illogical and unacceptable condition. It will impede the steps of dialogue from the outset and will throw obstacles in the way of its logical course in advance. It is unacceptable for America to stipulate that the dialogue lead to direct negotiations, while neither America nor the other parties to the dialogue can guarantee that the dialogue will achieve positive results leading to further steps. What if no positive results are achieved through the dialogue with America? In such a case, what good could possibly come of negotiations, direct or indirect? What good can come of setting such a precondition, other than obstructing the initial step of dialogue between the joint delegation and the United States?

The Egyptian side is conscious of the fact that we stand before an opportunity, and that if this opportunity is lost it will be difficult or impossible

to create another one like it for a movement toward peace, for there is now a positive Palestinian understanding of the situation and of the realities of the struggle. There is an undeniable realism on the part of Jordan, and there is almost unanimous Arab support for the necessity of working to reach a peaceful solution to the problem.

This is a view that Egypt has tried to impress upon world opinion and which, finally, many international policy makers have come to share--the conviction of the importance of the time factor. The most striking illustration of this is what Mrs Margaret Thatcher, prime minister of Britain, expressed in her recent talk with me: she feels sad because steps toward peace continue to be taken with a slowness that does not accord with the seriousness of the situation.

Another striking illustration of this is the following, which Mrs Thatcher also said in her talk with me: the United States is the only party that can influence Israel and persuade it to sit down at the negotiating table and reach solutions without preconditions.

This is the truth of which Egypt has long struggled to persuade and convince world opinion.

It is without doubt an objective truth. I would only add that the responsibility of the United States in achieving peace makes it America's duty under these circumstances to exercise its influence on Israel to stop its repressive actions on the West Bank and to stop threatening Jordan with a raid or attack because of Israel's belief that the PLO has bases in Jordan and that some operations on the West Bank have emanated from Jordan.

I know for a fact that King Husayn will tell President Reagan of America that the justifications offered for this threat are untrue, that the PLO has no bases in Jordan and that no operations in the occupied territories have emanated from Jordan.

This information is true and is supported without hesitation by Egyptian sources of information.

The United States should also realize the extent to which it embarrasses its friends in the region by its repeated use of the veto against any resolution condemning Israel for an aggressive or repressive action or for inhumane practices that obstruct peace efforts. In doing so, America has not encouraged the shaping of better circumstances for a movement toward peace. It would have been more useful if America had carried out its role in convincing Israel to give up such practices in order to prepare a climate more conducive to a movement toward peace.

Egypt will speak with the United States on these issues on the basis of its firm friendship, a friendship that gives Egypt the right to ask America to carry out its role in moving peace forward and in helping to complete the steps toward it.

Also on the political level, President Mubarak's conversations will include many meetings with delegation leaders from African and nonaligned nations taking part in the UN session. Also included will be visits to Portugal, Spain and France, countries which all come within the framework of Egypt's broad advocacy of moving the peace process forward and of creating circumstances conducive to peace. In this connection, President Mubarak's visit to Portugal and Spain comes as a new indication of Egypt's plan for broad movement, this being the first time that President Mubarak is visiting Portugal and Spain. In the case of Spain, it is the first visit by any Egyptian president.

There is no doubt that the Egyptian presence in this new arena will serve the great goal of peace as well as the goal of strengthening bilateral relations with the two countries.

As for the president's visit to France and his upcoming talks with President Mitterand, they take on a special importance because of their timing. President Mitterand insisted that his meeting with President Mubarak take place one day before his meeting with Soviet leader Gorbachev, who will begin his visit to France on the following day. President Mubarak obviously will inform Mitterand of the latest developments in the peace issue and of developments in the movement to seize the available opportunity for achieving peace and solving the Arab problem.

On the level of bilateral relations between Egypt and the United States, President Mubarak's talks in Washington will deal with fundamental points concerning the best possible use of American aid to Egypt in order to achieve the purposes for which that aid was granted.

As we know, the United States is offering Egypt grants that need not be returned and loans of generous terms. These grants in aid and easy loans play an undeniable role in the comprehensive campaign for development on which Egypt is embarking, and they also play a role in strengthening Egypt's military defense capability.

Certainly, the Egyptian people are aware of this and appreciate it. However, we also believe that there are fundamental points that need to be discussed so that the goals of such aid can be achieved in the best way, so that the aid can play a more effective role in confronting the major problems facing the Egyptian economy and so that it can play a more effective role in strengthening Egypt's military capability.

Among these points are the following:

(1) There is an explicit American promise that Egypt will be equal to Israel in the amount of aid each receives. This American promise has not been realized until now. We know that policy makers in the United States have reasons and motives they can present to explain the reasons for not keeping this promise. Although we might grant the validity of some of these reasons, we still ask how the discrepancy between aid to the two parties can be so enormous.

(2) There is also an American promise to help Egypt with certain military industries so as to create at least some sort of self-sufficiency in some kinds of weapons. Until now this American promise has not gone beyond the realm of promises and hopes. At the same time, the United States is helping Israel produce the Lavi aircraft, a fighter that is a substitute for the F-16, and is offering Israel \$250 million in supplementary assistance for this purpose, besides the \$200 million being invested in the United States for the development of systems for this Israeli aircraft.

(3) In light of the friendly relations binding Egypt and the United States, it is incomprehensible and unacceptable for the United States to continue insisting on placing certain restrictions on particular armaments needed by Egypt, especially when what Egypt is asking for is not going to influence the regional balance of power and will serve only our defensive goals.

(4) Related to this issue is the illogicality of the United States' flooding Israel with arms in spite of the lack of reasons and the alteration of circumstances that once justified America's largesse with weapons on the ground that Israel was threatened by external danger. At the same time, restrictions remain on compliance with Egypt's arms needs, in spite of the increasing threats confronting Egypt. The attempts that have taken place to influence the stability of the Sudan are not hidden from American policy makers, nor is what is going on in Uganda and Chad, or the Libyan stand toward Egypt and the increasing Soviet presence in Libya--these being real dangers to Egypt.

(5) In spite of our appreciation of the importance and necessity of American military aid to Egypt, the positive side of this aid is diminished by the fact that American weapons prices remain high in comparison with the price of East Bloc weapons. Furthermore, the United States does not treat us as it treats the European states to which it offers weapons. The United States reduces the price of weapons offered to the European countries by what is called "the cost of scientific research," on the ground that America would be able to use European weapons in case of war. This reduction brings the price of American weapons within a reasonable range. Why does the United States not treat us on the same basis?

Besides, we are still paying the American Pentagon 3 percent of the value of military aid for what are called "administrative expenses," besides interest. These administrative expenses are demanded by the Pentagon in return for supervision of the implementation of the arms program. Assuming that we receive \$1.3 billion in military aid, this means a deduction of \$39 million for administrative expenses. I think the United States could easily exempt Egypt from these charges, especially since it would require only an administrative decision on the part of the American government, not Congressional legislation or approval. Related to this is the fact that the United States gives Israel more than \$12 million for training, while Egypt's share of training assistance does not exceed \$2 million!

(6) Among the disputed issues in bilateral relations between Egypt and the United States is the standing American request that nuclear vessels be

permitted to pass through the Suez Canal, a request that Egypt continues to refuse, guarding against any damage to the canal if any accident affecting such ships should occur and lead to a disruption of navigation.

The United States believes that the passage of such ships through the canal is 100 percent safe--they have been passing through the Panama Canal without incident for a long time. Egypt, however, continues to demand greater guarantees of the safety of such ships passing through the canal, especially since if American ships are allowed passage Egypt will treat the other countries possessing such ships on the same basis. Thus, the passage of such ships--if it is conclusively determined that their passage through the canal is safe--will set the direction for the future.

In my opinion, if the United States is certain about the safety of such ships passing through the Suez Canal, it must guarantee to indemnify Egypt for the total income of the Suez Canal should there occur an accident leading to a disruption of navigation. The entire matter would be open to discussion if America were to give the Suez Canal Authority all the modern systems and equipment to oversee safe transit and the nonpollution of the waters of the canal.

Having accustomed us to dealing with matters on a quid pro quo basis, let the Americans now grant by the same logic that passage through the canal by such ships will realize the United States a savings of not less than 1 billion dollars, not to mention the strategic saving of the time formerly taken by these ships in going around the Cape of Good Hope. If these ships are to go through the canal, why not add the value of the savings to the total of American aid to Egypt?

Of course, we are not bargaining with the United States about the passage of nuclear vessels through the Suez Canal. Egypt cannot do that. We are, however, discussing the principles by which we will deal with the United States and with any other nation that has such ships.

It is our duty to strive to realize the interests of our country and people, just as others strive to realize the interests of their countries.

Our discussion of many points connected with American aid does not mean that we deny the value of this aid or that we close our eyes to the fact that in the end it is aid, not a business deal subject to the laws of supply and demand. It does, however, mean that we are looking for wider horizons of cooperation between the two countries, wider horizons for benefitting from this aid and broader fields of participation in the implementation of comprehensive development plans and in strengthening Egypt's military capability. In all of this, dialogue is useful and always desirable.

It is perhaps this that moves me finally to say that we all acknowledge that American aid to Egypt exceeds the amount of previous Soviet aid to Egypt. This leads us to ask why the United States has no great national project in Egypt, one that would play a role in solving one of our country's fundamental problems and would stand as a timeless symbol of Egyptian-American friendship,

even as the High Dam rises in the south of our country as a symbol of Egyptian-Soviet friendship during one of the periods of our country's history?

Why, for example, does the United States not think of reclaiming 100,000 feddans of land in western al-Nubariyah or 200,000 feddans in al-'Uwaynat and presenting them as a gift to the Egyptian people to remain as an eternal sign of Egyptian-American friendship?

If America did so, it would be inscribed in the history of Egyptian-American friendship as a sign that time could not efface and as a practical and lasting expression of this friendship.

Why do we not enter into a dialogue with the United States about a great national project such as this?

12937

CSO: 4504/3

EGYPT

NEW CABINET ADVISED TO GAIN PEOPLE'S CONFIDENCE

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 12 Oct 85 p 7

[Article by Rajab al-Banna: "It Is Not Too Much To Ask of the New Cabinet"]

[Text] Before the new cabinet begins to tackle the price demon, educational reform and efforts to rescue us from swimming in a sea of sewers, I think its primary task should be to build confidence between the government and the people. Throughout many long years there have been many reasons why such confidence has cracked. These cracks have turned into deep wounds which have bled internally without surfacing, but which nonetheless has caused us much worry, emotion, violence and negative feelings. We have tried to treat the attacks and symptoms without looking for the roots. The new cabinet has every chance to build this confidence for it opens a new page on which it can write the reasons why people rule for or against it and can leave its imprint in Egypt's political history. The people have received it with applause and optimism, though not completely devoid of caution. Experience has taught them not to be overly optimistic and not to offer blank confidence in advance. The government, by its actions and conduct rather than its statements and utterances, is the one institution which can firmly establish such confidence. Every time it takes one step in this area, the Egyptian citizen will take two steps toward it until the gap is bridged and the cohesion we have been talking about for dozens of years is achieved.

To build confidence on a sound basis, the following matters ought to be embedded firmly in our political life:

First, officials at all levels must beware of going too far in making promises and statements before fully studying each subject and discussing suggested alternatives. It is better for an official to say a subject has not been fully studied than to present us with rash promises and improvised personal conceptions only to discover that he did not mean what he said. Some may think that people forget, but the truth is that they may forget some details but the "general picture" they form about a certain official is generated from the sum of his actions, statements and commitment to what he says and his fulfillment of the promises he makes.

Second, we hope the cabinet will not surprise the people with its decisions. Democracy is not achieved by decisions from above but rather by putting

forth issues and questions, by allowing the people to take a real part in its debates, by listening to all opinions, no matter how different they may be, and by justifying its acceptance or rejection of a certain opinion. Should this happen, destructive tendencies would disappear automatically and sincere, mature opinions would be sure to expel shallow, biased opinions. Constructive criticism would manifest itself and participation, without which no government can achieve its goals and implement its policy, will be realized.

Third, every word and every figure an official issues must be 100 percent accurate and beyond doubt. If an official says something and we find out, even years later, that it is contrary to the facts, the shaken confidence, the psychological detachment and the credibility crisis will be difficult to treat.

Fourth, so long as the cabinet ministers participate in forming public policy, we must restore to our political life the principle of joint liability. This is a constitutional principle because our constitution is not based on the principle of the individual responsibility of ministers, as was the case during the time of totalitarian regimes. There is not and should not be one policy for the minister and another one for the cabinet. There should always be one policy drawn up by the government as a whole whereupon it is held responsible for everything a minister says or does. This will give it the image of a strong cohesive government and its strength lies in not issuing any decision, at any level, before conducting a full study and debate. Once a decision is issued, it is fully responsible for it and must be ready to bear the consequences, as is the case in all democratic countries of the world.

The image of a strong government is enhanced by the government's firmness in enforcing all the laws of the land. If some laws are no longer suited to the times--and there are many--it must promptly deal with them either by amending or repealing them in order to make it clear to everyone that laws are made to be enforced. We can thus put an end to the spirit of contempt for the law caused by loose enforcement or by a feeling that these laws are no longer enforceable or worthy of respect. We do not need, this time around, any talk about a legislative revolution for we have had enough talk to the point of boredom.

A new cabinet means new hope. Hope in this cabinet has its justifications. The new cabinet's extended hand will have millions of other hands extended to work with it. Confidence can bring about a miracle, the miracle of true cohesion. Should this happen, millions of citizens will burst out with tremendous energy in all fields, able to overcome all difficulties and realize all hopes. This energy is the true alternative to the lack of capabilities. Our world is full of people with weak and backward capabilities who have achieved leaps beyond imagination.

EGYPT

PRESENT LEADERSHIP OF PARTIES SEEN AS AUTOCRATIC

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 12 Oct 85 p 7

[Article by Dr Usamah al-Ghazali Harb, AL-AHRAM Center for Political and Strategic Studies: "Political Autocracy and the Reality of Parties in Egypt"]

[Text] Dr Faraj Fudah raised the question of what he called "political autocracy" within most political parties in Egypt, meaning that the affairs of these parties "are run as they used to be managed in the old days," particularly regarding the absolute powers the party leaders used to enjoy in managing the parties' affairs and treating their members.

Based on the fact that "one cannot give what one does not have," his article doubted that these parties, which lack democracy from within, can realize democracy in the political system as a whole.

The fact is that the "political autocracy" phenomenon in most Egyptian parties may be explained by several factors. On the one hand, a look at most party leaders in Egypt today reveals that these leaders belong to an old generation which emerged or crystallized 40 years ago, especially in the period between the end of World War II in 1945 and the outbreak of the revolution on 23 July 1952.

There was the Wafd Party which was hampered by conspiracies at the hands of the British, the palace and the minority parties, not to mention its internal differences and the big landowners' control over it. At that time as well, the Muslim Brotherhood, Young Egypt and the Marxist groups took definite forms as the rejectionist ideological forces which gained force and impetus, in particular in the wake of World War II. The Wafd's failure, coupled with the efforts of these aforementioned forces, helped set the political stage for the force which rose to overthrow the entire old regime, namely the Free Officers.

These five political forces that crystallized 4 decades ago are still offering today the great majority of leaders under the current circumstances of party practice. The old Wafd is present in certain symbols of the New Wafd. The Muslim Brotherhood joins under the banner of the New Wafd as well. The Marxists are present in the Grouping Party leaderships; Young Egypt members are in the Labor Party; and the Free Officers are represented by the leaders

of the Grouping and Labor parties, in addition to some leaders in all parties, including the National Party. Hence we find ourselves before a specific pattern of "historical" personalities whose leadership takes on a predominantly "paternal" character and their ideas and opinions are respected and revered by the disciples around them. Within this framework, these leaders' exceptional power not only becomes an acceptable matter but is always justified and strongly advocated.

However, the practices of those leaders not only reflect their historic character but--perhaps more importantly--are also linked to the nature of the undemocratic legacy of the parties and the forces they ultimately wound up with, particularly in their internal organization. The old Wafd, throughout its existence as a party from 1924 to 1952, no doubt raised the slogans of liberalism in defense of political democracy. Nevertheless, its chance to assume power and apply its liberal slogans was very short lived. Its presence in power, alone or in a coalition with others, did not go beyond 8 years and 3 months. More important, the Wafd was never exempt from the "political autocracy" phenomenon. Under the sweeping leadership of Sa'd Zaghlul and Mustfa al-Nahhas after him, the Wafd did not know true democracy within its ranks. The leader's opinion overrode the majority's opinion, regardless of its weight. The leader's power invalidated any organizational rules under the pretext that the leader expressed the nation's will in his capacity as its "representative." Sa'd Zaghlul and Mustafa al-Nahhas did not bow to the majority within the Wafd in more than one vital case.

On the other hand, the old declared ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood, Young Egypt and the Marxist organizations did nothing to indicate that democracy and respect for the majority were anything more than a tactic in the search for additional influence in the political arena. Moreover, the manifestation of the leader's expressions and paralysis no doubt marked these organizations' internal practices. Whereas the personalities of Hasan al-Banna in the Brotherhood and Ahmad Husayn in Young Egypt leave no room for doubt, the successive schisms reflected more clearly the total lack of organizational discipline and the great number of leaders within the Marxist organizations. As for the Free Officers, it is difficult to evaluate their internal relations as a political party. This truth, however, is undermined by the fact that their organization's military and secretive nature rendered discipline and loyalty to the supreme command--be it before or after their rise to power--infinitely more important than democracy and respect for grassroots wishes.

Moreover, the wide gap between these leaders and the following generations--and this is an important point--was due to the fact that the political practices of the 23 July regime under 'Abd-al-Nasir and al-Sadat regime did not help to produce new generations of political leaders throughout the 3 decades. The Free Officers monopolized political power and the focal point of their struggle with the other forces was to deprive them of exercising any effective role. For many years following the July Revolution, the criterion for selecting leaders in Egypt was an apolitical one. The undeclared prerequisite for filling leadership positions was the candidate's "purity" from any political "color" and loyalty to the supreme political leadership was a

prerequisite for a growing number of unpoliticized bureaucrats and technocrats in order to fill "leadership positions."

The successive political organizations which eventually crystallized in the Socialist Union did not provide an opportunity for the emergence of true political leaders except within the most limited scope. These organizations, by virtue of their being formed by the government, were unable to produce their own special leaders. Their leaders "came down" from above and therefore it was no coincidence that they did not provide, for example, ministers and government officials, save for a limited number of exceptional cases. The opposite was true in the sense that government agencies and the public sector were the ones that used to nurture leadership positions in successive political organizations.

Added to that is the fact that the great majority of the Free Officers occupied the significant positions in the various government agencies in their thirties at the expense of one or two subsequent generations! All this helps explain the leadership crisis currently suffered by existing parties and the presence of the "generation gap" in the political chain within their ranks.

The fourth point has to do with the cultural and social reality of Egyptian society in general. For autocracy is still a common hereditary disease in Egyptian society in general and is not restricted to its political institutions. Government agencies and public-sector bodies, cooperative organizations, labor and professional unions as well as universities, colleges and research centers are all managed by the "autocratic" method whereby one person or a handful of persons dominate their activities with an extraordinary ability to outwit organizations and bylaws. Nepotism and favoritism still play a huge role and within this general framework, autocracy is not anomalous in political parties. In this case, instead of being a tool for developing the social and political reality and overcoming its negative aspects, it has become captive to this reality and an embodiment of its negative features.

12502

CSO: 4504/4

LIBYA

AL-QADHDHAFI INTERVIEWED BY EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION FIGURES

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 23 Aug 85 p 7

[Interview with Libyan leader Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi by Salah 'Isa, Faridah al-Naqqash, 'Abd-al-'Azim Manaf and Sa'd Zaghlul Fu'ad, members of the Egyptian opposition; date and place not specified]

[Text] The magazine AL-MAWQIF AL-'ARABI, which is published in Cyprus and supports the Libyan Jamahiriyyah, published in its last issue a long interview with Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, conducted by a group of political figures and journalists from the Egyptian opposition: Salah 'Isa, Faridah al-Naqqash, 'Abd-al-'Azim Manaf and Sa'd Zaghlul Fu'ad.

In view of the importance of the interview and the timeliness of the issues touched upon, in particular that of the expulsion of foreign workers, both Egyptian and Tunisian, some of the important parts are presented here.

Faridah al-Naqqash: Before beginning our discussion, Colonel, we would like to relay to you the complaint of Egyptians working in Libya regarding the way in which the decree terminating their work contracts was carried out. We are confident that the political decree was not intended to do so, but it was carried out in a way that will leave the Egyptian people with deep wounds and regrettable memories, though we are confident of the good-heartedness of the Libyan people and, in general, of all their good intentions.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi: I was informed of this today, and I will follow the matter personally.

Sa'd Zaghlul Fu'ad: I circulated among the Egyptians who had assembled at the port of Tripoli waiting to depart, and I found them wounded by the procedures. They had no objection to the decree, but it is strange that the matter had gone so far as to include the confiscation of a refrigerator or a washing machine, or to prohibit them from leaving the country with an iron.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi: Things like this do not happen in Egypt?

Faridah al-Naqqash: Colonel, is there really a decree terminating the work contracts of Egyptians in Libya?

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi: If the Egyptians working in Libya support the Egyptian regime by providing it with hard currency, then they are indirectly assisting "Israel," and therefore must be expelled.

Faridah al-Naqqash: Is it useful to replace all the Egyptian and Arab workers with workers from Ghana, Korea and the Philippines?

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi: The decree to terminate the foreign workers in the Jamahiriyyah is a general one, and does not apply specifically to Egyptians. Since you are journalists and are now here in Libya, look for the truth of the matter yourselves. Go take a look at those who are being deported. Are they just Egyptians, or all the foreign workers in Libya?

Faridah al-Naqqash: Most of those being deported, Colonel, are Egyptians.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi: Because most of those working in Libya are Egyptians. Instead of saying "Thank you," you say to me "Damn you," because most of those whose contracts are being terminated are Egyptians. We are used to having the Arabs deny a favor.

[Several voices at once] No, Colonel, we do not object to the decree, but to the way in which it has been carried out.

Faridah al-Naqqash: We are not saying that. We are saying that the Egyptians helped in the development plans in the Jamahiriyyah, for the future of the whole Arab people, and not just for the future of the Egyptians.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi: We do not deny that. They have been working with us for 16 years. I am the one who brought the Egyptians into Libya. I am the one who has proposed unity with Egypt on more than one occasion. I am the one who said that the Libyan oil belongs to the Egyptians and the Libyans. But you greeted us with ingratitude and rejection.

Salah 'Isa: Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, you appear to your enemies, and perhaps to some of your friends, as a puzzle. You say no to everything, and yet you are the president of an ambitious country.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi: (interrupting) Point of order! I am not a president. I am the leader of a revolution. The Jamahiriyyah does not have a president, because the people are the president.

Salah 'Isa: I am sorry. You are the leader of a revolution in a small country with limited resources. Yet you say no to everything, to the point that some people say that you are simply an historical objective, in the sense that you are a symbol of the country's rejection of what has been presented to it, since there is much that is impractical in your policy. What do you say to that?

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi: I say what I think is right and necessary, based on a nationalism that gives expression to the Arab nation, but in a regional reality that includes all the tragedies that I have mentioned. We are a small, poor desert country with few inhabitants. But duty is duty and what is

right is right. Should I say yes to America when it takes the Gulf of Sidra? I say no. Should I say yes to them when they want hegemony over the Arab countries? I say no. Should I say yes to recognizing "Israel"? I say no. Should I consent that Palestine be its territory? I say no. Should I consent that the Arabs pay for Hitler's crime by being pushed out of their land and deprived of their future in payment for the oppression of the Romans, the Europeans and the Nazis against the Jews? I say no. I have to say no, whatever the reason, even if I do so from a small and limited country, as you were saying.

Salah 'Isa: Does it not sometimes concern you that you are alone in the middle of an Arab nation that is looking for compromise solutions.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi: You know, I do feel that sometimes, and it is a natural feeling. Like prophets, revolutionaries feel alienated from the world in which they live because they bring a message that clashes with the established order. Even Noah, who according to the Holy Koran lived to be 950 years old, despaired and cried out, "Oh God, I have called to my people night and day, but my call only makes them flee more" [Koran LXXI, 5-6]. And he called out, "Oh my Lord, leave not a single one of the unbelievers on earth" [Koran LXXI, 26]. In other words, annihilate them, because every time he called on the people to look to their own benefit, they called on him to do the opposite. This is a tragedy that revolutionaries also live, because they have an awareness and a sensitivity that drives them to anger and rebellion, and to dream and visualize what others cannot see. The others may not have this anger. If they did, they would all be revolutionaries. This anger and this rebellion against the present reality alienate the revolutionaries from the world in which they live. Even the revolutionaries' dreams appear strange because the revolutionary sees tomorrow and dreams of the future as if it were real because he is sure that it can be realized. It is a vision that those who are not revolutionaries cannot see or do not believe can be realized. I, for example, believe that the Arab nation could be a paradise, that it could be a single, strong state. I can imagine the possibility of linking the Nile with the great artificial river, so that the desert between Egypt and Libya can be watered and planted with crops, so that the Western Desert can be filled with fruit and become a lush garden.

'Abd-al-'Azim Manaf: The case of Sudan has been closed, as well as the case of Morocco. What is the next one?

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi: The dossier of the revolution -- and it is a dossier which is constantly open -- is a revolution that must take on all the legacies, conflicts and complexities on Arab soil: reactionism, regional borders, backwardness, and the spheres of influence of imperialism and Zionism.

12727

CSO: 4504/477

LIBYA

MUHAMMAD AHMAD AL-AMARI EXPRESSES SOLIDARITY WITH MOZAMBIQUE

Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese 31 Aug 85 p 10

[Text] Mozambique and Libya have the same enemies and are allies in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and against colonization in Namibia, said Muhammad Ahmad al-Amary, secretary of the People's Bureau of the Socialist People's Libya-Arab Jamahiriyah, accredited in Maputo. This diplomat spoke to our newspaper on the occasion of the 16th anniversary of the great Libyan revolution, to be celebrated tomorrow, 1 September.

It was on 1 September 1969 that an insurrection began in Sheba which quickly overthrew the monarchy. The fall of the monarchical regime met with great popular support, due to the corruption and decadence of the aristocracy linked to foreign capital.

The Libyan diplomat, in Maputo, stated that it was after the great revolution of 1 September that the Council of the Revolution, led by Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, immediately put a plan into effect to eliminate foreign military bases.

So on 28 March 1970, the English were expelled; on 11 June 1970, the Americans left the country; and on 7 October, the Italian contingent was eliminated.

One of the main objectives of the great revolution was achieved: power passed into the hands of the people, with the establishment of the people's committees and the people's congresses, which are executive and legislative organs, respectively.

"Workers, who were oppressed and had low wages, are now a privileged class in Libya," said Mohamed Ahmed al-Amary in the meeting with the journalists.

The Libyan representative said that great successes have been achieved in al-Qadhdhafi's country during these last 16 years in the fields of agriculture, telecommunications and transportation.

The revolution was not limited just to Libya. It has shown up outside the country's borders in the Arab world, on the African continent and in the rest of the world, said al-Amary, adding that his country supports all the liberation movements in the world that are fighting for freedom and independence.

"We are fighting against foreign occupation in Africa or anywhere else in the world and we support all liberation movements. It is because of this, our progressive position, that we are on the black list of imperialism," said the Libyan diplomat.

He added that "Libyan support for the people of South Africa, Namibia, Palestine and Nicaragua is not approved of by imperialism, which wasted no time in applying economic sanctions against our country and retaliatory measures even in the human area."

In Maputo, the representative of the Socialist People's Libya-Arab Jamahiriyah went on to stress that Mozambique and Libya have common enemies and are allies in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

"We demand that it be the South African patriots who discuss the destiny of their country and not the puppets linked to the Pretoria regime, in the same way that we defend the fact that the Palestinians themselves should discuss their future," said the Libyan diplomat.

Referring to relations between Mozambique and Libya, al-Amary said that they have been good with tendencies to become even closer.

He added that, beyond cooperation in and of itself, there exists the political coordination between the leaders of the two countries, who exchange information on the international situation and in particular on southern Africa.

Asked about the wave of expulsions of foreign workers from Libya which is currently taking place, the Libyan representatives in the RPM [People's Republic of Mozambique] stated that it is occurring in response to a decision arrived at by the Libyan People's Congresses that they were no longer necessary.

He said furthermore that, in relation to Tunisia, one of the countries whose workers are affected by the expulsion, the Libyan government had previously informed Tunisia and had proposed talks on the matter. Meanwhile, there has not as yet been any response.

9895

CSO: 3442/411

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

OIL REVENUE INCREASE--The Bahraini oil balance of payments continued to improve during the first 6 months of 1985, attaining a surplus of 103.5 million dinars [approximately \$275 million] compared to a surplus of 88.6 million dinars during the same period of 1984. [Summary] [Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 18 Sep 85 p 1 GF]

CSO: 4400/20

ISRAEL

PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE CONVENTION RESOLUTIONS'

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 25 Aug 85 p 2

[Text]

NAZARETH (Itim. - The first convention of the Progressive List for Peace movement ended yesterday with a call for the government to recognize the PLO as the exclusive and sole representative of the Palestinian people with whom peace talks must be conducted.

Some 250 delegates from 40 branches took part in the convention. At the congress' conclusion, representatives adopted a resolution declaring that the state of Israel belongs to all its citizens, Jews and Arabs alike. The participants also called for a continuation of the Jewish-Arab struggle against racism, facism and Kahanism.

In elections for secretary-general of the Arab section of the movement, Riah Abu al-Asal defeated Dr. Rashid Salim, one of the movement's founders. A 22 member central committee, including one woman, was also chosen.

CSO: 4400/11

ISRAEL

TEACHERS' SEMINARS ON JEWISH-ARAB COEXISTENCE BEGUN

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 31 Jul 85 p 9

[Article by Nili Mendler]

[Text] "I was shocked to hear teachers talk. They use students' positions as their defense. But they themselves have a problem with Arabs. The author expected a lot of openness. After all, we were invited by the schools. The first steps were met with tremendous resistance, i.e., with defense, with apologies. I did not feel welcome. I felt I could in no way change stereotypes and such extreme positions." Mira Wolf, a moderator in teachers' workshops, organized by the Institute for Education for Coexistence Between Arabs and Jews, recalls her experiences in some high schools. Her audience consists of 10 group leaders, 30-40 years old, among them the manager of the Institute, Gershon Baskin. All are really excited about the cause. They are sit around a large table, chain smoking, they tell of their experiences, they react, ask and support each other. These are the few people who took it upon themselves to do the impossible: to change teachers' political views and through them students' views. In other words, to change political trends through education.

The Institute, which in recent years was closed to reporters, allowed the author to participate in a 2-day closed seminar intended for Jewish group leaders. It was held a week before the report was published. One reason for the change in attitude -- financial trouble. Although the Institute cooperates with the Ministry of Education, conducts seminars for hundreds of teachers and students and prepares study material, the ministry does not support it. The Office of the Prime Minister finances its rent. The main activity is facilitated thanks to support by a German fund named after Hans Zeidel.

The resistance that the Institute encounters from many of the teachers is the same it arouses among large segments of the general public. A marginal, though symbolic, example: The small sign announcing the location of the Institute in a residential building on Ramban St in Jerusalem has been torn down by unknown persons five or six times. People at the Institute have not given up. They intend to put up a new sign. "We are not a leftist organization. We are a national institution. This institute was set up during the Likud administration," says Gershon Baskin. There are 20 more

voluntary organizations in the educational system. The most prominent among them is the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem.

At the beginning of the seminar Mira Wolf reads from her notes. She reads quotations from what she heard teachers say at workshops for coexistence in a vocational school in Hadera and in an academic high school in Netanya. All told, the Institute has to date visited eight high schools. In at least one of them the principal asked the Institute to conduct a workshop as a vehicle to pinpoint Kahane supporters among his staff. "I have nothing against Arabs and I have many Arab friends. The problem is my students," one teacher told Mira at a workshop. That teacher unwittingly exposed his views in the course of the workshop: "An Arab teacher alongside with me? I am not sure this makes me happy. But he could, I suppose, teach some subject...not literature or Bible." Later, in another context, that same teacher said: "My daughter will not study with an Arab teacher. There is a limit."

One teacher said at a workshop: "I don't think I can face my students and say I am opposed to Kahane. I am not for him, but he is right on some points." Gershon Baskin believes that only 1 percent of all teachers really are for education for coexistence between Arabs and Jews. There is no need to invest anything in them in order to change their views. But 30-50 percent of all teachers openly oppose the Institute. He says that the Institute intends to change that -- from within, from within the schools. It intends to start a p.r. campaign among whole educational staffs. Participants in the seminars point out that there is a lot of goodwill and openness among those teachers who come there on their own. The situation is different when Institute people arrive at schools and when teachers at a seminar are attending because they are told to do so by their principal or academic committee.

Living with Conflicts

As a challenge, the Institute, in cooperation with the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem, has published a booklet called: "At a Junction." Its main thrust is to expose conflicts and air them, first with teachers, then with students. The booklet, which is only part of a plan, is not intended to replace studies in citizenship, as it is not based on imparting knowledge. It consists mostly of questionnaires and socio-games intended to expose conflicts and point out prevalent ambivalent feelings, ignorance and confusion. Once students and teachers are shown that a large part of their opinions is based on ignorance or on ignoring the position of Arabs in Israel as an ethnic minority, the problem of Kahaneism can be confronted. In order for the booklet to be accepted even among those who identify with the right and also the religious segment of the population, the authors were careful to point out through the material they included that their basic outlook is that of a Zionist-Jewish state where the Arabs are a minority.

The group leaders struggle with the questionnaires. In one of them the teachers are requested to plan an Independence Day ceremony in a Jewish school, and a similar ceremony in an Arab school. The moderators recall the shock exhibited by Jewish teachers and principals when they find out that Independence Day is celebrated in Arab schools. Says 'Amalya Rubin, one of the group leaders: "A few days ago I met a principal from a West Bank school who

is interested in a workshop for coexistence. I ran this exercise of Independence Day with her. I asked her if she knew what could be done. We recapitulated the list: Alterman, Bab el-Wad, the flag at half mast, wreaths for the fallen. Then I told her: 'Now you are a principal in an Arab school. Not in a Galilee village, isolated from Jewish population, but in Haifa, a mixed city. At 11 am you hear the siren announcing the festivities. You cannot avoid it. What do you do in your school?' She responded: 'Nothing.' I asked her: 'You don't observe Independence Day, after all you are an Israeli!' She answered: 'Yes, maybe to point out that Arabs, too, had losses in the War of Independence.' She was dumbfounded. Then she said: 'It is very difficult. To tell you the truth, I don't know what to do.'

When 'Amalya Rubin told the principal that the workshop deals with relationships between Israeli Arabs and Jews the principal said: "There is no problem. It is actually easier." 'Amalya asked why. The answer was: "Israeli Arabs carry Israeli identity cards, it behooves us to teach equality as pertains to them. I would even be willing to demonstrate for them." 'Amalya persisted and asked: "The children you work with live on the West Bank" (the principal herself lives within the Green Line). She answered: "True, but we already have coexistence there. West Bank Arabs work in Israel. When they are thirsty the children bring them cold water. This is true coexistence."

The group leaders are divided into groups and they plan an Independence Day ceremony in an Arab school. Each team consists of an "Arab student," an "Arab school principal" and a "Jewish supervisor." As the ceremony is planned, the problems surface. The group leader who plays the part of the student usually asks difficult questions or refuses to take part in the ceremony. The Jewish supervisor is always careful to include national Jewish symbols, whereas the Arab principal is caught in the middle, trying to bridge the gap and mediate. He is afraid of both the student and the supervisor. He lacks backbone. He is subservient. One of the group leaders reads a passage written by an Arab educator, included in the booklet: "It drives me crazy to teach loyalty to the state. I am thought of as a traitor and when I stress the nationality of the students and I try to foster their pride, I am told I am a traitor."

Gershon Baskin says that up to recent years it was required to hold an Independence Day ceremony in the Arab sector. Today it is no longer required. According to him he does not know one Arab school which does not hold some sort of a ceremony on the day. One of the moderators, Tikva Levi, says she tried this exercise in a high school in Hadera. "There was a Kahane supporter there among the students. Very sophisticated. He planned the ceremony in an Arab school. He decided to hold a nationalistic Arab ceremony. The school memorial would be named after a slain PLO man, the flag would be the Palestinian flag. At the end I asked him: 'As a Jew, what would you have done to Arabs who held this kind of a ceremony?' He answered: 'I would expel them.'"

The Palestinian Flag in a Classroom

Gershon Baskin tells about a group of teachers that outsmarted him, when he held the exercise with them. They decided to divide the students into three

grops, in three parallel lines. Each group would wear clothes fo the same color. All told there would be three colors: black, red and green, the colors of the PLO flag. Baskin said: "The purpose of the exercies is not to solve the problem of Arabs who have to identify themselves with the state, but to make Jewish teachers and students aware of the fact that Arabs have a difficult time identifying." At the same time he admits that when he succeeds, the problem is not yet solved. Students tend to dismiss the difficulties by saying: "They can either identify or leave."

8646

CSO: 4423/86

ISRAEL

TRANSPORTATION MINISTER CORFU TALKS ON CURRENT ISSUES

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 20 Sep 85 p 8

[Text] TRANSPORT MINISTER Haim Corfu, like a politician in any party, can display selective vision when it comes to discerning the links between cause and effect.

"I see no connection whatsoever between the deeds and policies of Israelis in Judea and Samaria, and acts of terror carried out by Arabs there," he says.

Corfu says: "If the Arabs decide to perform terrorist acts, they will do so whatever Israelis do or don't do, because their terrorism is an expression of a political struggle which they want to wage. It is not a response to provocation." With events in Hebron leading the front pages daily, Corfu says the Arab attacks in the Judean town would probably have taken place even if the Kiryat Arba settlers had not tried to move into properties in the casba market area and other parts of old Hebron.

He says: "The Arab residents of Hebron are passive toward the Jewish presence. If the military government were to permit Jews to live in the house which they bought in the *suk*, their presence would have a calming psychological effect. Thanks to the small details of everyday life among neighbours, hate would be diluted and dissipated. And remember, things quiet down the moment the military government shows a tough policy towards the Arabs. In fact they are already quieting down."

The Jerusalem-born, seventh-generation sabra draws a confident comparison between the Arabs of Hebron and the Arabs of Jerusalem:

"In the Old City before 1948, Jews and Arabs not only lived next door to each other and ran businesses next to each other, they worked together. My father was partners with an Arab resident in a bakery. In the Arab *suk*, Arab stall-owners paid rent to Jewish landlords in many cases. What counts in coexistence is the pattern of behaviour and not the proximity."

To which he adds the cryptic remark: "In the past, as we saw in Jerusalem, neighbourly integration between Arab and Jew was at its most cordial, at a time when there were no such things as mixed marriages."

IF THE IDF's long presence in southern Lebanon interfered with its training programme, doesn't the intensified military presence in Judea and Samaria detract from training and preparedness, as well?

He rejects the suggestion outright.

"One of the tasks of our army is to keep order there. Law enforcement does not impair IDF training in the slightest. Nor does it detract from fighting capacity. The IDF can manage to do all the training it needs and also keep order in Judea and Samaria."

Corfu flies his pragmatic colours when it comes to future policy in Hebron. "Let's not create a problem out of a house in the casba when we don't need to," he suggests. "Why shouldn't Jews take over one single house? After all, the settlers are such idealists that they are ready to risk

their lives by living in a densely-populated Arab section. Let them. And I personally believe they will generate a good atmosphere in their vicinity."

And to prove the amity now prevailing between Arab Hebron and Jewish Kiryat Arba, he adds: "Most of the clients of Kiryat Arba lawyer Eliakim Ha'etzni (one of the vigorous advocates of the return to Old Hebron) happen to be Hebron Arabs."

Corfu says the reason Likud chief and Vice-Premier Yitzhak Shamir did not vote in the inner cabinet to let Jews take over all Jewish-owned or Jewish-purchased properties in Judea and Samaria was that Shamir sought to achieve the party's ends smoothly and without unnecessary provocation.

Corfu explained: "In order to make progress in settlement of Judea and Samaria, you have to think your policy out logically, and realize that provocation is counter-productive. You have to expand settlement without a fuss, in a calculated manner."

"If you like, it's the late Chaim Weizmann's traditional policy of buying a dunam here and a dunam there, until it all creates a pattern of reality. There's nothing to be ashamed of, even for a Herutnik, in commending one of Weizmann's tactics," he said.

CORFU HAS no patience for "politicians who shout themselves hoarse but do absolutely nothing."

It appears that he is directing his scorn at the leaders of the opposition Tehiya Party, until he adds: "We have our share of politicians who shout themselves hoarse in the cabinet, as well. Some ministers believe in the principle of 'I talk, therefore I am.' Of course, we have to talk inside the cabinet, but we're supposed to think about what we're talking about. But there are some who do most of their talking outside and precious little thinking anywhere."

While he advocates letting Kiryat Arba settlers live in the one house bought in the casba already, he said he has no time for what he calls the "cat-and-mouse-games which the settlers are playing with the army."

After the murder of an IDF soldier in the casba, a Likud spokesman pinned the responsibility for attacks on Jews on the Alignment.

"I would have been happier had the spokesman not made such a statement," he concedes, "because we could have done without it." However, he rejects the suggestion that the spokesman's statement constituted criminal incitement, saying, "We are all in the midst of a spiral of charges and counter-charges and it is too late to distinguish between them."

"The regrettable point is that the spiral erodes the credibility of the national unity government, which needs to project firm authority, effective management and a positive image," Corfu says.

"Apart from the awesome economic challenges, our next challenge is to alleviate the polarization of the nation into opposing camps."

"You can almost feel in the air how brother hates brother. And I am talking about masses of ordinary people, not the two leadership elites as in the 1940s. The nation is split," he says with a sigh.

CORFU REGRETS that the Likud did not insist that Shamir serve first as prime minister in the national unity government. Had Shamir been prime minister, he says, the Likud ministers would never have dreamed of attacking their Alignment colleagues the way Alignment ministers attack their Likud colleagues.

"Were Shamir prime minister today, the Histadrut would be behaving

much more circumspectly than it has been," he says. "The Histadrut wants to exploit Peres. It is aware of his weaknesses. It is aware of his sentimental, as well as his ideological, commitments and makes the most of them. The Histadrut knows Peres's political imperatives and his aspiration to be prime minister not only for these first two years of the national unity agreement."

"The Histadrut could never squeeze Shamir like it can and is squeezing Peres," he said.

Corfu says he thinks the Alignment will implement the agreement on rotation of the premiership next year, because "those are the realities of the situation and there is no alternative."

"From time to time, temptations crop up to explore options to the national unity government before the rotation date comes round. But none of those options is practical and none will work. That's why I'm ready to put my money on rotation.

"Peres's headaches are with his own colleagues more than with the Likud," he says, "if you look a little closer at what's going on."

Corfu firmly believes that no narrow-based coalition, headed by either Likud or the Alignment, could solve Israel's key problems.

"Narrow coalitions depend on the religious parties. These parties have years of experience sitting with the Alignment and years of experience sitting with the Likud. They won't want to fiddle around with political experiments. They will want above all to play it safe," he predicts.

WHAT ABOUT the challenge on the right? Polls show a rise in support for Tehiya and Kach—at the expense of Likud, whose support has dropped well below 30 Knesset seats, the polls show.

Corfu recalls that on the eve of the 1981 elections, he had told Likud maverick Geula Cohen that Tehiya had no chance of winning more than three seats.

"There was tremendous agitation over the withdrawal from Sinai. The polls gave Geula six or seven seats. They were at the peak of a

tremendous emotional and political wave. But what happened? What the voters wanted most was to keep the Alignment from regaining the power which it had lost in 1977. So they stood firmly behind the Likud and kept Tehiya on the sidelines.

"But in 1984, Tehiya went up to five seats, because the voters were despondent about the Likud's chances of holding on to the government, not because of their admiration for Tehiya. The Israeli voter is intelligent enough to weigh up the broader trends and chances.

"Today a lot of Likud supporters are angry with us because they see we are abetting the national unity government's policy of restricting settlement. They think the government should crack down much harder against terror. But when the election actually comes round, most of the traditional Likud sympathizers will come back to us," he says.

However, he admits he is worried about first-time voters backing Rabbi Meir Kahane's Kach faction.

Corfu says that, before and after the next election, he will call for the continuation of the national unity government.

"Neither the Likud nor the Alignment can possibly gain a serious edge over its opponent. Neither can afford to struggle along trying to glue a narrow coalition majority of 63 to 65 seats together with all the political cost. We are fated to swim together," Corfu predicts.

CORFU IS THE LAST of the Mohicans. Among Herut Party ministers in the Likud bloc, he is the only survivor of the Irgun Zvai Leumi which former prime minister Menachem Begin commanded.

Because he worked as an electrician's apprentice in his teens, Corfu put together many a mine and explosive device while serving in the Irgun in Jerusalem. He spent some five years in various British detention camps, and one of his fellow prisoners in East Africa was the then Lehi (Lohamei Herut Israel) leader Yitzhak Shamir.

In Herut, Corfu always symbolized the loyal, follow-the-leader mentality, remaining in the mainstream.

After Corfu first entered the Knesset 16 years ago, his former power base in the Jerusalem branch of Herut gradually slipped from his grasp. As a result, in each successive election, he has had to guarantee himself a respectably high place on the Likud list. He managed to pull the necessary strings because he argued, convincingly, that he was too busy keeping the Likud solid and party fortunes bright, to worry about making friends.

As long as Shamir remains top man in the Likud, Corfu need not worry. If Ariel Sharon or David Levy should replace Shamir, Corfu may be in deep trouble. His saviour may yet be Moshe Arens, who is the

favourite of mainstream party men like Corfu, to take over should Shamir step down – or have to do so.

Today Corfu, 64, is a placid and sober politician. But he was quite a scamp when he first entered the Knesset. He loved to dig up a scandal now and again. In 1974 he accused a cabinet minister (from the Alignment, of course) of using ministry money to buy an expensive wedding gift for the son of an MK. His charges were struck from the record after the plenum burst into pandemonium. The next year, he accused a minister of bribery and corruption.

Hurling charges of that sort is no problem behind the armour plate of parliamentary immunity, which he also made good use of to carry on needling Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek, in a campaign which he first launched while serving on the city council between 1967 and 1969.

But Corfu, like most other parliamentarians, settled down in time. Since he got his Cabinet portfolio in 1981, he has been the image of sagacity and consideration.

His efforts to stress consensus, and to obscure points of disagreement across party lines, have not earned him the nickname of "the Likud's Alignment-nik" for nothing.

A strange nickname, indeed, for the last Irgun member in the Cabinet!

CSO: 4400/13

ISRAEL

IDF INTERNAL REVIEW OF THE LEBANON WAR

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 5 Jun 85 pp 6-11

/Article by Alex Fishman: "The IDF" The Lessons of Lebanon"/

/Text/ Chapter 1: Fear of the Book of Lessons

Early in 1984, the General Staff was asked to present the IDF summary of lessons from the Lebanon war to the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee. The chief of staff, Gen Moshe Levi, asked staff officers to prepare for him a brief summarizing these lessons. The brief was, in fact, presented to the chief of staff, but it never reached the committee. Ultimately the committee got a brief overview of the lessons of the Lebanon war. But no one questioned their source, the facts on which they were based, nor the level of which they were drawn. No one on the committee questioned the whereabouts of this unique and only book summarizing these lessons, as approved by the General Staff and applicable to the entire army. Had this question been asked, the committee would have discovered...no such book exists! How could this have happened? Before solving the mystery of the IDF's book of lessons, let us pause to examine a basic and fundamental issue related to today's IDF, 3 years after the war. Not in vain did we open with the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee saga. Neither the pre-war nor the post-war IDF was held under any meaningful public scrutiny by any civilian body. The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, which is a legislative body, and the public institution known as the "State Comptroller," are nothing but a disgusting cover-up of inadequate civilian oversight of the defense apparatus. That legislative body supervising the defense apparatus has almost no authority whatsoever. It does not even have basic authority over its monetary expenditures. By definition, the committee's job is "listening and counseling."

In his latest report, published in April 1985, the State Comptroller wrote: "Some of the lessons drawn from the Peace for Galilee campaign concerning the training of ground forces were not properly implemented." What happened? The findings were made public and the subject was shelved. When State Comptroller Board members ask the General Staff whether and how the findings were implemented, they will get the same response that

was given to the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, because they lack authority and are unable to challenge the IDF's answers. Post-Lebanon war political developments worsened the problem of civilian oversight of the military. The relationship between Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin established game rules that preclude effective supervision by the prime minister and the cabinet of the military.

Three years have passed since the war started, and the IDF remains unchanged, despite the war's technical and tactical difficulties: the IDF draws its own conclusions and implements them with no external supervision.

The Lebanon War Is a Poor Example

The in-depth analysis of efforts the IDF made to learn from the Lebanon war reveals the army's belief that this war is not an example for future wars, that it open a new page and start from scratch, as if between 1982 and 1985 nothing had happened.

The conscious repression of everything related to those 3 war years and their implications for the army's future is prevalent in the IDF. The military leadership fails to understand that the Lebanon war was a true test of the IDF's comprehensive military ability, and the IDF did not succeed to the degree expected, given the huge post Yom Kippur war investments. Battlefield troop proportions predetermined certain military objectives, but these were only partially achieved at best. The war revealed a decided lack of coordination between the IDF's resources and means and its ability to activate them on the battlefield. Basic principles of war such as control, command, staff operations, and the decisionmaking process were tested during the Lebanon war. Also tested were basic military values such as morale, initiative, aggressiveness, values education and unconditional obedience, values which are unrelated to the political process that caused this war. These principles bear no relationship to Lebanon's topographic difficulties, compared to the IDF's classic battlefield conditions in the Middle East. But instead of analyzing why the set military objectives for the Lebanon war were not fully achieved, the IDF prefers to continue hiding behind the political failure: "The political leadership set war objectives and failures." The military leadership set war objectives, and did not realize them. But the failure at the political level does not justify the absence of truthful and thorough examination and analysis at the military level.

The Brutal Stage and the Elegant Stage

In order to properly implement the war's lessons and plot a course for the future, the army must display great openness. But in the past few years the IDF leadership has gone through two stages which have discouraged

this trait: "the brutal stage"--during which anyone who criticized the army was attacked and suppressed--this period characterizes Ari'el Sharon's defense ministry--and the pleasant or "elegant stage," during which debate and criticism were allowed, but anything at odds with the system's philosophy, or bound to make needless waves, was ignored.

At the beginning of the year, during senior field officers' training, the trainees expressed amazement at the new army spirit, allowing military freedom of expression in all realms. But those very same senior officers--overcome, no doubt, by the freedom of speech and independence of thought--forgot the fate of those independent opinions, and how they impact on decisionmaking. For example, a comprehensive and extremely critical research project on the structure of the army was prepared at the National Defense Academy. The officer in charge of this study, which was not well received by the IDF, is about to end his army service...

The State Comptroller wrote in his latest report: "The chief of staff's order that all lessons be brought to him for his approval complicated the approval and implementation process."

The Comptroller further stated: "The May 1983 summary of lessons, conclusions and recommendations prepared by the training department was not distributed since it was not properly cleared by the General Staff." The Comptroller further added that in August 1984 he was advised by the office of the assistant chief of staff's that the chief of staff had reviewed the issue in early August. But our investigation revealed that the summary report was simply concealed. This is why the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee was unable to review the summary, which was, in fact, the purpose of the cover-up.

The Critic Was Subordinate to the Examinee

We must ask: how does the IDF conduct training today? On what basis? What is the source of the lessons of the war?

Since the IDF is organized according to corps (the battlefield corps command was only established after the Lebanon war), every ground corps and branch (air and sea) appointed its own staff to examine its wartime performance. This system meant that from the start the examiners were accountable to those being examined and were subordinate to them. How was it honestly possible to expect an objective evaluation on the part of the examiner, when the subject was his own commander? Thus, it was inevitable that the lessons were oriented to tactics rather than to the decisionmaking process.

After the corps and branches collected the data, an internal decision was made as to which subjects would be probed generally. Further general meetings were conducted, during which each corps presented its operations

and lessons before the IDF's General Command... No corps was honestly able to define the basic issues it confronted in this war. Instead they presented their unit's operations, pinpointing difficulties encountered and the need for improvements.

In addition to the corps critique, staffs made up of senior officers were appointed, which examined central issues such as intelligence and combat systems, since scores of new systems were used for the first time during the Lebanon war. Even these staffs, however, were not mandated to fully present the main issues, which would probably have disclosed vulnerabilities in the IDF. Actually, according to the mandate given to these staffs, their role was that of onlookers, an addition to the corps' conclusions.

The range of lessons was not included in one volume, which would underscore the order of priorities and the main problems, and reconcile the various inter-corps contradictions, since each corps had a limited view of the problems. Thus, the IDF's present training is carried out, at least in part, on an intuitive basis. Furthermore, the IDF did not examine the battles waged around Beirut, or the creeping battles waged 2 weeks after the first ceasefire. The IDF did not check the general or Northern front command operations. Operations at the divisional level were not examined, and it was at the division level that most of the problems surfaced. The IDF did not investigate what happened in this war. At the most senior level, it investigated only what was convenient...

Chapter 2: Decline in the Quality of Command

From whatever angle we choose to examine the Lebanon war, the bottom line remains unchanged. Ultimately, the conclusion is extremely unpleasant, quite uncomplimentary, and far removed from the myths: The quality of the senior command is one of the striking and most worrisome weaknesses of the IDF. Most of the senior command above division rank lacked expertise, training, command resources, and command qualifications. This is the answer to the lack of coordination ("lack of correlation" is the more technical term) between the army's means and resources and the person in charge of implementing and supplying them.

Actually, a serious gap was created between the ability of the platoon to brigade rank field officers, and that of group leaders. Seemingly, the brigade commanders generally met the war's demands. But for the most part, the group leaders performed below expectations with a few exceptions. This is not new for the IDF; its roots were detected already in the Yom Kippur War, but not its seriousness, due to nature of the fighting during this critical period. The defensive battles waged at the onset of the Yom Kippur War dictated a certain kind of activity in which the battalion and brigade commanders played a major role. These commanders "counteracted incursions and closed the breaches." By contrast, the Lebanon war, which carefully preplanned and launched on a large scale, presented the opportunity to examine in detail the groundwork in preparation for the war, during the war, and after it ended.

Broadening Perspective

The secret of a battalion-level field commander's success is largely personality-related, but it depends first and foremost on routine and intensive battle technique drilling. Thus, as soon as the junior officer is assigned to platoon command, he carries out highly repetitive and frequent drills for years. The main variable in a field officer's functions are his broadening perspective as he ascends the line of command and his operational experience gained in the IDF's Middle East conditions. There is thus every chance that this officer will know his job. Certainly, the Israeli combat officer's relative advantages should be considered: independence, initiative, drive, and basic personal qualities. This combination has successfully withstood the military test.

Detailed Verification Process

But at the senior level, instead of combat techniques officers are occupied with multibranch, multi-corps, professional systems management which requires an ability to conceptualize and see two steps ahead, analyze and draw conclusions in uncertain conditions. The transition from the formation to the multi-branch unit implies going from brigade to division commander. At this point, the commander's training needs to be more specialized. Also, the inter-level verification process must be more detailed. The brigade commander is not necessarily the group leader candidate of choice.

The origin of the problem is rooted in the commander's initial training. In contrast with the norm in other armies, officer training in the IDF is concurrent with service. In Western armies, for instance, the same academic analyses of principles of war and battle theory are taught to all officers in an academic military setting as basic professional training. By contrast, the IDF approach is unsystematic, with training done in courses which some officers take, while others do not. A significant number of the IDF senior officers reach a high command level with no academic training, which is fundamental to independent study, broadening horizons and the ability to analyze abstractly. Presently, some commanders are lacking in military knowledge. When they reach leadership positions their deficiencies become critical.

Senior Officers' Academic Background

The State Comptroller's report further reveals that an April 1984 survey of the academic background of regular officers underscored the fact that only 29 percent of them held an undergraduate degree; 52 percent to 86 percent within the ranks of lieutenant colonel and major general were university graduates. These relatively high figures in the senior ranks are the result of the IDF's efforts of the last few years, prompted by an awareness of the importance of higher education. But the data also reveals that academic studies were carried out at a relatively late stage; among battalion commanders, only 28 percent had a full undergraduate education.

The situation is far more serious with regard to formal military education. In his latest report, the State Comptroller wrote: "A regimental commanders' background review reveals that many of them assumed their rank while on assignments that called for ranks higher than theirs, hence requiring more seniority than these men actually had. Of all regimental officers serving in field corps, 68 percent had not yet taken the regimental commanders' training course and 36 percent of all ground troop officers had not even undergone platoon commander course training. Of all field units platoon commanders, only 44 percent had taken the course. Only 57 percent of officers on assignments requiring the rank of major actually held this rank." These are only a few among the many examples of the IDF's poor officer training from the earliest stages on.

The results of this situation are seen in the higher echelons. The IDF's "gay fifties" period is over. Presently, the IDF is a frequently tested modern army, and the military is a profession in the fullest sense of the term.

Let us now turn to that is known as the IDF's "command approach." It teaches officers to advance at the head of their troops, in the front line, which is a positive element of leadership and performance. But when this practice becomes a habit, it is to the army's disadvantage, because senior commanders must be positioned advantageously to receive the most complete information coverage possible. They must be out of the epicenter of battle, and this is seldom the case in the front line, where the senior officer's position is such that he has no surveillance benefit from his elevated observation point.

The Initiative Belongs to Subordinates

But the IDF is still committed to the continuous defense command approach. The major general himself rides the first command car to reach the front line. During the Lebanon war the chief of staff personally commanded an anti-tank missile unit against Syrian T72 tanks. It so happened that a western front attack on the city of Tyre was commanded by an officer from Israeli territory. But the assistant chief of staff, and Chief of Staff Moshe Levi, who arrived on the spot, recommended that the operation's commander join his forces in Tyre. The man headed for Tyre, but was stuck for 12 hours on the jammed roads, thus losing command control over his troops. This approach contradicts the comprehensive war concept, according to which the initiative should be delegated to subordinates, while the commander sets the objectives.

During the battle for Sultan Ya'qub a battalion was stranded. This was first and foremost the brigade commander's responsibility. However, two unit commanders and the front commander himself were also involved. That front commander was in charge of scores of battalions involved in other efforts. But the commander chose to zero in on this battle aspect. Activation of large numbers of troops was carried out appropriately to the company and battalion command approach. The senior officer defined

the objective, the method and the timetable, and directly supervised the operation. At present this type of central command is practiced only by the Soviet Army and the Israel Defense Forces.

The psychological principle affecting senior officers during the Lebanon war was the "back to the womb" syndrome. These were, undoubtedly, good company and battalion commanders. This holds true as well for the senior officers who apparently yearned for their assignments of earlier years. But the brigade commander's qualitative and quantitative decisions are essentially different from the battalion commander's decisions. Also, the army's attitude toward the inter-branch field unit commander's responsibilities was as if it were a regular field command. How else can one explain the high turnover of commanders and the standard training?

The IDF launched the Lebanon war after an 8-year growth period, following the Yom Kippur War. Some of the brigades which served in the war were fairly young reserve units. the commanding officers' average assignment span was between 12 and 18 months. This unadvisable practice significantly reduces the officers' professional knowledge. A positive example of brigade command in the Lebanon war is that of the present chief of personnel, Maj Gen Amos Yaron, who commanded the al-Awwali landing and the Beirut area battles. Yaron acted as a director-general, who knew his job and the mosaic of inter-corps forces under his command.

Why Was the General Staff Almost Neutralized During the War?

We have not yet touched upon the General Staff's overall performance or that of the Northern Front command during the Lebanon war. This omission is intentional, since the army itself has not yet examined this issue. Even though there is on-going high-level General Staff training, it is carried out intuitively. No one ever questioned the General Staff's near neutralization in the course of the war. No one looked into the puzzle of how the Northern Command was split into two fronts, where the western and central fronts were managed by the Northern Front commander, but the eastern front was commanded by a general, out of the Northern Front commander's purview... Probing these issues might be irritating to some. This is, in all likelihood, the reason why no further investigations were conducted.

It is reasonable to ask: If the senior command level was unsatisfactory, why were not some of these senior officers replaced after the war? The reason for this is simple: Those who went through the war without major blunders got away with lesser mistakes.

The truth is hard to hide: The performance of the senior command set off a red light in the IDF. Even though the issue was not probed, the role it played in the IDF's command problems during the Lebanon war is unescapable. After the war, senior officer training and advanced sources were introduced for the first time. Sharpening intellectual analysis in live exercises as well as the officer's command approach

were emphasized in training. Senior IDF officers train more frequently and are tested constantly in war games. New training and advancement criteria have been established, but, even so, the parameters are not sufficiently defined, nor is the emphasis clear enough. The command choices are not clear cut to the degree of precluding past mistakes, which at the senior level can be disastrous.

Chapter 3: Technical and Tactical Lessons

Undoubtedly, the post-Lebanon war IDF is technically and tactically more mature and could serve an example to western armies. Battlefield experience and the ability to anticipate battlefield conditions provide an invaluable advantage to the IDF. All the theoretical knowledge of the future battlefield cannot replace experience. As already noted, in the area of land warfare the IDF was not innovative. However, all armies must confront reality in order to implement combat lessons. One of the most interesting issues that characterized the Lebanon war relates to the air force, whose battle accomplishments and destruction of the ground-to-air missile batteries were among the war's clearest and most decisive achievements. Another facet of this success that went unnoticed was the well-endowed air force's contribution to land victories. The Lebanon war underscored a well-known factor: The existing cooperation between air and land forces needs to be changed, because it is ill-suited to the requirements of the modern battlefield. During the Lebanon war the air force's contributions to ground troop positions did not match the huge sums Israel has invested in it. The air force was well prepared for war in terms of maintaining clear skies and destroying lethal anti-aircraft missiles. But it was unprepared to reinforce ground troops much in the same way that the IDF's battle strategy failed to reinforce ground troops. The air force's concept in the Lebanon war was outdated.

The emergency of SA6, 8, and 9 mobile anti-aircraft missiles added a new dimension to modern air warfare. There no longer is such a thing as an area clear of missiles, which limits the use of aircraft to support ground forces. The Lebanon war's disadvantages in the area of ground force support were learned, and the IDF has strengthened the coordination channels between air and ground forces. It is instituting the concept of "ground support" and coordination, which requires also a mental and conceptual change on the part of ground commanders.

The IDF was not innovative in the area of inter-corps field unit integration during the Lebanon war. When many elite and highly specialized units are available, the optimal utilization of these forces depends on the commanding officer's abilities.

Again, the IDF learned the proper balance of armored and infantry troops from hard experience. It seems that the existing distribution does not satisfy mountainous battlefield requirements. The army's answer to this is an increase in infantry participation, which actually began after the Yom Kippur War.

Too Much Information and Lack of Intelligence

Looking at the infantry corps, it is clear (this was also the impression of soldiers revealed during post war survey) that greater emphasis must be placed on house to house fighting over open field and classical enemy combat approaches.

The Lebanon war exposed another widespread flaw in modern warfare: Field commanders have an information surplus but also an intelligence deficiency. "Information" is the result of continuous data collection. The data collection process is very sophisticated but sometimes irrelevant. "Intelligence," on the other hand, refers to information analysis. The field intelligence system in the Lebanon war was very awkward. Information was not always received in the right place at the right time, and did not always enable commanders to make the right decisions.

In this area there are two possible lessons to be sought. At the organizational level, the information needs to be dispatched to the right place, and the irrelevant information efficiently sifted out. At the professional level of research on the ground, it is necessary to be able to obtain battlefield intelligence oneself, to know what is happening under your nose. This last issue was a problem during the Lebanon war, not because the commanders lacked the means, but because they did not know how to take full advantage of the means available. This is one of the real reasons why the IDF rarely operated at night during the Lebanon war. This might also explain the higher than normal number of requests to the senior command for timetable changes or operation scrubblings. It is very difficult to wage war blindfolded.

Electronic Warfare: The Gap is Narrowing

This subject is crucial in any discussion of technical and tactical lessons learned during the war. It emphasizes the narrowing of the IDF's advantage post-war over its potential adversaries. The IDF's use of electronic warfare emphasized this medium's importance to the enemy. Massive purchases sophisticated systems compensate for high quality personnel.

In view of all this, the IDF must operate within a new post-war command framework: The Field Command Corps must operate under less convenient conditions than those prevailing before the war. Substantial defense budget cuts have reduced reserve unit training. Training is crucial in the implementation of lessons, as well as in the purchase and development of more sophisticated and effective systems. What is required is the reordering of priorities in allocating resources for army training.

The IDF has made no significant or basic changes in its battle approach. The General Staff believes that the Lebanon war highlighted operational rather than approach deficiencies, this despite the budget constraints

compelling the IDF to operate on a more reduced overall scale, but providing the same degree of security. Whatever the case might be, the crucial post-Lebanon war question for the IDF is: Will the IDF of the future remain unaffected by the Lebanon war? The answer to this lies in the effect the war may have had on the soldiers themselves.

Chapter 4: The Frequency of Wars and Their Ill Effects

"A country that wages war every 15 years will exhaust its capabilities more rapidly than a country that wages war every 30 years. Man does not become apathetic in war. For example, a unit formerly stationed in Lebanon that is sent back there might reveal if it is able to function as it did during the first week of the war. In essence, people do not become immune to war, even though it is waged this often."

What happened to the IDF's human factor after these 3 years of involvement in Lebanon? How did the war affect the soldiers' attitude toward the military and their commanders? How unshaken is the confidence they have in their comrades? How unshaken is their morale and motivation? All these questions may be summarized as follows: If the IDF were under threat today, would it respond with the same norms that motivated the recruits to join the battle when commanded to do so?

There is no scientific answer to this fundamental question, simply because the issue was not probed by the General Staff. However, there is a widespread attitude in the military toward the war, on the basis of which this question may be speculatively answered.

A very general survey conducted last year probing the mood of upcoming recruits 17-year olds revealed that the motivation to join combat and volunteer units had not decreased. Fifty percent of the sampled youngsters' attitudes toward military service had not been affected by the Lebanon war; 25 percent were positively influenced by the war and 25 percent of the sampled 17-year olds claimed that the war influenced their motivation to join a combat or volunteer unit.

Who Was Most Adversely Influenced?

The analysis of this data reveals substantial population differences among those who claimed the war affected their attitudes positively and those who claim the war affected their attitudes adversely. It appears that the war most adversely shaped attitudes among the more educated, working class, while it positively affected youngsters in development towns. The increased motivation to join combat units, even following a war was not so successful, is well-known. Thus, after the Yom Kippur War, when youngsters were asked the above stated question, 50 percent stated that the war did not change their position, 40 percent claimed the war increased their motivation to join combat units, and only approximately 7 percent of the same said the war had affected them adversely. Thus, by comparison, motivation was adversely affected by the Lebanon war.

When questioned about the possibility of a volunteer army, there was a decrease in positive response. It is difficult to determine whether this effect is temporary or permanent, or whether it was a result of the Lebanon war. Actually, when these youngsters joined the army, there was no decline in the number of volunteers. There were temporary marginal changes only, but no more than that.

Increase in Reservist Desertions

An analysis of reservists' attitudes toward the war and its influence on their future opinions is less reliable, mainly for technical reasons. But, seemingly, some basic social norms were disrupted. Desertion, which had been rare, increased. This increase was not immediate but appeared during the stay in Lebanon. Together with this, there was an increase in attempts to evade military service and a rise in authorized absences; but these occurrences did not prove overly disruptive, even though they did project a negative image. One explanation for these occurrences is based on the theory that two forces act upon soldiers at war: fear and social pressure. During the Lebanon war fear was no greater than during the Yom Kippur War. Anyone in Lebanon knew that the dangers projected by the media were exaggerated. But this was not a heroic war, and the message from the home front was: "Leave Lebanon safely and as quickly as possible..."

In a war such as this one, appeals to the Students' Military Service Deferment Committee, thus far considered unjustified and evasive, were legitimized. Citizens who had in the past volunteered for reserve service, in spite of the difficulties, ceased to do so. The long-range impact is unknown, but it will depend on society's and the military's influence.

The Lebanon war reserves' morale did not differ from that of the Yom Kippur reservists. Morale was very high during the war, and fell somewhat during the attrition period, ultimately entering a period of improvement. This is a typical war time pattern. In spite of their low ranking, most reservists appeared for duty and performed as expected.

Burnout

A 1984 survey of soldiers in compulsory service, revealed no significant differences in terms of their willingness to serve and morale, when compared with a 1981 survey. In the 1984 survey there were minor variables in service satisfaction and morale. The soldiers expressed general satisfaction with their unit commanders, even though they claimed they were not trained for some of the situations they encountered in Lebanon. Some of the data indicated that the soldiers in Lebanon were suffering from burnout. Interestingly, the compulsory service soldiers' willingness to participate in advanced training was low. However,

after the war, they experienced increased pride in their units and less alienation. The refusal to serve in the military for political reasons is almost non-existent among the enlisted.

Tension in the Ranks

Eyal, a tank battalion commander during the Lebanon war, and presently a senior commander with this corps, confirms the researchers' findings: "On the eve of the war, we were stationed on the Golan Heights. That night we saw katyushas exploding over Qiryat Shemona. I could sense the soldiers were very tense. They were ready and thoroughly convinced of the need to fight. This is a high-spirited, well trained and well commanded battalion. During the war, quite a few of this battalion soldiers were wounded, and two company officers were killed. This required overhauling the battalion.

"Retrospectively, I am convinced that the battalion--after completing training and fighting in the war--is better than it was before the war. The soldiers are better trained and have a greater self-awareness. When these soldiers are given orders, one can see in their eyes that they understand these orders and will perform exactly as told, because they are experienced.

"The battalion's abilities were questioned months after the battle had ended. The answers have a double implication: Much was learned about activating varied forces in various battle modes, including anti-terrorist actions. On the other hand, the tank soldier's regular training schedule was ignored. The difficulty of maintaining an orderly daily training agenda is primarily mental and not always justified. This mentality is self-imposed by the not always justified need to maintain a war footing."

Eyal said about the reservists, particularly in elite units, who served under his command: "I knew the reservists under my command because I saw them on television demonstrating in front of Begin's house. The following day they were in the army under my command, and caused me no difficulty. They were well-motivated and performed well. In units where the number of people that showed up was relatively low, their commanders must be immediately reviewed. Only in this way will it be possible to predict which units will have problems and which units will operate smoothly."

Revealing the Truth

As a member of a military organization that did not emerge victorious, Eyal clearly differentiates between units which achieved their objectives --in the best possible means--and the opinions of the war's senior commanders. Eyal admits that the unsuccessful feeling within the organization makes him uncomfortable. This feeling prompts him to examine the causes underlying this situation. "In principle, the soldier must be presented with the truth, regardless of his feelings, because soldiers cannot be deceived."

In a survey conducted last year, civilians were asked two basic questions regarding their confidence in the military's ability, and their confidence in senior officers' decisions. This was a long-term study. Up to about 9 months ago, the answers revealed very high civilian confidence in the commanding officers and in the ability of the military to perform. But, since then, civilian confidence in senior officers' decisions has decreased.

In spite of all that has been said, it appears that Israelis have confidence in the IDF and its commanders. Civilians consider the war a catastrophe linked to the political leadership. But it seems as though people tend to project their dissatisfaction in life to their view of the army.

Yet it should be remembered that in the past few years, the civilian perception of the military profession has deteriorated, with no direct connection to the Lebanon war. An article published in the weekly KOTERET RASHIT quoting research on this subject states that Hebrew University's Barukh Kimmerling found that in 1969 the military was ranked second among professions in terms of prestige in Israel. Seven years later Vered Krauss found that a colonel ranked 15th on the prestige scale, while a major ranked 38th on that same scale.

An internal military survey, seeking to determine the prestige given by society to the military revealed that only 15 percent of the non-commissioned officers and 30 percent of the commissioned officers viewed the military as "very prestigious" or "highly prestigious." This attitude does not promote volunteering for the regular army and clearly explains the social attitude that prevailed during the Lebanon war concerning reserve duty evasion.

A summary of all the data from the various surveys does not seem to indicate serious inconsistencies in attitudes toward the IDF. There are some trends which should be watched. But when we question the IDF's readiness 3 years after the war, it is clear that in a true emergency, the IDF--both regular soldiers and reservists--would muster its forces, as it did during the Yom Kippur War.

9565

CSO: 4423/68

ISRAEL

INCREASE IN EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICA NOTED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 31 Jul 85 p 10

[Text] Exports to Latin America increased in the first 6 months of 1985 by 56 percent and reached \$56.6 million, compared with \$36.1 million in the same period in 1984. Of that, exports to Brazil were \$11.3 million in January-June 85, compared with \$8.5 in the same period last year.

Mr Yehuda 'Atzmoni, who is in charge of commerce with Latin America in the Ministry of Commerce, said that the potential of exports to Latin America, and especially to Brazil, is enormous, especially because Israel enjoys a special status in Brazil and there are hardly any difficulties in obtaining import licenses from Israel, when it comes to goods on which there is no import restriction in Brazil.

According to 'Atzmoni there is not enough awareness among exporters in Israel of the potential market in Brazil. This potential was ratified in a memorandum of understanding signed by the two countries in late 84. Therefore he recommends that exporters reexamine the potentials they have in this market.

Exporters who are interested in information about import regulations in Brazil can obtain such in the Center for Market Research of the Office for External Commerce in Tel-Aviv.

8646

CSO: 4423/86

ISRAEL

IMPACT OF DEFENSE CUTS ON UNEMPLOYMENT

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Sep 85 p 6

[Article by Macabee Dean]

[Text] TEL AVIV. — Procurement cut-backs by the Israel Defence Forces are jeopardizing the jobs of 8,200 persons employed in various industries, such as Rafael, the military industries and Israel Aircraft Industries, it is learned from highly-placed sources in the Defence Ministry. This is about 10% of all the people employed by these industries.

However, since there is expected to be an increase of about 20% in exports from these industries during the next 12 months, many of these 8,200 will not lose their jobs. The export orders will probably be concentrated in a few industries, and thus some companies may face severe manpower reductions; others none at all.

In addition, a reduction in construction by the Defence Ministry will jeopardize the jobs of another 2,100 building workers. The IDF is also cutting back its own personnel by about 3,000 persons, it is learned. (Some of these are civilians.)

All these steps are being taken in line with the reduction of expenditures throughout the country: other economies concern the type of food served (less meat), clothing allowances, amalgamating some units and reducing the manpower in others.

All in all, these steps should cut expenditures by about \$660 million in the current year. Of this amount, \$330m. will be a direct cut, while

another \$330m. will be achieved by "absorbing" rising costs in various fields.

It was pointed out that "although there may be some fat left in the security set-up, it was a very thin layer." Any further cuts could be detrimental to the country's security, it was said, especially since the Syrian armed forces today were stronger than both the Syrian and Egyptian armies combined on the eve of the Yom Kippur War. But this did not tell the entire story, for "adjustments" would have to be made in the light of future developments in the Middle East, such as an end to the war between Iran and Iraq.

Defence Ministry sources pointed out that local security expenditures (as distinct from foreign help) constituted only 14% to 15% of the Gross National Product, a percentage which had not changed in many years. Therefore, there was no reason for anyone to believe, as many did, that the security burden prevented the GNP from growing.

In addition to local security expenditures, which were some \$2,600m. in the current year, the country would receive \$1,400m. in American help this year, which would rise to \$1,700m. in 1986, and to \$1,800m. in 1987.

However, the current local security budget included some \$150m. from the \$1,400m. in U.S. help, since this \$150m. could be spent in shekels in Israel. Nor did these sums

include another \$250m. last year (and another \$250m. this year), which the Americans had earmarked for the prototype of the Lavi fighter plane.

The Defence Ministry tried its best to place its U.S. orders financed with American aid with companies which would subcontract part of the order with Israeli companies. But this was not always possible, although the American aid grants included such a requirement. In all, Israelis should have been able to pick up in the past years about \$2,000m. in such subcontracting orders. But often the Americans delayed placing orders, since they were not interested in exporting American jobs to Israel. Thus, only \$800m.-\$900m. worth of such subcontracting orders had been awarded locally during all the past years, and of this, only about \$150m. in orders was now being filled.

As a way of increasing its financial resources, the Defence ministry is now interested in selling shares in its companies, although control will remain with the ministry. At present, Elta is preparing to fit into this category, and it is possible that other companies, perhaps even Israel Aircraft Industries (a government company), will follow suit.

As for the future of Beit Shemesh Engines, the government will try to sell part of the company to cover its pressing debts (it will soon operate in the black due to its arrangement with Pratt & Whitney.) This was preferable, it was said, to putting the company in receivership, or having the government pay off its outstanding debts.

CSO: 4400/11

ISRAEL

IDF ENGINEERING CORPS CHIEF INTERVIEWED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 22 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Yitzhak Oked]

[Text]

A fortified position on the northern border that was recently built by the IDF's Engineering Corps using materials salvaged from positions built during Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Talking to reporters to mark Engineering Corps Day today, the corps commander said both Israel and Syria were busy fortifying the Golan frontier. The Engineering Corps yesterday unveiled a remote control robot for defusing explosive devices. Made in Ireland, the robot is capable of traversing rough terrain and working in difficult conditions such as mine-fields.
(IDF spokesman)

Whoever chose grey berets for the Engineering Corps must have seen its significance - an unglamorous colour for the corps doing a tough job with little glory.

But members of the corps are not completely unsung heroes. They are being honoured in ceremonies today marking Engineering Corps Day.

Corps chief Tat-Aluf (brigadier-general) Yehuda Cohen cites the Suez crossing during the Yom Kippur War as an example of the corps' image problem.

Everyone agrees this was the turning point of the war and many people have taken or received credit for the crossing. Little credit went to those Engineer Corps soldiers who prepared the bridges while under heavy fire.

Wars since ancient times have been governed by two elements, explains Cohen, movement and firepower. "Our job in the Engineering Corps is to ensure that the enemy has as tough a job as possible and that he pays a high price if he tries to move fast. There is no secret that our enemy is trying to do the

same to us. The longer we slow down the enemy, the longer we can disrupt his plans."

Turkish-born Cohen, 47, has lived in Israel since 1949. He has been in the Engineering Corps since joining the IDF in 1957. He started as a private and sapper and rose through the ranks, performing nearly all the jobs done by the corps. He studied with Britain's Royal Engineers and completed his engineering studies at the Technion.

Cohen is very proud of the corps, saying its soldiers perform a wider range of tasks than any combat soldiers. They deal with a variety of mines and explosives, and build bridges and other structures.

According to Cohen, corps members are top soldiers, because they undergo the same combat training as others do, in addition to special training for the corps. The same holds true for its officers, who participate in infantry courses and several months of tough training in Engineering Corps courses.

He explains that his soldiers need

intensive training because they are always at the head of advancing columns and sometimes are the first to come in contact with the enemy. Sappers usually decide how fast the columns move, he said. If they are stuck trying to clear a minefield, the whole column is stuck.

He breaks into a smile and taps his head, saying "This is where the nerves of the sapper are really tested. Sometimes under heavy fire from the enemy he has to clear a minefield, and on top of that trying to quiet a hysterical officer who wants the mines cleared faster."

The development of the corps was more difficult than some of the other forces in the IDF, Cohen says. "We did not have anyone from whom to learn.

"The western countries since WWII have not done much in the field of breaching equipment or counter-obstacle equipment. They did not feel this field was important.

Because of this, we had to do everything by ourselves. So today most of the equipment used in the Engineering Corps was developed here."

Questioned how the present cuts in the budget would effect the corps, Cohen answered: "We are already feeling the crunch and will feel it even more in the future. We have developed some new equipment at considerable cost. I'm very afraid that when the time comes to turn it from a development project into a mass production item, there simply will not be a budget for it and that will be a pity.

"We are cutting down on training, even using a simulator instead of having our soldiers work on live projects. But every soldier who has ever dismantled a live mine and put it back together again will tell you that there is a hell of a lot of difference between doing this on a live one and on a dummy."

What about parents of soldiers in the Engineering Corps who get grey hair and have sleepless nights just thinking about the job their sons to?

The officer knocks on the wooden desk. "Touch wood, we have one of the lowest accident rates in the IDF. Some say our soldiers are *yoramim*, or square. I say no; we train our soldiers to be disciplined as soldiers are suppose to be.

"We tell them in very simple language that in the Engineering Corps they simply do not have much leeway for mistakes. A mistake here is fatal. But if they work according to the book and regulations, nothing will go wrong.

"Now I'm going to tell you something that will sound contradictory. At a later stage in their training, mainly in officers' training course for the Engineering Corps, we also train them where and under what conditions we allow improvisation.

Cohen says it is not easy to attract young people to the corps because it can only accept youngsters with higher physical and mental profiles.

"We are competing here with all the elite units," he says. "I'm at least pleased that we seem to have a steady level through the years, in which about 30 to 40 per cent of the youngsters volunteer for the corps. Most of the others who join, and are not so keen in joining at first, usually remain with us.

Asked if corps members who drive the big tractors are less qualified than sappers, he snaps, "No!"

"These tractor drivers – and I'm talking now about drivers with the advancing units and not those working at the rear – have to be of the same bread as our sappers – clever and with nerves of steel. They sometimes have to lead the column before the tanks. These boys have to break through the enemy lines sometimes when everyone is under pressure and to be as composed as possible.

"One tractor driver was commended in the Lebanon war, because, under heavy enemy fire, he managed to push a burning tank that was blocking an entire column from a bridge. He did it in a very cool way despite all the obstacles. This is what we demand and expect from these drivers. In our eyes they are soldiers of the same quality as our sappers."

ISRAEL

IDF TRAINING CHIEF INTERVIEWED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 20 Sep 85 p 7

[Text] THE COUNTRY'S economic difficulties have forced the Israel Defence Forces to reduce its manpower and materiel and this has necessitated an adjustment in overall strategic thinking, the man in charge of the IDF's training and doctrine Aluf (Maj.-Gen.) Yosef Peled, told *The Jerusalem Post* in an interview.

The reduction in forces has brought Israel to a situation comparable with that which prevailed before the Six Day War, when the borders were closer to the main population centres. The defensive posture was based on quick response and included strategic concepts such as initiated wars and pre-emptive strikes, says Peled.

The cuts in the defence budget have been deep and widespread, and have severely affected training and resources and reduced the number of men under arms. The IDF now has to work with a shorter fuse, says the general.

"What do I mean by 'short fuse'?" A large regular army allows the State of Israel more time and room to maneuver to make the decision to call up the reserves. If there is an exercise on the other side of the border, this does not immediately necessitate calling up the reserves. A large regular army can deal with immediate threats. If the regular army gets smaller your room for maneuver is reduced. Every case of border tension means you have to call up units."

However, says Peled, there was no alternative to reducing the forces, and the IDF had to face up to the problem. If, because of economic considerations, the army had to cut its forces, this had to be accompanied by a comprehensive defence strategy.

On the eve of the Six Day War, Israel's borders were narrow, and the army was small. It was determined at the time that enemy concentrations on the border would be unacceptable. The war extended the borders and removed the threat of enemy armies in terms of the centre of the country. The army also grew in size. Defence conceptions changed, becoming much more offence-orientated than prior to 1967. The reduction in the strength of the IDF is bringing it back to a defensive way of thinking, and it might now have less forbearance to dodge a war, said Peled.

TURNING to Syria, the general says the IDF's main objective is deterrence. It is clear that the dominant military threat to Israel today comes from the direction of Syria. The Syrians hope to be able to confront Israel by themselves. "In my opinion they are far from being able to achieve this," he says. "Our central objective is to deter the Syrians from believing that they are capable of confronting us."

"We must, however, take into account the possibility that our read-

ing of the situation is different from theirs, and they could labour under the illusion that they are capable of taking us on. The IDF has the answers, if they were to make such a mistake."

Asked about South Lebanon, Peled says that the security zone is proving itself. He had not thought, prior to the IDF withdrawal in June, that the situation in the south would be as good as it is. Without ignoring the problems, "firing here and firing there," *in toto* the great achievement is that Israel is no longer involved in Lebanon, he says, adding that Israel was now not in Lebanon more than it had been prior to the outbreak of the war in June 1982.

The exit from Lebanon has allowed the army to deal with its primary missions; to train, to organize and to prepare for war.

Paradoxically, Peled says, he could see something positive in the reduction of forces due to budget cuts: it might lead to a raising of standards in the army.

He thought that difficulties and shrinkage might challenge the resourcefulness of the IDF and result in improved quality.

It had to be stressed, however, that the budget cuts were severe and continuing. The process started in 1979. This year's budget was cut after already having been approved because of continuing problems in Israel's economy.

"We cannot ignore the economic situation in which the state finds itself. We are part of the state, and we must contribute our part, together with all other sectors, to deal with our economic difficulties.

"But one must understand the implications of cutting the defence budget."

WHAT ABOUT "red lines?" Peled is asked. Most senior army officers talk about the danger of sinking below a certain level. "Everyone has his own red line," responds Peled. The IDF should in fact attempt to set an objective criterion of combat fitness. For example, if a tank crew trains less than a certain amount of engine hours and fires less than a

certain amount of shells, then it should not be considered fit for combat.

Such criteria have not yet been set, says the general, "but with the vast experience that some of us have in the matter, the feeling is not good."

What is the IDF's Training and Doctrine Branch?

This is a branch of the general staff as in other armies. However, in the IDF it still retains the anomalous designation "department" rather than "branch" (such as logistics, planning, etc.). It is the only "department in the IDF headed by an aluf (maj.-gen.). It is in fact operated like a branch of the general staff and its head is directly responsible to the deputy chief of the general staff and the chief of the general staff.

The branch is charged with formulating the army's combat doctrine.

The branch works out doctrines dealing with the interaction of the various arms of the IDF; combined land-air-sea operations; operation of all the senior commands; development of training theory; and training aids such as teaching with computers.

All large-scale exercises are the responsibility of the branch, as are the IDF's top-level colleges, such as the National Defence College and the Command and Staff College.

Within the branch there are sections such as history, which collects and documents the IDF's historical material. The IDF's publishing section, *Ma'arachot*, comes under the purview of the branch, which is also responsible for the physical fitness of soldiers.

With the establishment of the Ground Forces Command, some of the responsibilities of the Training Branch were reduced and some of its functions transferred to the GFC.

Asked whether the branch had anything to do with training soldiers to handle civilians in the administered territories, Peled replies in the negative, saying that this is handled by the units in the field. He stresses, however, that the soldiers have to be properly briefed and prepared for this kind of work.

YOSEF PELED was born in 1941 in Belgium during the Nazi occupation. His parents were deported to a concentration camp, where his father was murdered.

He was saved by a Christian family, which raised him until he was six. His mother survived the Nazi camps, and he was reunited with her after the war. In 1948 they arrived in Israel, and Yosef was raised and educated at Kibbutz Negba.

He enlisted in the IDF in 1960 and served in the Armoured Corps. During the Six Day War he fought as a 7th Brigade company commander in Sinai. During the war of Attrition prior to the Yom Kippur War, he commanded a tank battalion in Sinai. In the 1973 war he fought as a brigade commander under Aluf Moshe Peled against the Syrians on the Golan Heights.

During the Lebanon War, he commanded a force, known as "Yossi Force" (named after him). This formation, comprising Merkava tanks, paratroopers and anti-tank units, wiped out many of the Syrian Army's latest tanks, the T-72.

He has also served as operations officer at Armoured Corps headquarters, commander of a central training base in the south, commander of a reserve division, commander of a regular army division and deputy commander of the National Defence College. A graduate of the IDF's Command and Staff College and Britain's Royal College of Defence Studies, he has a B.A. in history from the University of Tel Aviv.

He is married and the father of two sons.

CSO: 4400/13

ISRAEL

COMMENTARY ON INCOME INEQUALITY

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 13 Sep 85 p 9

[Article by Yosef Goell]

[Text] GOLDA MEIR was fond of repeating a story from her early years in Palestine. When she had worked herself up to the position of secretary-general of the all-powerful Tel Aviv Labour Council by the early '40s, her take-home pay was significantly less than that of the Yemenite doorman.

The reason was that both were paid according to an egalitarian Histadrut pay scale, and while she had only two children the doorman had eight. Therefore, he was paid much more than she was.

It was a true story. There had been an extremely egalitarian wage scale for Histadrut employees until the mid-'50s, but it was unrepresentative of the broader Jewish *yishuv* even for the '30s. Still, that *yishuv*, and the Israel that succeeded it, were among the most egalitarian societies in the West up to the late '60s.

It was partly a result of the dominant socialist ideology of the times, partly a reflection of an immigrant society *par excellence* that was just starting off, and partly a factor of a relatively poor economy which did not have that much to distribute or to be ripped off by the more rapacious elements in society.

Last week, the Centre for Social Policy Studies in Israel published the findings of a study which showed that income distribution in Israel for 1979/80 was one of the least equitable in the industrialized Western World.

Studies of income distribution are usually carried out by dividing the given population into tenths, or deciles. In the case of the present study, the population was divided into deciles of family units rather than by individual earners.

The main findings showed that the top decile of families – the richest 10 per cent – earned 35 per cent of all reported income, net after taxes. The gross figure was 40 per cent. By comparison, the 30 per cent of the families in the three bottom deciles earned only 4 per cent of all net income.

EVEN MORE extreme was a more finely-tuned finding: The top 1 per cent earned 12 per cent of total net income, which was only slightly less than the 14.7 per cent total net earnings of half the population – the lowest five deciles.

For comparative statistical purposes, the income of the different deciles can be plotted on a curve and the rate of inequality of income distribution measured by what is called the Gini Coefficient, ranging from 0 to 1, with 0 signifying a state of total equality and 1 of total inequality.

The Gini Coefficient of income distribution in Israel for the 1970/80 study stood at 0.49. The comparative Gini Coefficient reading for the U.S. was 0.46, meaning a somewhat more equal distribution of income, than that which held in Israel. The inequality index for Israel in the 1971 study was 0.334.

It should be stressed that the findings for Israel distort the true situation in the direction of a false equality. They do not take into account income from wealth. Nor do they factor in income which evaded taxation.

There was a similar study conducted in 1971 based on findings for 1968-69 (the chairman of the commission that conducted that earlier study was the former governor of the Bank of Israel, the late David Horowitz, and among its members was the present Histadrut Secretary-General Yisrael Kessar, representing the Histadrut).

The comparable findings for 1968/69 were that the top decile accounted for 24.4 per cent of all net income (1979/80 - 35 per cent) while the lowest five deciles earned 27 per cent (15 per cent, 11 years later). The lowest three deciles earned 12.4 per cent (4 per cent in 79/80). The poorest 10 per cent earned 2.6 per cent of total net income in 1968/69 (0.2 per cent in 79/80).

So much for statistics. Israel, however, is such a small and intimate

country that they do not come so much as a shock but as corroboration of what one would have suspected from watching the profligate consumption of the Israelis at the top of the pile especially during the past year or so of economic belt-tightening.

And one should remember that the latest figures are for the years 1979/80. There is every reason to believe that income inequality - and especially the proportion of total net income accruing to the top decile - has grown by leaps and bounds during the last five years of high triple-digit inflation and of mad killings on the Las Vegas on the Yarkon stock exchange.

Lip-service has always been paid in Israel to the principle of relative income equality and of keeping the gap between top, middle and bottom as small as possible. In truth, during the '70s, great efforts were made to supplement the incomes of families in the bottom two deciles. But nearly no effort was ever made to keep down the earnings of the families at the top.

One could jump to the conclusion that the growth in income inequality was the fault of the Likud, which entrusted the economy to the hands of *laissez-faire* capitalist ideologues of its Liberal wing after it came to power in 1977.

But this would be only a partial truth. The Labour Party's late Pinhas Sapir had already created the country's first millionaires in the 1960s. And he and the late Yehoshua Rabinovich presided over the early stages of the breakdown of the income tax apparatus as an equalizing factor.

AS WAS THE CASE in many other areas, the Likud, when it came to power, took over a system that was in the early stages of deterioration and proceeded to run it into the ground.

The conscious political decisions which made hyper-inflation possible and which opted for living with it rather than fighting it, were a major boon to income inequality. As was the determined opposition both by Likud and by Labour politicians to the imposition of any capital gains tax on income from wealth which has not even been factored into the latest figures on income inequality.

Even when major elements in the economy blew up - as in the case of the bank shares collapse of October 1983 - the supposedly *laissez-faire* Likud government, with the wholehearted collusion of Labour, took extreme measures to bail out the holders of the bank shares. The impression was created that these were being held mainly by penurious pensioners and by near destitute little old ladies.

In fact, the bulk of the bank shares are held by families in the upper three deciles, who will be compensated for their losses from the income taxes collected largely from the middle deciles.

BUT WHY, one may ask, strive for greater income equality? After all, people are by nature unequal. And does not income inequality spur greater economic growth, which eventually redounds to the benefit of all?

There has been no better laboratory than the Israel of the past eight years to disprove that contention. Income inequality and the concomitant concentration of wealth in the hands of the families in the top deciles have grown by leaps and bounds, specifically in this period in which there was no economic growth.

Our rich were growing richer not because they were in the forefront of an energetic drive towards greater productivity. They grew richer because they were in a position to determine their own income from profits, if they were self-employed, and to determine economic policy of omission and commission by being able to influence the writing of tax law loopholes and to dissuade politicians from applying even the inadequate tax laws that existed and to permit the smuggling of wealth abroad by lax foreign currency regulations.

ABOVE ALL, the growing income inequality was the result of a differential ability to rip off large chunks from the foreign aid that flowed into Israel in the last decade and more.

More than in most other countries which receive foreign aid, that money in Israel went to doing the things for which they were ostensibly earmarked – especially in defence. But in the process, they also made the rich much richer, and whetted the appetites and honed the jealousies of the middle-classes and the poor.

The big chunks of national income going to the families at the top are apparently mainly responsible for the degree of our addictive dependence on foreign aid and for our horrendous foreign debt.

The saw that we are a poor nation with a rich population is only partly true. We are a poor national economy that has been milked nearly dry by the people at the top who have become substantially richer and whose riches have not been plowed back to finance further economic growth, but are largely escrowed abroad.

The findings of this latest study also provide a good explanation of why so many locally produced goods and services are so expensive. Average gross income for the period reported in the study was \$9,100, about half of that of the U.S. Yet many, many goods and services are much more expensive here than abroad.

Part of the explanation lies in higher local taxes and in lower local productivity. But a very large part of the explanation lies in the heavy concentration of self-employed in the upper deciles who set their own incomes by high mark-ups on the goods and services they purvey to the rest of us.

THERE ARE ALSO much more subtle influences at work: Israel is a small and open society. All of us see how our rich live, for there is not much space for them to practise their standards of living behind impenetrable walls, except when they go abroad. It is the top deciles who have set the standards and norms for a large part of the rest of the population in regard to what one should strive for in life.

Dr. Israel Katz, the head of the Centre for Social Policy Studies which conducted this latest study, noted in a television interview earlier this week that much of the general ambience of social dissatisfaction could be traced to the visible income inequality and to the norms the top deciles set, which are basically frustrating because they cannot be attained by people below the top decile or two.

I would add that it is this feeling of frustration that is also behind a good part of the growing *yerida*. It is not the Israelis who are at the bottom of the pile who have been leaving and who are tempted to leave. Rather, it is the Israelis in the middle who have adopted the goals set by the people at the top but who soon learn that they have no hope of achieving them in the small economic pond that is Israel.

ONE WOULD EXPECT that in an economy that is half owned by the government and by the Histadrut, an

ostensibly socialist Labour and a supposedly popularist Herut would not have permitted such a growth in income inequality. Part of the explanation for why they have condoned such a development lies in the terms ostensibly and supposedly. For many Labour and Likud politicians, periodically declaring their support for a greater measure of equality is mainly a matter of lip-service.

But many others are, and have been, truly concerned by these problems. By and large, however, the heads of our political parties have been totally mesmerized by a nearly exclusive concentration on the divisive issues surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict to the exclusion of nearly everything else.

The findings of this study and the simultaneous publication by the National Insurance Institute of figures on the sharp increase in the number of families who have slipped below the poverty line should serve as warning signals to all those concerned with the health of the Israeli economy and society.

CSO: 4400/12

ISRAEL

HYDROGEOLOGIST ASSESSES WATER RESOURCES IN 'ARAVA

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 15 Sep 85 (Rosh Hashanah supplement)
p 19

[Text] FOR THE past 10 years, Prof. Arie Issar has made his home in the Negev, very near David Ben-Gurion's grave overlooking the spectacular Zin desert. But whereas most visitors to the Israeli wasteland see only the dryness, Issar sees the possibilities for panoramic pastures.

"Many years ago, when I first suggested that there are water-rich aquifers in the desert, people thought I was mad," recalled Issar, a hydrogeologist who teaches at the Ben-Gurion University-affiliated Jacob Blaustein Institute for Desert Research at Sde Boker. "Today it is common knowledge that there are some 70 billion cubic metres of brackish but usable water under the Negev's surface.

"We've revolutionized the subject of brackish water, once thought to be unsuitable for anything, let alone agriculture. Some of these waters are now used even in conventional farming.

"This is a multi-faceted revolution: looking for water, new ways of irrigating, new types of plants amenable to growth in saline water - now we have to implement our findings with a view towards the coming century."

The national water system developed in the Fifties and implemented in the Sixties, which supplies most of Israel's potable water today, is outdated.

Issar's vision calls for a two-way system so that the north will supply the south in times of good rainfall and the south will supply the north in times of drought.

"The idea is that while the water in the north is dependent on the weather, which is changeable, the water in the Arava desert is predictable, it's fossil liquid there for the taking at any time, an incredibly large reservoir from which we can siphon off water to needy areas."

The greening of the desert by the Jewish National Fund is not Issar's idea of the proper management of the desert and its resources. "This is the ornamental, environmental side, which, although important, is secondary because people tend to forget that the real issue is food," he said. "We've learned to live off the work of others, but in fact we must live off our own work, we must produce something, not just make money work for us and appreciate the beautiful scenery."

The "how" is Issar's life-work.

"The Arava is a giant hothouse, with enough water in its aquifer to water it and turn it into a second Jezreel Valley. This idea is anathema to ecologists but our goal is to pay salaries and feed people. There are enough places in the Negev that are not suitable for agriculture and can be made into nature parks and re-

serves, even with the encroachment of the army [following the pullback from Sinai]."

Despite the farming crisis in Israel, Issar believes that the future lies in agriculture. Part of the crisis, he said, was due to a stagnation in research over the past few years. "We are treading water here while others are running ahead. We made great strides once, but now others are running ahead. We made great strides once, but now others have taken the lead in everything from genetic types to drip irrigation to winter farming. We must overtake out Spanish, Moroccan and Tunisian competitors once again."

As far as Issar is concerned, the major problem is that the agricultural research is being carried out in the Vulcan Institute in Rehovot, while the agricultural reserves are in the Negev. Even the southern experimental farms are run by the Rehovot staff.

"I'd like to see an agricultural research institute in the Arava, an extension of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev," he said.

Another pet project Issar would like to see expanded is the Halutza sands programme, which would turn a million dunams of shifting dunes into Israel's seed and fodder-growing centre. Today, the country imports these.

"I think that brackish water and reclaimed sewage waters can irrigate these areas sufficiently to make such farms realities," said Issar. "This can push agriculture in new directions and we've already begun implementing a new concept called long furrow farming."

More research is necessary. "This means that the researchers must move south and live here. Our country is small, but there is still a great deal of difference between scientists coming south once a week or less and those living in the area and really getting to know it and feel part of it," he said. "We must plan now so that when the times of growth and prosperity return, we'll be able to put the plan into motion."

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

SECOND MUSLIM CONGRESS DEMANDS-- The planning committee for the Second Muslim Congress set its date for 7 September 85. The Congress will convene in Nazareth and demand the return of all Waqf property. In a debate held following a proposal by Member of Knesset 'Abd Darwasha, 'Ezer Weizmann, the minister in charge of Arab affairs in Israel, promised an annual budget of \$1 million for the furtherance and development of community services of the Muslim sector in Israel. The minister also promised that the government would appoint a statewide commission for matters of the Waqf, most of whose members will come from activists in the Muslim community in Israel. The commission will have the authority to appoint local committees to manage Waqf properties, which the government plans on relinquishing. [Text][Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Jul 85 p 3] 8646

AGRICULTURAL EXPORT FIGURES--Agricultural exports will amount to \$512 million in the current agricultural year, ending September 85. These are the figures compiled by the economic department of the Agricultural Center. Last year agricultural exports were \$506 million, and the previous year \$500 million only. According to the data, the sharpest increase, 41 percent, was in citrus exports. Citrus exports alone amounted to \$175 million, compared with \$124 million in 1983-84. In contrast, there was a sharp decline in the exports of cotton, vegetables and flowers. Cotton exports declined from \$153 million to \$130 million and flower exports went from \$79 million to \$68 million. Vegetable exports are expected to decrease from \$52 million to \$41 million. [Text][Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 31 Jul 85 p 10] 8648

CSO: 4423/86

SAUDI ARABIA

REQUIREMENTS OF SERIOUS INDUSTRIALIZATION REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 31 Jul 85 pp 13, 14

[Article: "To Build a Development Base in the Kingdom: An Economic Study Asserts the Kingdom's Success in Establishing Domestic Industry"]

[Text] With the emergence of the role of the scientific technological revolution in our modern era, technology today, more than at any time in the past, has become a strategic weapon in the hand of the people who own it, as the struggle underway between the industrial and developing countries has become one between the people who own technology and those who do not.

One of the facts which one study on the United States may have ended up with is that 87.5 percent of the increase in per capita product is the result of technological development, while no more than 12.5 percent of this increase can be attributed to capital investments.

Indeed, some deductions have concluded that technological advancement's contribution to total modern output is 10 times greater than that of the expenditure of investment.

The most important of these conclusions, which have placed technological progress at the top of the factors of production and caused it to outstrip the contribution of capital in terms of influence, is clearly evident if we note the intensification of the imbalance in the development of sciences and technology among the countries of the world, which at the same time justifies the extreme competition over ownership of technology among countries.

No country which seeks prosperity and rapid development can ignore technology's role at the heart of economic and social development plans. Therefore each of these countries strives to enter the framework of technology by various means in order to catch up to the cavalcade of progress and find a technological identity for itself or create an innate technological capability for itself. This is what the research work attempts to deal with -- the ingredients for creating innate technological capability -- viewing it in the light of the economic and social development plans in the kingdom by means of four main research works in a Riyadh Chamber of Commerce research department economic study.

These are:

A research work dealing with the elements of technological capability in general. This research work sheds light on the notion of the intrinsic capability of technology and its components and conditions.

Three works of research related to the characteristics of the technological structure and possibilities for developing it in the kingdom. These research works try to answer the following questions:

What are the elements of the current technological structure in the kingdom and how does it stand with respect to the elements for creating innate technological capability?

Does the development of these characteristics permit the attainment of innate technological capability, or is it necessary that a collective (Gulf or Arab) framework exist, in order to help and support the attainment of the technological capability that is desired?

From the outset, we will hasten to point out that creating innate technological capability does not mean ignoring foreign experts and knowledge, but indeed the opposite. Modern experience all indicates that no domestic industry began that did not set forth from the heritage other countries and nations which preceded it had created, on condition that this heritage be absorbed, assimilated and incorporated in one's own innovation.

That is what the research work is attempting to underline at all its stages.

Characteristics of the Actual State of International Technology

The most important characteristics of the state of international technology are embodied in the presence of a profound technological gap between the advanced industrial countries and the developing countries, in the monopolistic stance of countries which possess technology, in the existence of an unbalanced market between people dealing in the area of technology and in the tying of technological transactions to coercive contracts which impose specific types on the people buying it.

Thus many problems which lead to negative effects for the developing countries arise from the characteristics by which the state of international technology are marked.

The most important problems in dealing with international technology assume the form of:

1. The gap in modern technology.
2. The monopolization of modern technology.
3. The rise in the cost of obtaining technology.
4. The rate of technical progress.

5. The negative effects of the behavior of multinational corporations.
6. The narrow scope of local markets, in a manner which obstructs the establishment of the suitable technology.
7. The mediocre nature of local engineering capability.
8. The phenomenon of the reverse transfer of technology.
9. The danger of subordination.
10. The elimination of small and craft industries.

Herewith we will deal with the various aspects of the most important of these problems:

The Modern Technological Gap

With the emergence and crystallization of the scientific revolution in this era, the lack of balance in the development of science and technology among the countries of the world has intensified. Technology has today more than any time in the past become an important strategic weapon in the hands of the people who own it and monopolize it, and the struggle which exists between the industrial and developing countries has become one between people who possess and do not possess technology, in circumstances where the countries which have technology monopolize the technological market and impose specific types of technology.

The conference of science and technology held in Vienna, the capital of Austria, in August 1980 revealed the following facts concerning the technological gap:

Research budgets surged from \$94 billion in 1973 to \$150 billion in 1980.

Six countries in the world monopolize 70 percent of the scientists and alone disburse 85 percent of the research budgets.

The advanced countries monopolize the efforts of about 2 million engineering scientists representing 87.4 percent of the people with advanced capabilities in this field in the world.

These countries spend 97.1 percent of the total spent on scientific research and technological development in the world.

The developing countries, with their billions of inhabitants, disburse just 3 percent of the total research budgets and have 13 percent of the scientists.

America spends \$143 per capita on scientific research and development, Switzerland \$187 per capita and Sweden \$148 per capita. One should bear in mind that the per capita average for scientific research and development in the Arab countries comes to \$2, the lowest rate in the world.

The United States makes more than 50 percent of its expenditures on all research in fields of life on the development of military technology, after which come West Germany (11 percent) and Japan (3 percent).

The preceding indices show that the advanced countries monopolize technology and that this monopolization is concentrated in the multinational companies.

The Monopolization of Modern Technology

It is clear from the preceding indices that a small number of industrially advanced countries monopolize international technology. The following arises from this sort of situation:

Many forms of modern technological advancement are not available to other parties.

The advanced countries impose specific forms of legislation by virtue of which it is prohibited to disseminate various kinds of specific technology.

The influence of the owners of advanced technology has increased and their arrogance in exerting all types of pressure has intensified.

Technological transactions are now among unequal parties, the advanced countries which have the technology on the one hand and the developing countries on the other.

The pressures of the countries that have technology are represented by the use of technology, as follows:

Intervention by the owner of the technology to prevent the beneficiary from giving the information and expertise he receives to others.

The determination of production, pricing and marketing policies and places of distribution, under the jurisdiction of the owner of the technology.

Direct intervention on the part of the owner of the technology, in accordance with the stipulations of the agreement.

The Rise in the Price of Attracting Technology

Excessive increases in the prices of machinery and equipment sold to the developing countries.

The addition of other non-material costs to the existing cost of machinery and equipment, embodied in the costs of technological services and research and development related to the solution of unanticipated problems and the costs of imposing and adapting technology during the transfer and training process.

The increases in costs to the developing countries by the difference between the monopoly price on the market and the competing price which if freed from monopoly would dominate the market.

The Reverse Transfer of Technology (or the Brain Drain)

The brain drain from developing to advanced countries represents a reverse technology transfer and indicates the transfer of domestic capabilities to various areas of the advanced world. An estimate by the Arab Labor Office has pointed out that the number of capable Arabs who have emigrated to the advanced world is about 120,000, and that is restricted to the higher management levels.

The Negative Effect on the Development of Local Technology Embodied in the Danger of the Submergence of Small and Craft Industries

The serious effort to acquire modern technology and apply its achievements on a broad scale leads to the danger of the submergence of small and craft industries, in view of the great benefits which are available to major modern projects.

It is necessary to protect these sorts of industries, because they usually arise on behalf of the requirements of local conditions and at the same time constitute an industrial and craft heritage. They are in fact local technology, since a group of technical and applied forms of knowledge lie behind them. It is true that the productive techniques used in them are primitive and backward in comparison with modern production techniques, but the danger is that the local industrial heritage will be eliminated before modern technology is acquired. It is necessary to protect these industries and seek to develop them and benefit from modern technology in this regard.

The Behavior of the Multinational Companies

The multinational companies are in reality considered the companies which dominate and control the sources of international technology. Therefore, the developing countries should study the behavior of the multinational companies in their dealings in the areas of technology so that they will be able to understand them, and this will help the developing countries in dealing with the multinational companies. It is possible to list the most important methods of the multinational companies as follows:

Centralization of information: This means that the production of scientific and technological information takes place in the parent company, and these companies do not allow this to take place in the branches, so that control over the affairs of technology may be tightened.

The branch company is absolutely subordinate to the parent company in matters of technology, so that the trend of the flow of information assumes a single direction, from the top to the bottom.

The international companies do not resort to the use of research and development centers existing in the host country.

A specific production technology is imposed, while all innovative effort which might affect their monopoly situation is thwarted, since they hasten to negotiate to buy any innovation in order to own it and keep it hidden

from use. In addition, the multinational companies do not hesitate to use every means to stifle new technology outside their writ.

Preference is given to the strategy of selling the total commodity in the form of a technological complex or package to selling fragmented products. The technological package includes technological elements in the form of project studies, design, supply, installation, operation and the provision of management expertise.

The international market is controlled through control of the international commercial firms, which imposes on independent companies the need to enter into the system of the multinational corporations' international control in order to be able to dispose of their products.

In order to round out the circle of control, the companies establish good relations with local consulting firms and consulting and engineering companies which guarantee them sovereignty over the productive techniques they have established, on the one hand, and sales on the basis of the technological package on the other.

The multinational companies operate on the basis of the principle of the internationalization of production, that is, the division of production in accordance with the distribution of its components among geographical regions or in accordance with process stages.

An effort is made to unify the specifications of the product, whatever the location of production might be.

Production techniques are unified, with reliance on the basis of the unity of specifications.

A homogeneous pattern of consumption is created in various areas of the world and an effort is made to expand the consumption base, further dominate the markets and have greater ability for profits and expansion of the volume of production.

The Risk of Technological Subordination

The results of technological subordination in various countries because of the international monopoly and the technological gap have produced the following fears:

1. The binding of the mechanism of emerging industry to foreign sources.
2. The binding of the output of industry to the demands of the foreign markets (processing for export).
3. The infiltration of foreign capital into the dominant branches of the industrial sector (equipment, electronics).
4. The rupture of the relationship among components of the national economy on behalf of the texture of the relationship of vertical and horizontal

specialization between industry in the country hosting the investment and industry in the mother country.

5. The transfer of technology which is less advanced than that prevailing in the advanced countries, more costly in economic terms (with respect to factors of energy, natural resources and capital), or more costly socially from the standpoint of the effect on the environment.

It is worth pointing out that in spite of these fears which are attached to the multinational companies possessing dominance over technology, this does not rule out the need for developing countries to enter into the realm of technology; they can either enter into this realm or fall into the abyss of crushing backwardness.

The experiences of numerous countries prove that it is possible for the developing countries, on the basis of conscious planning, sound selection and successful interaction with technology, to break this barrier.

The danger to which the purchaser of technology is subject is the cause of the deficiency to which he falls prey because of his scant information about the technology he is buying. In the event he is aware of matters related to the technology he wants to deal with, in terms of its quality and sources and the extent to which it is appropriate, this all makes the buyer secure, as far as possible, about the losses he might be subject to or at least seek to reduce them to the least possible level.

Elements in Building an Innate Technological Base

Building a local technological base has become a pressing need which no one can oppose, since that is connected to the importance of realizing economic independence and shaking off technological subordination. Nonetheless, no one denies that the road to building such a base is long and difficult, but it is inevitable and an unavoidable destiny.

Herewith we review in brief the elements in building the base of innate technology:

A. Providing a structure encouraging technical and technological progress.

B. Observing the tentative nature of technological development.

C. Being aware of the problems of choice, embodied in:

The choice of the suitable technology.

The choice of the suitable method for transferring technology.

D. Building scientific and technological capability.

E. Building the appropriate organizational and institutional framework.

Herewith we will make a review of each element, in brief:

A. Providing a structure encouraging technical progress:

This in general means creating and developing the environment (material and psychological) for encouraging technical progress in all areas of society. Connected to this, for example, are:

The development and improvement of human capabilities with persons of high, skilled and intermediate abilities.

A review of the systems and structure of education, the financial benefits stipulated for competent persons, the provision of all requirements of scientific and technical research in the form of laboratories, workshops, equipment and materials, the provision of a climate of stability for competent nationals, the protection of elements of industrial ownership while making actual use of the innovations of nationals, the preservation of the technical heritage and the effort to develop it.

B. Observing the tentative nature of technological development:

One can break down the basic stages through which the acquisition of technological ability passes into the following:

The stage of assimilation:

This includes the following:

Development of domestic negotiators' ability to choose and evaluate results in the area of technology.

Development of the ability of technicians in order to absorb technology (the installation, operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, and manufacture of machinery and equipment spare parts for various technical projects).

Adaptation and acclimatization:

Development of the intrinsic ability to deal technically with modern machinery and equipment by making the necessary modifications in the various equipment to conform to the nature of the circumstances of the environment and society. During this stage, the complexity of modern technical equipment is overcome.

Modernization and innovation:

This is the highest stage of technological progress. The preceding stage prepares for it by mastering the complexity of modern technical equipment and entering into the stage of modernization and innovation. This includes design, invention, execution and manufacture. This is the point where technical self-reliance emerges or innate technological ability is created.

C. Being aware of the problems of choice, as embodied in:

1. Choice of the appropriate technology:

The nature of the suitable technology has not yet been determined -- whether it must be obtained from others or must be innovated locally. In addition, there is no specific attempt to determine the different aspects and features of the characteristics of the appropriate technology. This is the first problem raised by the effort to benefit from modern technological progress to realize this sort of progress in the local context through one's own efforts. Connected to this is the study of the patterns of technology and the choice between labor-intensive and capital-intensive technology. Opinions in this regard may be put in several categories, but it is appropriate to take a mixture of the two, in the following manner:

Capital-intensive technology in major capital industries (basic mineral, petrochemical, iron and steel, machinery and electronic industries).

Then there is the choice between the pattern of production and consumption. Also related to the issue of the appropriate technology is the issue of the evaluation of technology, in view of the numerous effects it has, which go beyond the economic aspects to the social ones. Therefore, it is necessary that it pass through the stage of evaluation before it is chosen. What is meant by evaluation is the study of the various effects arising from the application of technology in the direct and indirect areas. The truth is that if backward countries rely on imported technology for a while, the process of evaluation will be easy for them, since this imported technology has already been applied.

The evaluation process requires experts with special knowledge supported by an advanced information system, in order to make use of it in learning the effects resulting from technology in the political and social areas. This in general is not available to developing countries, but this does not mean that one should not attempt to carry out the experiment, based on its applied effects in other countries. It is also necessary in the event of discrimination to discriminate between evaluation at the level of the unit and evaluation at the level of the economy as a whole.

2. The choice of the appropriate form of methods for transferring technology:

Multinational corporations' contribution to the capital of projects.

The forms of industrial ownership rights, embodied in:

Patents.

Permits.

Copyrights.

Technical aid.

These forms are regulated by agreements between the two parties to the transaction.

The technology involved in intermediate machinery and equipment and the products of technology.

D. Building scientific and technological capability:

Modern experiments prove that local scientific technological ability is based on the following five steps:

1. Research and development. This step contains three stages:

Basic research: By this is meant research activity aimed at increasing scientific knowledge though no applied objective is intended by it.

Applied research: By this is meant activity aimed at increasing scientific knowledge by which an applied objective and specific process are intended.

Experimental development: By this is meant the use of the results of basic and applied research to produce new materials or improve existing ones, including setting out designs for the producer or newly creating and developing initial models and experimental and pilot plants.

2. Industrial engineering designs (basic or detailed). These are mainly related to the practical aspect of industrial production and are considered the natural prelude to the production process.

3. The manufacture of intermediary components.

4. The manufacture of machinery and machinery parts, that is, manufacture of the means of production.

5. Quality oversight: This means a constant increase in the quality of products.

E. The organizational and institutional context appropriate for technical and technological progress:

By this is meant the development of the systems, organizations and institutions to which the responsibility of administering technological effort must be assigned in order that innate capability may be acquired and built. There now are a number of organizations and agencies in charge of scientific and technical research activities in most Arab countries.

Building the organizational context is also connected to legislation and laws bearing on the protection of the forms of industrial ownership and means of dealing with that.

Characteristics of the Technological Structure in the Kingdom

The main characteristics of the industrial structure in the kingdom:

1. The industrialization process has increased in momentum recently, since the number of non-oil industrial organizations and their capital

expenditures were very meager in the fifties, but in the sixties and seventies their numbers and total capital expenditures in the non-oil industry sector increased several times over.

2. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of the development of transformation industries in the kingdom is considered a new one. Therefore, the following is apparent from some studies which have analyzed the non-petroleum transformational industry sector:

The volume of the capital of current (non-petroleum) organizations is very small in general since financing from private resources is prevalent in the capital disbursed. Thus, the non-petroleum transformational industry sector represents a very small percentage of the economy, and the average volume of industrial organizations is considered very small in terms of capital or the number of people working in them.

The paltry nature of the volume of capital invested and the volume of productive capacities have been reflected on the extent of non-petroleum transformational industry participation in gross domestic product, since this contribution still remains extremely minor.

There are three main groups of industrial activity, represented by:

Foodstuffs and beverages.

Mining (non-metal) products.

The fertilizer, cement and steel industry absorbs the bulk of the capital invested in the non-petroleum transformational industry.

Although the government's policy is aimed at assigning the main task of promoting the industrialization process to the private sector, government investments in industry are considered large, because all massive investments are being carried out for the most part by means of the government.

Although the government has followed the policy of transferring capital ownership to the private sector as soon as the projects completed -- examples of which are the Saudi Cement Company, the Jiddah Oil Refinery and recently the SABIC company -- it is also expected that the government sector's dominance of industry will continue for a while, since the government has sought to accelerate the rates of industrialization and diversify the production structure.

Main Characteristics of Manpower in the Kingdom

1. The considerations of manpower development in the kingdom arise from the following:

The desire to improve the level of productivity of Saudi workers, especially those coming from rural areas, because of their low levels of training and education.

Reduction of dependence on foreign manpower to meet the deficit in the labor market, and the need to rely on nationals to meet the country's basic needs.

The platform the kingdom is drawing up regarding comprehensive development requires the acquisition of qualified manpower.

2. Although the shortage of trained manpower in the kingdom constitutes an obstacle, it is less burdensome than in other countries which are faced with a shortage of monetary and human capital.

3. The kingdom is following a platform of emphasizing a rapid, deep educational policy to raise the level of scientific education as far as the workforce in the kingdom goes, and the need to pursue education as a main means of manpower development underlines the desire to lessen the two following phenomena:

The current drop in industry's share of manpower, since industry's share of manpower is still limited in comparison with farming, sheep herding, fishing and so forth.

The reduction of the existing technically trained manpower deficit, which in some plans has been estimated at between 600,000 and 1 million trained workers.

4. The dimensions of constant educational progress in higher education are apparent from the continuous growth in the number of students and educational institutions and the rise in the level of education and the volumes of budget allocations.

Educational progress is also apparent from the priority education enjoys in the plans of government programs to eliminate illiteracy, and a great increase in the number of students and educational organizations and a rise in the level of education and the volume of allocations to the education budget have resulted from expansions in education.

5. In addition to the policy of education, which is aimed at expanding the scientific base, there is the policy of training to eliminate vocational illiteracy and qualify various groups to enter the labor market and also the development of the work methods and techniques of the people who have joined the workforce.

6. In spite of the relative imbalance in skills required of the trained manpower in mid-level positions, it has been observed that the higher employment levels, especially in government and semi-governmental departments, are occupied by competent Saudis at a high educational level.

What gives encouragement, as far as the need to provide skilled manpower and provide intermediate levels of desired skills is concerned, is the constant increase as a result of education and increase in the numbers entering and graduating from universities each year. Saudi citizens, in spite of the obvious shortage in trained personnel, are also trying to adjust to the comprehensive resurgence in all sectors of labor in the kingdom, especially the industrial sector.

Characteristics of the State of Technology in the Kingdom

In spite of the difficulty of measuring the characteristics of the state of technology in the kingdom, it is possible to derive evidence on it from some of the following main indices:

1. The degree of growth of scientific technological ability.
2. The degree of technological reliance on the outer world.
3. The degree to which prevailing techniques are suited to the goals of development.
4. The degree to which the legal, organizational and functional framework of the flow of information has been rounded out.

1. The degree of growth of scientific technological ability:

The degree of growth of scientific technological ability depends on the characteristics of the structure of production.

A. The structure of domestic product and the relative importance of technological industries in it.

B. The structure of skills and the extent to which scientific skills are available which are able to deal with modern technology.

C. Scientific and technological policy and the extent it is encouraged through specialization in research and development.

A. The structure of domestic product: the characteristics of the productive structure.

It is possible to observe the characteristics of the productive structure through:

The degree of concentration of the factors of production:

One can consider capital intensity indicative of the volume of the installation. Therefore, the large industries have been capital intensive, with the significance that arises from that in terms of technology. The result that has arisen from that is that the most prominent (large-volume) capital intensive industries are the intermediate productive commodity (basic metal and chemical) industries.

The kingdom entered into these industries in a tangible way when it entered into a group of basic, metal and chemical industries.

The capital goods industries are also capital intensive ones in the advanced countries, and they are the most advanced industries in the technological cycle. It has not yet become feasible for the kingdom to enter into them.

The rise in export transactions:

The kingdom's foreign trade statistics indicate reliance by transformational industry to an increasing degree on intermediate (raw and processed) commodities as well as imports of capital commodities.

This indicates an absence of suitable interrelations among sectors on the one hand, and it also indicates an imbalance in the degree of technological integration, as will become clear from the following point:

The degree of technological concentration in the industries established:

Modern experiences with technology show that a specific composition of technological commodities exists and that one can consider those who produce them to have transcended the stages of inadequate technological capability.

These commodities are represented by formation and finishing components and accessories, then the production of intermediate commodities used in transformational activities, and finally the production of machines and equipment.

Inadequacy in the production of these machines and equipment is considered the most important aspect of technological deficiency and without it the technological cycle is considered incomplete.

It is observed that the major portion of transformational industry commodities produced in the domestic private sector in the kingdom are non-technological; indeed, they are final industrial commodities, since they are not used in subsequent transformational industry activities.

The kingdom is considered in better condition in this area than other developing countries, since the government sector has entered some technological commodity fields, as we have pointed out. These are the areas of basic commodities (metal, chemical and so forth).

The possibilities of developing the characteristics of the technological structure in the kingdom:

The scope of development of industrial technology in the kingdom is defined by the treatment of the main imbalances in the domestic industrial structure, from which a study was produced on the characteristics of the technological structure in the kingdom. The most important essential requirements for technological development are embodied in the following:

1. Establishing a domestic industry to produce equipment, machines and components. The study has stated that experiences with modern technology show that local technological capability will enjoy no independence unless it enters into this area.
2. Forming the necessary skills through education and training.
3. Rounding out the institutional and legislative context for the acquisition of technology.

To reach these goals, one can choose between two alternatives (while ruling out the third, which is total subordination to a foreign source of technology, as has been the case with some experiences in south Asia and Latin America), in view of the infringement on national sovereignty this choice entails.

The first alternative in developing the characteristics of the technological structure:

Continuing the current platform, which is founded on the existence of three heterogeneous sectors, the government sector, the private sector and the mixed sector, where one can state that:

The government sector (basic industries) is distinguished by technology which is originally foreign.

The private sector, which is distinguished by a traditional technology, especially in craft installations and to a lesser degree in other small industries.

In this regard, one might note the presence of the National Science and Technology Center in the kingdom; that is the central body to which this responsibility has been given, and will perhaps be the center of technological decisions in the future. It is also possible to consider the universities and research centers in the various bodies as technological decisionmaking centers.

Even if it is clear that technological decisionmaking did and still does take place through participation between the local and the foreign parties, whether the local party is a research center, consulting firm or the like;

And there is no doubt that the assumption by a central body of assistance in technological decisionmaking guides the technological decisions, especially in the light of reliance on the outer world in obtaining technology;

It usually happens, in developing countries, that the result of cooperation and participation between the local and foreign parties in carrying out research that has a specific objective is that the conclusions turn out not to be to the benefit of domestic interests and that the structure of research concerns is influenced by the type of relationship between the local and foreign parties.

The joint sector: this is characterized by the use of foreign technology in areas with less influence than other vanguard industries in the attainment of technological development. In this context, it is possible to create diverse changes in the conditions of technology, among them:

1. The codification of a law or legislation on the transfer of technology, especially for contracts on licenses -- contracts which are not yet regulated by a single statute and are still subject to the special rules and circumstances of each contract in isolation.

For this reason, these circumstances do not allow for oversight of these contracts.

2. A review of the possibility of setting out legislation on industrial ownership to regulate industrial ownership activities and keep abreast of other countries and the international community in this regard.

3. The establishment of a technological data bank (or in more general form the establishment of a general national information and documentation system, in addition to expansion of the role of domestic scientists and researchers in feasibility studies).

4. The creation of a sort of connection among scientific research agencies and production agencies.

5. Enhancement of experience in industrial participation by moving into more efficient areas in the technological development of local industry. This depends on the extent of success realized in the vertical and horizontal dimensions of technological expansion, in the following manner:

In the vertical dimension, the degree of progress depends on the extent of the transition from the stage of the manufacture of intermediate commodities (metal and chemical) to the stage of the manufacture of capital goods.

In the horizontal dimension (that is, the level of a single technological cycle), technological progress depends on the extent of the ability of the system to obtain research, experimental and practical capabilities which will enable it gradually to dispense with the foreign party. The lack of such capabilities is considered a main cause of delay in the acquisition of local technology and continued reliance on foreign experts, especially in the area of repair and maintenance. Meanwhile one must be attentive to focussing the coming stage on the process of maintenance of the facilities which were constructed in the previous stage, in order that the kingdom may eliminate the problems which some developing countries have been exposed to because of the deterioration of maintenance activities, such as accumulated breakdowns in some facilities and so forth.

These recommendations represent partial reforms within the platform of continued reliance on foreign technology (imports and simulation).

The Second Alternative: Building Innate Scientific Technological Capability

This alternative means relying on local sources to supply domestic industry with machinery, knowledge and skills. This requires the injection of vigor into the local scientific community as a whole. The situation also requires the stimulation of contributions from all the units of the scientific group in the nation (universities, research and development units and information, consulting and survey agencies). This also requires administratively and organizationally devoting attention to the scientific research climate and connecting the achievements of science to applied aspects. The choice of technology is considered one of the main pillars on which innate technological ability is founded, and the criterion of choice depends on three elements:

1. The availability of factors of production.
2. The goals of development.
3. The degree of growth.

By applying these three factors to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the following is apparent:

1. With respect to availability of the factors of production:

The kingdom is characterized by a relative availability of natural resources and capital and a relative scarcity of the labor factor, especially the skilled and semi-skilled labor base, along with difficulty in the ability to expand at the apex of skilled labor in the short run, which requires attention to the following upon selection of the suitable technology:

Concentration on capital-intensive industries.

The development of labor-intensive technology, especially small industries and craft establishments, so that increased productivity will be achieved with a drop in labor intensiveness.

Concentration on capital-intensive industries requires the need to use new science-intensive and capital-intensive industries, which are what is known as the equipment and component industry, since the equipment and component industry represents the dominant link in the technological structure.

The equipment industry is broken down into two sections:

The production of machinery allocated to the manufacture of finished goods.

The production of machines used to make the machinery allocated to the manufacture of finished goods.

The technological link is rounded out only when the industrial core manages to produce the means of production.

The components industry is related basically to electronic industries, which are also broken down into two distinctive sections:

Basic components, those that enter into all electronic systems, including integrated circuits, switches and transistors.

Special components, components which enter into an entire electronic system, such as a television set, computer or communications satellite.

The core of technological industry must reach the first segment of this sector.

2. In terms of development goals:

Development strategy in the kingdom revolves about the need to diversify the base of the domestic economy through construction of an agricultural industrial base which will raise the rates of economic growth.

In accordance with that, the choice of technology will be on the following bases:

The choice of complex, capital-intensive advanced technology in essential large industries.

The gradual evolution of labor-intensive industries into moderately complex technology, first of all, then into science-intensive technology.

3. In terms of degree of growth:

Although industry in the kingdom is still nascent, the realization of a reasonable level of industrialization can be observed, especially in the area of basic industries derived from foreign technology. There is no doubt that the establishment of machine and component industries requires the formation of intermediate industries feeding the machine industry, especially the basic metals industries (such as steel) and chemical industries such as plastics.

This means an increase in the relative weight of heavy industries in the industrial structure, including their intermediary and capital sectors, provided that this be governed by two things:

The requirements of local finished goods industries (food, clothing and housing).

The requirements needed for internal expansion such as the machinery and component production sector.

It is worth pointing out that starting with the equipment and component industries does not mean entering into all of them. This is possible, in the practical sense, in the first stages of the development process; the appropriate thing is to determine the pivotal sectors for embarking on it, for instance the readymade clothes, food preservation and preparation, petrochemical, small agricultural machinery and local construction materials industries.

The research emphasizes a number of recommendations, among them:

1. The kingdom's experience has registered some of the ingredients and components of intrinsic technological capability by making a start in heavy basic metals industries and expanding public education, manpower training and the training of scientific and technical personnel, as well as providing a relatively suitable internal and external social and political climate for technical and technological development.

2. In spite of all this, the project to build scientific technological capability is still in its infancy.

The study states that thinking about building innate technology means immediately looking to the future of matters. The research has broken this view of the future down into two levels of action:

A. A regional level in the kingdom which is concentrated on the development of technological elements through the following elements:

The restructuring of economic activity so that the transformational industrial sector will assume basic importance in the technological evolution process, while calling for the expansion of machinery industries and establishment of a nucleus for basic electronic industries, so that these industries will possess the suitable quantity and quality of allocations.

The provision of the components of scientific and technological ability by:

Expanding the base of the educational pyramid and guiding the use of the apex of the pyramid.

Expanding university education and furnishing the necessary academic depth.

Creating an adequate number of research and development centers and stimulating them so that they will become an effective connecting link between science and application, while providing adequate allocations for that.

Developing engineering design, consultation, technique and resource survey processes.

Using the suitable scientific and technological knowledge by:

Encouraging basic scientific research, especially in pioneering areas such as nuclear physics, microorganisms and electronic engineering and in the area of social sciences.

Encouraging applied scientific research in industrial areas which are slated to play a leading role in the process of structural transformation, such as electronics and research into renewable energy sources, especially solar energy.

In the supranational Gulf and Arab context:

Viewing technology as part of the Arab development process as a whole and striving to create the structure of a technological base in an Arab collective context beginning with the countries of the Gulf area, whose circumstances are similar and are subject to the same technological circumstances, and ending with a collective Arab framework built on specialization and the division of labor on a collective Arab basis. This will help in the optimum exploitation of the region's resources, first of all stopping the Arab brain drain and guiding the transfer of Arab manpower and competence so that benefit may be derived from that in a better way. This will also lead to a reduction to the maximum possible extent of the importation of foreign experts or at least a gradual reduction of that in a manner which will permit the development of manpower in each country then in a Gulf and Arab context, and their gradual replacement of foreign experts.

Giving consideration to mixing the innate technological base in the context of an Arab concept for embracing a number of recommendations, most important of which is creating organizations in the Gulf or Arab context which will be responsible for strengthening the elements of the structure of the technological base in the Arab region, and from that establishing a competent Arab body which will negotiate in the name of the Gulf then Arab group when contracts related to technology are concluded, establishing a competent body for effecting coordination in the purchase of permits, so that it will be possible to avoid duplication in the purchase of contracts in the Arab Gulf area, setting out a map of technological skills in the Gulf and Arab contexts and, in addition, establishing an information bank which will provide all the desired data on the technology available, its types, its sources and its conditions in the most up to date methods.

11887

CSO: 4404/471

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

ABU DHABI EXPENDITURES

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 18 Sep 85 p 3

[Article by Ahmed Hassan]

[Text]

THE Abu Dhabi government's expenditure in the emirate has been substantially more in the first half of this year than in 1984 during the same period.

According to a report prepared by the Department of Planning, the government spent Dh922.4 million on development projects in the first half of this year. This figure, however, is merely 18 per cent of the total amount earmarked for development projects. The sum earmarked under the provisional budget is about Dh5 billion for 1985.

According to statistics, the government's spending last year for the same period was about Dh861 million. This again, was a mere 16 per cent of the amount allocated towards development projects last year. The amount allocated for development projects in the 1984 budget was Dh5.25 billion.

The development budget of Dh5 billion has been distributed among various government departments, in accordance with the projects being handled by these departments. For the 1985 budget, the provisional allocations for the Abu Dhabi Municipality and the Town Planning Department are the highest.

Thirty per cent of the development budget allocations have been reserved for projects being managed by the municipality and the Town Planning Department, 23.3 per cent of the budget

allocations are for the Water and Electricity Department, while the Department of Public Works and Housing gets 22.6 per cent. Twentyfour per cent of the allocations have been split among other government departments.

Last year, the largest share of the development budget was allocated for the Department of Public Works and Housing.

It is significant to note that the Abu Dhabi budget has also a provision for expenses on projects that have not been planned earlier. Among such projects this year is the construction of a special centre to handle drug trafficking and narcotics. The centre will also deal with the illegal sale of liquor. The Dh15-million complex is being constructed in Abu Dhabi by the Department of Public Works and Housing.

Another project allocation in this regard is for the construction of clinics in Al Ain at an estimated cost of Dh10.4 million. Twenty low-cost houses are being constructed at Maria, in the western region, at an estimated cost of Dh9 million.

Another such project for which the 'emergency provision' has been made involves the expansion of the television network in Liwa, also in the western region. The expansion project is estimated to cost Dh6.6 million. It is being managed by the Ministry of Information and Culture.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

DUBAYY IMPORTS FALL

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 23 Sep 85 p 11

[Text]

DUBAI'S imports the first half of this year fell by 6.2 per cent compared to the corresponding period in 1984, official statistics made available yesterday revealed.

But the drop was less than the nine per cent recorded for the first quarter of this year and only half of the unprecedented 12 per cent decline registered for the whole of 1984.

The decline in re-exports was 9.6 per cent, considerably less than the 13 per cent fall registered in the first quarter.

However, in the case of exports, the latest statistics presented a different picture. The first half of this year recorded a decline to the tune of 41.6 per cent, substantially higher than the 23 per cent fall for the first quarter.

Since 1978, Dubai's exports have been rising at an annual rate of 15.7 per cent and this is the first time that this sector has shown a decline.

Exports

Last year, even when imports and re-exports showed a downward trend, exports went up by 13 per cent under-

lining the growing importance of indigenous manufacturing activity.

Half-yearly statistics showed that exports were worth Dh586,972,927 compared to Dh1003,676,587 for the corresponding period last year.

Imports from January to June this year were valued at Dh8.22 billion against Dh8.76 billion for the same period in 1984. Japan continued to top the list of exporters to Dubai although the value of its exports went down from Dh1.75 billion to Dh1.61 billion.

The share of US was down from Dh1.11 billion to Dh930.6 million.

Among the major exporters to Dubai, only the UK, India and Bahrain improved their performance in terms of value during the first half of this year.

The UK, the third largest source of Dubai's imports, improved its share from Dh857 million to Dh863 million despite the general downturn in the emirate's trade. The increase is attributed in part to the depreciation of sterling.

Rank Improves

Bahrain which was ranked sixth on

the emirate's imports chart earlier displaced Italy from the fifth place by improving its exports from Dh350 million to Dh366 million.

Italy's share of the market simultaneously went down from Dh405 million to Dh361 million. West Germany continued to be ranked fourth although its share also went down from Dh540 million to Dh498 million.

India displaced France from the seventh place by marginally increasing its exports from Dh311 million to Dh317 million while France, now in the eighth position suffered a decline from Dh312 million to Dh260 million.

Although there were changes in the ranking of several other exporting states, the pattern of Dubai's trade remained by and large unchanged during the first half of this year. Trade sources said the latest statistics underlined the need to restructure Dubai's import sector to meet the reduced level of business.

The high proportion of re-exports to imports showed that Dubai will continue to be a centre for regional and international trade and justified the policy of promoting the Emirate internationally as the Gulf's most important entrepot.

CSO: 4400/10

PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

GOLD DISCOVERY IN HADRAMAWT--Abu Dhabi, 13 Oct (WAKH)--The Democratic Republic of Yemen has announced the discovery of gold and other minerals in commercial quantities in the southern province of Hadramawt. A Yemeni official was today quoted by the UAE newspaper AL-ITTIHAD as saying that prospecting activities were expected during this month. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources will study the feasibility of expanding the area of exploitation in light of "encouraging factors in the estimates of the volume of reserves," the Abu Dhabi-based newspaper said. However, AL-ITTIHAD added that production by an unnamed Soviet company was not expected before 1988 when the basic structures for the operation are completed. [Excerpt] [Manama WAKH in English 1630 GMT 13 Oct 85 GF]

NEW EXPLORATORY OIL WELLS--Abu Dhabi, 13 Oct (WAKH)--[UAE newspaper AL-ITTIHAD quotes a Yemeni official--FBIS] as saying that new exploratory oil wells were spudded by the Italian company AGIP in its concession area along the Bir 'Ali coast. A Soviet company, Techno-Export, was also drilling its third exploratory well in 'Ayadim area, while the Brazilian company Petrobras was also drilling its first exploratory well in Hawarim area. All four wells are expected to be completed next year, the paper quoted the source added. [Excerpt] [Manama WAKH in English 1630 GMT 13 Oct 85 GF]

CSO: 4400/20

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

AGREEMENT WITH NETHERLANDS--An agreement was signed at the Public Works Ministry today between the YAR and Netherlands. According to the agreement, the Dutch Government will grant 5,598,920 riyals in aid to finance a number of rural water projects. The agreement was signed by 'Abdallah al-Khurshumi, minister of public works, and the Dutch charge d'affaires in Sanaa. [Summary] [Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 21 Sep 85 GF]

ARAB FUND LOAN--An agreement was signed today in Abu Dhabi between the Arab Fund and the YAR. According to the agreement, the Arab Fund will provide a loan of \$16.3 million to the YAR to bolster the balance of payments. [Summary] [Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 9 Oct 85 GF]

NETHERLANDS AGREEMENT--A long-term 15,187,935 riyals loan agreement was signed today between the YAR and the government of the Netherlands. According to the agreement, the Netherlands will provide, install, maintain, and operate medical equipment which will be used at the general revolution hospital [Mustashfa al-Thawrah al-'Amm] in Sanaa. [Summary] [Sanaa Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 9 Oct 85 GF]

CSO: 4400/20

AFGHANISTAN

SOVIETS PULLING BACK AFTER HEAVY FIGHTING IN EAST

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 8 Sep 85 p 1

[Text]

Soviet troops were pulling back in some parts of eastern Afghanistan after more than a week of heavy fighting, and battered Muslim Mujahideen appear to be holding their positions, sources said Friday.

Soviet forces estimated at 10,000 to 15,000 troops, backed by scores of tanks and armored personnel carriers, have been conducting a major offensive against guerrilla supply lines and positions in Paktia Province.

Losses on both sides reportedly have been heavy, with the fighting coming to within a mile and a half (two kms) of the Pakistani border at times.

Guerrilla commanders, speaking on condition they not be identified further, said Friday that the Soviet forces were pulling back in some areas after inflicting heavy damages.

The Afghan Mujahideen are fighting to oust the communist government of Afghanistan, which is supported by an estimated 115,000 Soviet soldiers. Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in December, 1979, and changed the leadership of the communist government.

The Afghan Information Center, an independent group that monitors events inside Afghanistan, reported that Soviet forces appeared to have pulled back from the Gagi area of Paktia where fierce fighting was reported earlier in the week.

It was not clear if the Soviets were pulling back to local garrisons or moving further back to the town of Gardez in northern Paktia, center officials said.

"Things are a lot quieter now," said the center's director, Professor Sayed Majrooh.

Khob Reinforced

The Soviets seemed to have at least partly accomplished their goal of reinforcing the town of Khob, which has been surrounded by guerrilla forces for almost a year, Majrooh said.

It was not clear if the Soviets had broken through to Khost on the ground, but they had substantially reinforced the garrison, he said.

Majrooh said the Soviets had flown hundreds of troops into Khost and the town was now in much better condition to resist Mujahideen attacks.

Other reports indicated that the reinforced Khost garrison

had been attacking the surrounding insurgents.

Majrooh attributed the quieted fighting to the large number of Mujahideen reinforcements sent across the border to Pakistan. "Many Mujahideen have gone back now and this is making a difference," he said.

The Soviet attack was timed to coincide with the Muslim holy holiday of Eid ul-Adha when many guerrillas visit their families in refugee camps in Pakistan.

The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, one of the main guerrilla groups

claimed in a statement Friday that its forces had destroyed up to 45 enemy tanks, armored personnel carriers and trucks in the Paktia fighting.

The claim was impossible to verify, as is most information from Afghanistan, because the government bans western reporters.

The National Front also claimed it had killed 107 Soviet and Afghan government soldiers. Losses on both sides are reported to be heavy, and guerrilla groups admit they lost scores of men.

CSO: 4600/26

AFGHANISTAN

MUJAHIDIN LAUNCH COUNTER OFFENSIVE

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 10 Sep 85 p 1

[Text]

Afghan Mujahideen killed scores of Soviet troops, shot down four helicopters and destroyed 76 tanks and armored vehicles in a major offensive near the Pakistan border, Afghan guerrilla leaders said Sunday.

A spokesman for one of the largest Afghan guerrilla groups, the Hezb-e-Islamic led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, said a Soviet-led force overran four Mujahideen posts in eastern Afghanistan about 2 miles (3 km) from the Pakistani border in late August.

But on Sept. 1, he said, a force of 5,000 Muslim fighters launched a counter offensive in which they destroyed 36 tanks and other armored vehicles, shot down four helicopters and killed scores of Soviet troops.

Forty more tanks and trucks were destroyed as the Soviets retreated to the border village of Chahawni, he said.

"We wanted to keep attacking them and follow them to Chahawni," said Saifullah Halimi, 31, one of Hikmatyar's field commanders. "But our leader said

not to, because the area was flooded and heavily mined."

He said 85 of his guerrilla fighters were killed during 10 days of fighting in the district of Zazi in eastern Afghanistan. The district is used as an infiltration point for Afghan Mujahideen from Pakistan.

The guerrilla reports could not be confirmed.

Major guerrilla groups based in the border city of Peshawar denied responsibility for shooting down an Afghan domestic airliner last week in Afghanistan in which, according to Radio Kabul, all 52 people aboard were killed.

"We don't know anything about this incident," a Mujahideen spokesman said. "The Mujahideen would never shoot down a plane with innocent people on board. It could only happen if our brothers knew the plane was carrying Russian soldiers, which the airline often does."

Afghan guerrillas are trying to oust 115,000 Soviet occupation troops who invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 in support of President Babrak Karmal.

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

PAKISTANI VILLAGE BOMBED--Afghan aircraft crossed into Pakistan and bombed a remote border village in northern Waziristan territory, killing two people and injuring ten, a government spokesman said. On Monday morning four Afghan aircraft crossed into north Waziristan--a section of Northwest Frontier Province--and fired rockets at the village of Faqiran Killi, the spokesman said. Two people were killed and ten others were wounded, three seriously, he said Tuesday. The Pakistan government said the attack was unprovoked and lodged a protest with the Afghan embassy. The hamlet is near the route from Waziristan to Khost, a city in eastern Afghanistan's Paktia Province where Soviet forces have been under siege by Afghan resistance fighters. Soviets launched a massive anti-guerrilla operation in Paktia last month. Bombing there sometimes spills over into Pakistan. Twelve people, including an Afghan refugee, were killed and another injured last month on Pakistan's northern frontier with Afghanistan as a result of Afghan air raids and artillery fire across the border. On Tuesday, diplomatic sources said Afghan Mujahideen repulsed a large-scale Soviet-led offensive in eastern Afghanistan, killing or wounding more than 1,000 people in fierce fighting. The reports from the diplomats, who hold regular briefings on the condition that they not be identified, could not be independently verified.

[Text] [Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Sep 85 p 1]

CSO: 4600/26

BANGLADESH

SWEDISH AGENCY HALTING AID TO POPULATION CONTROL PROJECT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Sep 85 p 7

[Article by Peter Bratt: "Sida Stops Project Support"]

[Text] Sida has decided to stop continued support of the so-called population project in Bangladesh. Millions of poor women have been sterilized for large amounts of money under hygienic conditions which were frequently repellant. Fifty-six million kroner have gone into the project so far.

The World Bank sponsors the population project in Bangladesh. It started in 1975 and its second phase will conclude this December. Thus far the project has cost 770 million kroner, Sweden having paid 96 million.

The decision about the third phase was originally to have been made in February but owing in part to Swedish hesitancy has been put off until now. The next 5-year phase is to cover 271 million dollars or approximately 2.2 billion kroner, that is to say a very substantial increase.

50 Kronor

The project pretended to work on child and maternal care together with family planning. In practice almost all resources have gone into sterilizations.

Each sterilized woman received 50 kroner, which corresponds to one month's salary. Doctors received 5 kroner per sterilization.

Even so-called health workers, together with other staff, were paid for each woman they succeeded in having sterilized at clinics. Each clinic had to perform a certain number of sterilizations per month, otherwise authorities withheld staff salaries.

In 1983 an international group investigated the program and found that half of the clinics did not sterilize instruments between operations, doctors did not change operating gloves, if they had any, and the group was compelled to issue instructions concerning how staff should wash their hands between operations.

Many women have died as a result of the procedure. At the present time approximately 70,000 women per month are sterilized in Bangladesh. In the last 5 years alone over one million have been sterilized. Women often do not know that the procedure will make them permanently sterile.

"Shocking"

Karin Himmelstrand is the head of Sida's women's unit and coordinates Sida's so-called women's council which consists of representatives of women's organizations and women's political associations. She has studied the program on the spot.

"There is almost no health service in Bangladesh. Most are sterilizations. What shocks me the most is that the people running the program have so little feeling for the poor. If they really cared about them they would devote those resources which currently go into sterilization to education and child and maternal care instead."

12789

CSO: 3650/352

INDIA

HINDU ANALYST SCORES CENTER'S APPROACH TO SECURITY

Madras THE HINDU in English 8 Sep 85 p 2

[Text]

A BIG threat to Indian democracy is the growing menace of terrorism in public life, the new cult of blind hatred and senseless violence bred by a strange combination of communal fanaticism and political extremism. In this abnormal atmosphere of irrational anger and growing intolerance, there is no place for reasoned debate, a spirited defence of a principle, an uncompromising espousal of a cause or a firm adherence to one's convictions, without running the risk of a cold-blooded bid to silence a dissenting voice.

A free society with all its imperfections thrives on the opportunities open to its people to articulate their inner feelings without any fear of intimidation. But at the same time freedom cannot be allowed to degenerate into licence to foment disaffection, inflame passions, incite violence or preach hatred in the name of ideology or religion. There has to be a credible balance between the concept of unrestricted freedom and the need for some degree of regulation in a modern society beset with problems of rapid social change and emotional readjustment to the new realities of life. The very attempt to redress a grievance or avenge

Initiative always with extremists

a humiliation with a loaded gun destroys a democracy by placing a premium on communal or political violence.

An agonising dilemma that torments all free societies today, especially those of the Third World, is to what extent a State should regulate the freedoms of its people to protect them from threats of violence. It is not easy even at the best of times to maintain a healthy distinction between imposed constraints and self-restraint for evolving a widely acceptable code of conduct with its own value systems. It is the absence of respect for authority based on the sanctity of the rule of law that erodes both the power and prestige of a permissive society,

making it increasingly vulnerable to internal turmoils and external pressures.

In the last 37 years since Independence, India has gone through the painful ordeals of many agitations leading to a lot of bitterness and bloodshed, but has survived as a political entity largely because of its inner resilience. The foreign critics who thought that the new Indian State might break up in the face of these convulsions have been pleasantly surprised to see it emerge stronger from such challenges with all its cross-purposes. The more perceptive observers of the perplexing Indian scene now look upon this vast country as a society in a state of constant flux rather than a polity in disintegration.

Revenge killings

The Punjab crisis, however, has left many deep scars on the minds of the Indian people, because of the appalling atmosphere of violence bred by the bruised Sikh psyche, which has done immense harm to itself by transforming a political agitation into a religious crusade and glorifying terrorism as a legitimate means of avenging humiliations or redressing grievances. It has romanticised violence by en-

couraging demented and determined young men who have taken to extremism to indulge in political murders and even play with the lives of innocents by planting bombs in public places. The continuity of revenge killings as a form of organised vendetta is sought to be justified with the astonishing apologia that the assailants are left with no other alternative to register their protest against the Government's refusal to punish the perpetrators of the November riots that followed Indira Gandhi's assassination.

A more preposterous argument that is being advanced by the protagonists of this extremism is that the moderate Sikh leaders like Sant Harchand Singh Longowal have to be eliminated to prevent them from agreeing to anything short of a total acceptance of the original Akali demand for a privileged position for themselves in Punjab with an assured share of power in the country even if they do not press for secession. Despite its communal overtones, Sikh extremism has developed some extraordinary political overtones that renders the

more reasonable Sikhs even more vulnerable than their Hindu counterparts to this intimidation. It is not surprising that in the last four years the Sikh terrorists have killed as many Sikhs as Hindus in their fanatical frenzy to propagate their perverse cause with selective assassinations.

A shocking feature of these killings is the high degree of professional competence these terrorists display in hitting their targets with deadly precision in almost every instance. It can be argued that a determined killer, in a cold and calculated bid to get his victim at any cost, will sooner or later succeed in his deadly mission if he is prepared to run the risk of endangering his own life. But in practically all these assassinations, the culprits have been able to kill in broad daylight and disappear into thin air despite tight security arrangements in cities like Amritsar, Jalandhar, Chandigarh and Delhi.

This sad experience has shown that the mere display of force does not by itself provide for better security in the face of determined terrorism. The initiative always rests with the extremists who pick and choose their targets and wait for an opportune moment to carry out their murderous mission. What is even more distressing is the feudal concept of Indian security which places the primary emphasis on providing protection to the top leaders, senior officials and even Members of Parliament by posting more and more armed policemen at their homes and offices. The special security districts in the national capital have been organised for VIP protection rather than prevention of terrorism. The result is that the terrorists are able to strike with impunity at places of their choice with the least protection.

Politicised police

The brutalisation of the Indian police, followed by increasing political interference with its performance, has led not merely to increased laxity and incompetence, but also loss of public confidence in its ability and determination to cope with this gravest internal threat since Independence. The casualness with which the highly politicised police forces in the northern States have been behaving in coping with the increasing crime wave is much more evident in Delhi where not a day passes without its quota of murders, dacoities, bank robberies and petty burglaries which are not unusual in a big city except that the culprits are not caught in most cases.

One of the unfortunate legacies of the independence movement has been the tendency to glorify terrorism, which made those who were involved in conspiracy cases into national heroes in the milieu of a freedom struggle. It was natural for patriots like Bhagat Singh to be hailed as heroic men who sacrificed their lives for India's Independence. But after 1947, the whole context changed and the leftist radicals who resorted to armed struggle in places like Telengana came into conflict with the new government, which gave the police a free hand to put down what was deemed to be a communist-led insurrection.

The nation's leadership faltered in adopting subsequently a selective approach to violence by condoning some acts for political reasons, while showing no such leniency in other cases. There was a classic example of an amateur hijacker being rewarded with a Congress(I) ticket for an Assembly seat in his home State, but others who committed similar offences being made to face the consequences of their criminal actions. This tendency to adopt double standards has prevented the Government from pursuing vigorously some of the earlier cases of political assassinations for tracking down the culprits. A telling example of this disinclination for whatever reason was Jagat Narain's assassination in 1981 which was the starting point for the political killings that followed in Punjab culminating in Sant Longowal's assassination.

It will be a year soon since the murder of Indira Gandhi in her own house by her own bodyguards who hatched the daring plot to kill her in this inner sanctum protected by several concentric cordons of special security district that was set up in Delhi. In the last 10 months, her son, Rajiv has done what all he could to save the Sikh militants from their own sick mentality by offering a very fair settlement

Feudal concept of Indian security

of the Punjab problem. But the hardliners among these terrorists are adopting a tougher line by treating his generous response as a sign of weakness rather than a well-meaning readiness to close this most painful chapter in India's history since Independence. He is thus compelled to adopt a policy of combining his political generosity with firm administrative measures to curb this terrorism at any cost.

The Prime Minister took a calculated risk in ordering elections in Punjab after the recent accord to sustain the atmosphere of conciliation. But having taken this decision, he could not have put off the poll after the assassination of Sant Longowal without imperilling the whole agreement. The Government is treating the terrorist threat to disrupt the elections as a grave challenge to the rule of law in the country which is the very basis of its parliamentary system. So he is entitled to the unstinted support of all responsible people in thwarting this threat of disruption. It would be impossible for Indian democracy to survive if the Government succumbs to these threats of violence.

At the same time Mr. Rajiv Gandhi should give the highest priority to the reorganisation of the police, the humanisation of the forces of law and order by stopping political interference, professionalising the security services and paying the officers and men a living wage to end petty corruption. It is a shocking fact that many more in this country die in police firings than at the hands of dacoits, terrorists and other anti-social elements. The police

methods of interrogation involving torture, fabrication of evidence and intimidation of innocent persons must end if the people are to have any faith in its capacity to protect them.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was badly advised in first resisting, then delaying and finally diluting the terms of reference of the inquiry into the anti-

Sikh riots in November last in which many of his own party members were involved in Delhi. He lost an excellent opportunity to provide a healing touch to the wounded Sikh psyche by punishing some of those who tarnished the memory of Indira Gandhi by killing innocent people.

A reassuring feature of the Punjab tragedy is that the great majority of both Hindus and Sikhs are equally disgusted with the happenings in Punjab where at least 2,000 people have died before, during and after the military operation. It is not without significance that there has been no Hindu backlash against continued terrorism, since the Hindus as a community are not holding all the Sikhs responsible for the vandalism of a lunatic fringe that has taken to violence. The November riots too were not Hindu-Sikh riots in the commonly understood communal sense, but a violent reaction of a section of Hindus against Sikhs many of whom were saved by their Hindu neighbours.

Primary duty

It is the primary duty of every Government to protect not only its top leaders and other functionaries but also the common people from threats of political, communal or personal violence. But it requires a more enlightened approach to security, since no one can really be protected from assassination attempts by merely increasing the number of bodyguards without the active cooperation of the people who should be allowed to organise their own vigilants in their respective localities to meet the threats of terrorist violence. The present policy of deploying too many commandos and other armed men equipped with deadly automatic weapons, drawn from a medley of security services with no centralised direction and co-ordination, is by no means the best way of protecting a President, a Prime Minister or anybody else in the hit lists.

It has to be done with greater discretion and understanding of the psychology of terrorists with very little overt display of the armed might of the Government. The best way of maintaining security in the capital, for example, is not by posting swarms of armed men with stenguns round the clock, since physical strain and mental boredom are bound to make some of them jerky with all the attendant dangers of over-reaction, creating an entirely different set of problems.

CSO: 5650/0006

INDIA

DELHI PLANS EXPOSE OF PAKISTAN EXTREMIST TRAINING

Madras THE HINDU in English 11 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Sept. 10.

The Government of India intends to publish shortly a well-corroborated account of Pakistan's involvement in the Punjab crisis, along with full details of the kind of training that has been given to the extremists at secret camps, the types of weapons given to them and the way they have been indoctrinated to engage themselves in acts of terrorism to create communal discord in the State.

Though it has had a lot of highly incriminating information about this sinister activity, India had refrained from disclosing the damaging details since this would have logically led to a break of relations with Pakistan.

But now the Government feels that it can no longer afford to keep silent without publicly indicting Pakistan for its diabolical interference in the country's internal affairs, which is continuing despite General Zia-ul-Haq's protestations of innocence. So it has been decided to come forward with damning evidence of Pakistan's deep involvement to expose its evil intentions.

Intelligence checked

According to information at the disposal of the Government which has been checked and cross-checked to make doubly certain of the facts established through painstaking investigation, there are at least a dozen secret camps in Punjab, Sind and occupied Kashmir where the Sikh extremists are trained after they are politically indoctrinated at other centres. The training includes use of sophisticated arms and methods for political assassinations, destruction of sensitive installations, disruption of communications, creation of communal discord, and spreading of panic through indiscriminate violence.

The Pakistani secret services which have been in contact with the extremists abroad have utilised their clandestine contacts in Punjab to spread disaffection among the young Sikhs and encourage them to get across the bor-

der to receive training and return to India to carry on their campaign of terrorism. A good many Pakistani agents posing as expatriate Sikhs have been employed to brainwash these young recruits with insidious propaganda, inciting them to avenge the humiliation of last year's military action at the Golden Temple.

Many of the captured terrorists have confessed that they had been to Pakistan to receive training and returned with weapons to engage themselves in acts of violence. The intensive interrogation of these terrorists, who have been questioned separately at length, has led to the discovery of foolproof evidence of Pakistani involvement to an extent that would have normally led to a rupture of diplomatic relations.

The interrogators have been able to correlate the highly damaging confessions made by these terrorists to establish beyond any shadow of doubt not merely the fact of Pakistan's complicity, but also to identify the individual officers of the Pakistan Army, police and secret services, involved in this perfidious operation. The shocking details, if and when made public, will come as a big surprise even to those ardent advocates of Indo-Pak amity, who have been inclined to give the benefit of doubt to the Zia regime to exonerate it of any treacherous involvement in the Punjab happenings other than the offer of some token assistance to the extremists to derive a bit of perverse satisfaction from India's discomfiture.

What India has been facing is not just a few pinpricks from Pakistan, but a brazen attempt to destabilise Punjab by arming and inciting the terrorists to indulge in senseless violence. The Government of India has been concerned more with the political ramifications of this conspiratorial attempt than the subversive impact of this terrorist activity, which at no stage, has posed any grave danger to the unity or security of the country, other than creating some law-and-order problems.

" The reluctance of the Government to come forward all this time with conclusive evidence of Pakistan's complicity in the Punjab crisis has created a credibility gap, making many foreign governments wonder whether Islamabad was really guilty of any deep-rooted involvement other than some marginal interference. The impending publication of a detailed indictment will set at rest all such doubts by exposing Pakistan fully before the bar of world opinion.

CSO: 5650/0008

INDIA

BRITISH HANDLING OF TERRORIST ARRESTS QUESTIONED

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 7 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by K. N. Malik]

[Text] LONDON, September 6.

THE arrests of six Pakistani members of the fanatic Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, yesterday in Luton, Birmingham and Lancashire, were made by the special branch of British security on information provided by Indian intelligence.

The Indian high commissioner, Dr. P. C. Alexander, passed on the information to the British foreign office which in turn alerted the home office.

The information collected in Britain, some say from sources close to British intelligence, had the Indian high commission believe that a Pakistani JKLF activist, Chowdhury Mohammed Siddique, wanted in the kidnapping and murder of the Indian diplomat, Mr. Ravindra Mhatre, early last year, who had fled to Pakistan, returned to Britain sometime in July this year.

He brought with him two Soviet-made automatic guns. He along with some other activists then got busy plotting the kidnap of a senior Indian diplomat. A number of JKLF activists in Luton and Birmingham were allegedly involved in the plot.

MEDIA INFORMED

The British media was tipped off before the raids and arrests. As planned, photographers and reporters were present when the raids were carried out. Later in the day British newsmen were given details of the arrests.

The manner in which the press was tipped off before the arrests and briefed after the arrests has raised doubts about the whole incident. Unless the exercise

was aimed at publicity U.S.-FBI style, there was no need for the fanfare which accompanied the arrests.

This is not in keeping with British style, in any case. Many feel that the British wanted to arrest some Pakistani Kashmiris and may arrest some extremist Sikhs to convince India of the firmness with which Britain would deal with mischief-makers at the time of the Indian Prime Minister's visit here from October 14 to 16.

RAJIV'S VISIT

The FBI had also discovered a plot to murder the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, and the Haryana chief minister, Mr. Bhajan Lal, just before Mr. Gandhi visited the U.S. in June.

The second question being asked is why the British took the tip given by the Indian high commission so seriously at this juncture when it brushed aside most tips on terrorist activities in the past.

On a number of occasions Indian intelligence had made available to its British counterparts information about extremist Sikh hit-squads planning the murder of Indian leaders.

The plots were often hatched in Britain, according to this information, but the British did not take the information seriously or at least did not act on it.

There are some who believe that the British intelligence planted the information through its sources in Britain who in turn tipped off the Indians in Britain. This way no one could say that the British discovered the plot or made arrests simply to convince the Indians on the eve of the Indian Prime Minister's visit to Britain.

They could easily turn back and say that they acted on information received from the Indians. The British could not be sceptical about the arrests because the information was passed on to them by the Indian themselves.

Many wonder why there was any need for the Pakistanis to smuggle Soviet-made automatic guns from Pakistan. The same would be available in Britain. It is highly unlikely that Siddique could have entered Britain without the knowledge of the British immigration and police authorities.

Many were surprised that Ammanullah Khan was not arrested even when in a letter to British MPs he claimed and justified murdering Mr. Mhatre. The British also did not arrest or deport extremist Sikhs even though many openly vowed to kill Indian leaders.

JKLF IN-FIGHTING

According to some sources, the arrests of JKLF activists may be the result of in-fighting within the front. Recently Ammanullah was ousted from the presidency of the front and was replaced by Mohd. Afzal Jatwi.

The group led by the latter was trying to put pressure on Qayum Raja, convicted in the Mhatre murder case, to link Ammanullah with the murder case, it is learnt. The arrests of Ammanullah along with his five supporters could be the result of information provided by some JKLF activists.

Mr. Ravindra Mhatre was murdered early last year and several JKLF activists were sentenced in the case early this year. Among the arrested persons are some senior office-bearers of the JKLF.

INDIA

PAPER REPORTS, DELHI DENIES FRANK CAMPER CLAIM

Camper: Bomb Warning Given

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 10 Sep 85 p 1

[Text]

BOMBAY, September 9.
(UNI).

FRANK Camper, the American superstar guru of saboteurs, assassins and terrorists, had several times warned the Indian consulate in New York of Sikh terrorists' intention to blow up two Air-India planes on the same day at the same time but the consulate staff did not pay any attention to him.

This startling revelation, along with details of how the Sikh terrorists had penetrated the innermost circle concerned with the Prime Minister's security, had been published in an interview which Mr. Pritish Nandy, editor of the "Illustrated Weekly of India" had with the owner of the Alabama-based terrorist school.

Mr. Camper had disclosed that his contact offered to give details of the plot to place bombs in Air-India aircraft but the government of India was not interested in the least. If the consulate in New York had co-operated, so many innocent lives could have been saved, Mr. Camper mourned.

Mr. Camper has said that the plane that exploded and the plane to Bombay, on which the baggage at Tokyo airport was to have gone were scheduled to blow up together in mid-air. But the explosives expert the terrorists used was unable to time the bombs accurately. That's why one blew up too late and the other exploded on the ground.

The terrorists' intention was to blow up two big Air-India planes on the same day and hog headlines the world over. This would have made them the most feared terrorist group in the world overnight.

Mr. Camper alleged that Mr. Gandhi's security plans were reaching the Sikhs almost as soon as they were being conceived. There was one person very close to Mr. Gandhi who was informing the Sikhs about his every move. Every plan, and in fact every last-minute change in plan, was reaching them instantly through this person.

Mr. Camper said the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), at whose request he had penetrated the terrorist organisation, had gently conveyed this information to the Indian security which "quietly moved away this person without any fuss or controversy."

Mr. Camper said, "We can never confide in the Indians because your intelligence has been penetrated by the GRU. Anything we tell you reaches the Soviets immediately." He admitted that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) too had penetrated Indian intelligence. "Otherwise, how do you think we know," he added.

"The terrorists had perfect plans for assassinating Mr. Gandhi as well as the Haryana chief minister, Mr. Bhajan Lal. It's the FBI that saved them on the basis of information provided by my school."

Mr. Camper alleged that there were other terrorist organisations like the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) which were supporting Sikh terrorists in a clandestine fashion. "I have evidence of all this. First-hand evidence," he said.

Continuing, he said the Sikh terrorists had plenty of money. Plus, they also had the support of Pakistan and communist China, who were giving them all kinds of backing, military as well as monetary.

When asked how exactly he had penetrated the Sikh organisation, Mr. Camper said, "That's my evidence in the New Orleans trial. I'd rather not speak now."

Mr. Camper said he had initially trained four Sikh terrorists. Balraj Singh, editor of a newspaper in Manhattan was their leader. The other three were Lal Singh, Avraj Singh and Sukhvinder Singh. Of these, Sukhvinder Singh has been caught by the FBI and charged with attempt to murder Bhajan Lal. "Sukhvinder will almost certainly hang. There's too much evidence for him to get off lightly," he added.

He, however, refused to disclose more details as he had to shortly testify against Sukhvinder in the New Orleans court where he would disclose all details.

The terrorist trainer said the Sikhs, who were in considerable number in Birmingham, were out to kill him and his colleague Paul Johnson for betraying the "Khalistan" cause.

Mr. Camper said the FBI and the CIA did not want anything to happen to India. They were not interested in seeing the break-up of India and had done their best, given their bureaucratic limitations, to stop the Sikhs in America from harming India. "Unfortunately, the Canadian authorities are not all that co-operative," he added.

He said the Sikhs had offered him a huge sum of money to rescue one of their colleagues, who was convicted for gun-running, from an Indian jail in Amritsar. He refused as it was a "stupid, hare-brained scheme."

He added, "India is not a banana republic where you can walk in and break a jail to rescue someone. The Indian law enforcement authorities are excellently organised, tough and capable. If you think you can monkey around with them, forget it. They'll catch you even before you reach the jail."

TWO DRAWBACKS

He said, "Only two things are preventing the Sikh terrorists from harming India further—their lack of field experts and enough fighting equipments. They don't know where to buy the equipments, ammunition and crack fighters."

Mr. Camper said he had agreed to be debriefed by Indian military experts but the government of India had turned down his offer as it "didn't want to tangle with me."

During the training in his school, Balraj Singh was seriously injured in an ambush, Mr. Camper said and added that by now he should have lost one of his eyes. "That should be a dead giveaway". Lal Singh too was a good fighter but Mr. Camper never thought he would hit the "big league" in the way he had.

He said he had received requests both from Sinhalese and Tamil terrorists in Sri Lanka to train their people but he had refused as he did not know who was right and who was wrong.

Delhi Denial Reported

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 11 Sep 85 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, September 10.

THE government today denied having received any information about the plot to place bombs aboard Air-India aircraft from Frank Camper who runs a mercenary school in Alabama in the United States.

A spokesman of the external affairs ministry dismissed as baseless Camper's allegation that there was a person close to the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, who was informing the Sikhs about his every movement.

Camper in his interview with "The Illustrated Weekly of India" had also stated that the Indian security forces quietly moved away this informant without any fuss or controversy after he had conveyed a message to them in this regard.

The spokesman said no such information had ever been received by the Indian mission in the U.S. or by any Indian security organisation from Camper or from any of his associates. "No one close to the Prime Minister has been removed for any such lapse," he added.

The spokesman referred to Camper's offer to infiltrate the Sikh terrorist organisation and said that the government has had no contact with Camper.

"Neither Camper nor these people who claimed to know him had even mentioned or offered to give details of any plot to place a bomb on the Air-India plane," the spokesman said.

Asked whether any contact was made before or after the Air-India plane crash on June 23, the spokesman said the sequence was not known.

CSO: 5650/0007

INDIA

BRIEFS

SIKHS IN NORTH AMERICA--New York, Sept. 6 (PTI)--Four Sikhs were assaulted, a priest, allegedly shot at a member of a congregation at a Gurdwara and a memorial service for Sant Harchand Singh Longowal was foiled in three incidents of violence reported in North America last week. One Sikh broke his arm, another his ankle and the other two were wounded. They were returning by car from a Gurdwara opening ceremony on August 25, when they were stopped and beaten up by a group of militant Sikhs. All of them were identified by an Indian newspaper here as being involved in a court injunction obtained by the Akali Singh Society in Vancouver against a bid by separatist Sikhs to hoist a "Khalistan" flag. In Toronto, INDIA ABROAD reported that sword-wielding Sikh militants had thwarted a memorial meeting for Sant Longowal on August 25 sponsored by the Canadian Sikhs and Hindus United for Peace. The report said the 200 people who had turned up for the meeting were confronted by the militants. The temple management then called off the meeting. In California's El Sobrante, a Sikh priest was accused of shooting a member of his congregation on August 24. [Text] [Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 7 Sep 85 p 3]

CSO: 5650/0003

IRAN

COMMENTARY RECOGNIZES 'ANTI-ZIONIST' RESURGENCE

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Sep 85 p 2

[Text]

In recent guerrilla attacks on Zionist positions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip a number of Zionists were killed or wounded. Meanwhile, in two bomb explosions in Jerusalem the occupiers suffered more casualties. Attacks on the Zionists have even spread to the Golan Heights, where despite constant popular anti-Zionist protests, instances of armed struggle have been rare. These developments have added to the fears of the Zionists who are adopting increasingly repressive methods for stopping the movement.

In recent weeks, the Zionist cabinet was busy considering possible responses to popular protest. After Yitzhak Rabin, the Zionist war minister asked for intensified security measures, special paratroop units were dispatched to the occupied territories in the West Bank and a curfew was imposed in the cities of Ramallah and Hebron. In the town of Tul-Karam a curfew was already in effect. At the same time Zionist vigilantes armed with weapons wonder in West Bank city streets spreading death and terror with the complicity of the military forces.

The Zionists are determined to stop the armed struggle in the occupied territories from becoming another Lebanon. However, the lesson of Lebanon is that if people continue resistance and struggle they will surely win. Accordingly, the people in the occupied territories should be aware that they will witness the liberation of Palestinian territory if they endure the hardships of struggle.

Today, the importance of resistance is dramatically demonstrated by the failures of all peace plans that were in themselves no more than conditional surrender to Zionist demands.

The world community, and Islamic countries in particular, should give financial and spiritual support to this popular movement in Palestine. The Muslims have to support the struggling Palestinian Muslim masses not only because Masjid Al-Aqsa in Jerusalem the first Muslim qibla (direction for Prayer) is located in Palestine, they must aid the Palestinians to preserve their own independence, self-determination and respond to the pressure that the imperialist powers, especially the United States, are putting on them through the Zionist regime.

CSO: 4500/25

IRAN

PAPER SUPPORTS PROSECUTOR GENERAL'S FIGHT AGAINST MINI-SATANS

LD040917 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1200 GMT 3 Oct 85

[From the press review]

[Text] During this week the revolutionary action of the prosecutor general of the country in preventing the return of mini-satans was of great significance. JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in its political commentary under the title "The Battle Against Mini-Satans Should Continue" has commented about the new directive issued by the prosecutor general of the country, and writes:

Hojjat ol-Eslam Musavi-Kho'iniha, the prosecutor general of the country, by issuing an official circular addressed to all the Islamic revolution and public prosecutors, instructed them to provide the complete names and details of the plunderers and fugitive capitalists who have again returned to the country and who are taking their cases to courts or prosecutors' offices and to send the details as soon as possible to the office of the prosecutor general, so that Shari'a and legal steps can be taken against them.

This revolutionary step is what the martyr-nurturing people, who were the main supporters of this great revolution, expect from the judiciary. With this move, the prosecutor general renewed people's faith in the judicial system, and reassured them that a number of well-known lawyers will not be able to misuse certain legal loopholes or seemingly legal tactics in order to enable the mini-satans to return to the country.

The directive of the prosecutor general has emphasized that certain reports indicate that some fugitive capitalists who have returned to the country are finding their ways to the courts with the help of some lawyers; and at times succeed in obtaining decrees to dispossess those who have occupied their properties or factories.

One should regard this revolutionary directive of the country's prosecutor general as a good beginning for the severance of mysterious hands from the judicial system of the country; because there are many people who possessed great wealth through collusion with the royal court, princes, banks or misuse of public funds, and now wish to prove their ownership of that plundered wealth by employing mercenary lawyers.

This revolutionary move of the prosecutor general of the country could be regarded as the beginning of a basic review of all decrees issued by courts in this respect. To the extent that this directive caused the happiness of the martyr-nurturing nation and the supporters of the revolution, it worried to the same extent, or even more, the mini-satans and those who were making use of the return of the mini-satans and those who were trying to regain their illegitimate interests in this way.

The realization of this point helps us to better understand the importance of the issue; because if this move by the prosecutor general is only a temporary measure which is not followed up, the mini-satans will retreat for a while, but will then try to take a few steps forward.

The campaign against the mini-satans in political, social, economic and cultural dimensions should be a clear, calculated, fundamental and continuous campaign; so that the return of the mini-satans and the satanic culture will be eliminated for ever.

CSO: 4640/25

IRAN

CHIEF JUSTICE DISCUSSES IMPOUNDED PROPERTY

GFO60830 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0430 GMT 6 Oct 85

[Excerpts] Mr Musavi Ardabili, the chief justice, during a mass media interview yesterday afternoon, said in reply to a correspondent's question on the reasons for returning impounded or (?detained) properties and [words indistinct] their owners, it is the job of the Islamic government to impose real Islamic laws. Our objectives and our program are based on the saying of 'Ali Ibn Abi Talim, peace be upon him, which says: I will take back the ownerless properties and return them to the public treasury, even if these properties are part of the dowry of the spouses of the usurping persons.

The chief justice added, the judge must order that action be taken on this statement.

Gazi, [the judge--FBIS] can make mistakes like any other person. This does not mean that when this or that property is restored, God Forbid, the justice department is acting illegally or is not prosecuting the revolution. When Gazi reviews his own order or orders of another person, he is doing what all other courts are doing. In a certain case he might revise his own order or he may order that restored or returned properties be re-impounded.

The clash of the judiciary with the usurpers at the treasury or the owners of illegal properties is a legal duty. The law in Islamic justice exacts that the illegal properties be impounded and given to their true owners. This is the rule that governs our Islamic policy. We are charged with keeping peace in the Islamic society. We believe that whoever possesses legally acquired property is not its owner, and the person who has illegal property in his possession should return it to the public treasury. The chief justice cited certain judges, who against the law had ordered restoration of certain portions of certain property unlawfully, and were now serving prison terms for violating the law. Ardabili said, with certain difficulties that we have it was possible that a certain Qazi or any other lesser official of the judiciary might have violated the law--(but he will not have to wait for long) as we act with finality and speed in these matters.

With regard to properties that are perishable or deteriorating the chief justice said: In the work rules addressed to the administrators of such properties like the foundation for the oppressed, we have allowed officials

to conform to special procedures so that property that is liable to deteriorate or perish or lose value be sold. The proceeds are placed in a special account. The court may order legal action regarding the property.

With regard to the latest Interior Ministry circular issued to the foundation of the oppressed, which allows the foundation the right to administer the impounded properties, Ardabili said that the foundation of the oppressed must report all such matters immediately to the special courts set up under Article 49 of the constitution.

CSO: 4640/24

IRAN

EDITOR OF NEW DAILY COMMENTS ON POLICIES

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 19 Sep 85 pp 1-2

[Text]

TEHRAN — The Persian daily Resalat will start publishing re-months, its editor told the TEHRAN TIMES.

In an exclusive interview Hojjatolislam Azari Qomi said, "the daily will be free from any sort of influence and will pursue Islamic views in the press.

Resalat much talked-of in the foreign media made its debut just two weeks ago when its "zero edition" was brought out on the newsstands in the capital. The zero edition is technically printed prior to the regular issues of the periodicals on a trial basis.

Qomi, a Majlis member from the holy city of Qom said his daily will be independent and will not back any person in particular.

He said, "We will publish material in the newspaper which we consider Islamic."

To report the facts objectively, respecting the people and reporting both opposing and the agreeable viewpoints

are among the plans of this newspaper so that it would help in promoting the awareness of the people of the country, Azari Qomi said.

He denied that the newspaper will be an instrument in the hands of the opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran, adding that these rumors have taken root because of his opposition to the plans of the government of Mir Hussein Musavi.

He said that although he had been against the trends and policies of the government of Premier. Musavi, yet he had never tried to weaken it because of the approval given to it by the Imam and because he firmly follows the Vali Faghih (Jurisprudent).

Azari Qomi, confirming that he and some other Ulama of Qom had sent a letter to the Imam at the beginning of the year, said that he firmly denies that this letter carried the view that the war (Iran-

Iraq war) should come to an end. He added that all the signatories of the letter stand firm in their desire to continue the war which represents a war against the East and the West.

Azari Qomi said that the work of the present government will end on October 8, 1985 and it is possible that the president will present his new government to the Majlis a few days before this so that there would not be a hindrance in the work of the executive.

As the representative of the people of Qom in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Majlis, Azari Qomi said that the future prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran should have a great revolutionary background, should be firm and decisive and should be a strong believer in the Islamic Republic. He added that the prime minister should be able to gather the best colleagues, should be popular and also have the support of the people.

CSO: 4600/31

PAKISTAN

ARTICLE EXAMINES CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC SERVICES

Karachi DAWN in English 24 Sep 85 p 5

[Article by N. Nawaz Khan]

[Text] **IN ABSTRACT** discussions we are all against bribery and corruption but in practical and concrete terms, perhaps, none. A corrupt or dishonest official is not a man from Mars, he is one of us. He is tied with multi-dimensional relationships to the people around him.

If we are all against corruption, as we profess to be, why do we not come across a real-life story in which a father has disinherited a corrupt son, a son has rebelled against a corrupt father or a wife has refused to touch 'haram' income of her husband? Why have we never seen a group of concerned citizens organising social boycott of a neighbour on the grounds of his known corruption? How many matrimonial proposals are turned down because of reservations about the sources of a family's affluence? The sociologists may like to probe the reasons of this apathy and double standards of our society, we are concerned only with practical implications of this phenomenon.

Fact of the matter is that even those among us who abhor corruption, do not show that abhorrence in our social relationships. A corrupt individual does not run the risk of being ostracised by his peers or society at large. We would like

the problem to be solved by Government without our own active involvement. A section of the community is, of course, not against corruption at all no matter how much its members protest in public. They hate the honest public servant and would go to any length to probe his moral defences to find the weak spots through which his integrity could be destroyed. It is indeed a miracle that we still have public servants who are able to resist their blandishments, inducements, temptations and, above all, pressures of all kinds. They refuse to be bought by the rich or intimidated and blackmailed by the powerful.

Wholesale corruption

A recent editorial in Dawn on 'Cancer of Corruption' made two points regarding corruption in public services. These were, that corruption invariably flowed from top to bottom, and that bureaucracy, which in our setup was all powerful and all-pervasive, has contributed the most in the spread of corruption. We accept the validity of both the points but like to add two caveats. Firstly, when we say that corruption flows from top to bottom, the 'top' is not reached at the level of Secretary of a Federal Ministry, it goes higher than that; in fact, right up to the pinnacle of the power pyramid in the country.

Secondly, while we may hold the bureaucracy primarily responsible for the spread of corruption in the country, some blame must also be apportioned to those who, while in power, deliberately corrupted the public services through inducement or intimidation. Their responsibility cannot be belittled by saying that a few such instances cannot be the cause of wholesale corruption that one comes across in public services nowadays. Firstly, the instances to which we are referring are not just a few but many, and secondly, a ruler who commits even one illegal act through a public servant, starts a chain reaction that ends in the corruption of entire bureaucracy.

Public services of a country, if they are to be just and fair in their dealings with public, must be guided in their decisions by impersonal laws, rules and regulations. Obedience to an impersonal law creates in them a sense of norm consciousness that keeps them on the straight path and protects them from the illegal demands of their political superiors. If under pressure from the top, they start taking decisions that are arbitrary or against the norms set by law, they would forfeit the protection of law. They would be then at the mercy of those whose biddings they carried out in disregard of norms established by law. At that stage all their moral defences would have crumbled and they would have no compunctions against feathering their own nests while they were in the good books of their masters. It is in this sense that we blame the rulers for corrupting the public services. Unfortunately, this process started soon after independence.

Some authorities claim that it started in early fifties during the first post-independence elections in the Punjab, others would give the credit for starting the process, in a systematic manner, to Nawab Kalabagh. One may choose any date one prefers, but the point to note is that the process has not yet come to an end.

Later in this article we are making some suggestions on how to combat corruption in public services but it must be appreciated that the condition precedent for taking effective action against corrupt officials is the political will to

give an honest bureaucracy and clean administration to the country. If a Government claims that it intends to root out corruption and clean up the public services, while at the same time it uses and manipulates the services for its political ends, it is either deceiving itself or the public. A bureaucrat who helps a politician to remain in power, will expect the politician to look in the other direction when he tries to help himself.

Only that Government can have the political will to clean up the Augean stables of bureaucratic corruption which has a strong, well-disciplined political party at its back and does not, therefore, need the bureaucracy to prop it up. Nor is it obliged to confer unmerited privileges and continuous opportunities of patronage upon the legislators to keep them in line and retain their confidence. So far the country has had only one such government but it not only threw away its chance to clean up the services but also proceeded to destroy their independence and self-confidence by dismissing over 1300 employees with one stroke of pen, mostly on the basis of complaints by its party workers. It even tried to substitute loyalty to the party in power and its head, for loyalty to the State and the law of the land.

We do not know when the country will have another Government with a convincing popular mandate and how that Government will use the opportunity given to it by the electorate. Whether it will proceed to strengthen institutions of public accountability, that is, the Parliament, the judiciary and the Press or try to subvert them for its political ends. While there are no two opinions about assumption of full sovereignty by the Parliament and restoration of complete independence to the judiciary, freedom of the Press is a different matter. Many well-meaning persons hesitate to recommend full unbridled freedom for the Press. In the context of the problem that we are discussing, we would submit that a mere cancellation of the amendment to the libel law, that gives undue protection to public functionaries, is not enough. We must go further than that and bring our laws on libel as near as possible to the American laws so that a public figure could successfully sue a newspaper for damages only when

he proved that not only the information published by the paper was untrue but the paper did not exercise reasonable care to verify the facts. Grant of such a freedom to the press will make the public figures, that is, politicians and top bureaucrats, think twice before they transgress the law.

Corruption has now become a way of life with us and penetrated almost all facets of our lives. It cannot be eliminated in a short period. Its containment, what to say of elimination, would require a strong commitment by the people and the Government to wage a war against it, and to continue the struggle for a decade, or even more, if necessary. Whenever a Government, irrespective of its political hue, starts a systematic campaign against corruption, it will have a real fight on its hands. The number of persons who have acquired a vested interest in corruption and corrupt practices, is far too large and they will not accept defeat easily. In the fond hope that sooner or later the country will have a Government with the mandate and the will to clean up the administration, we make three suggestions for its consideration.

Libel law

First, all Government servants must be adequately remunerated. They should not be compelled to supplement their salaries, by fair or foul means to provide shelter, food and clothing to their families. (We are assuming that medical facilities to the family and education to the children, will be provided free, or at nominal cost, by Government). Present salaries do not fully provide for the basic needs of a large number of Government servants. A Government that is serious about fighting corruption, will have to give its employees a living wage and earmark resources for this purpose, year after year, till the desired level is reached. Since it will be almost impossible to find additional resources through conventional means, some unorthodox methods may have to be used to supplement budgetary resources set aside for this purpose. For example, additional resources can be raised for this purpose by improving pro-

ductivity of Government servants and thereby reducing their number.

One method of improving productivity and finding additional resources for payment of higher wages would be to tell each departmental head that any amount that he saves, by reducing the existing strength of his department, without lowering its total or per man productivity, will be paid back to his staff by way of productivity bonus. A well-designed scheme of this type may even start a healthy competition among departments and ministries to make every one pull his full weight, and thereby eliminate feather-bedding which is so common in all government organisations.

Secondly, Government servants' sense of security, independence and self-confidence must be restored if they are expected to resist illegal orders of their superiors. Efficiency and Discipline Rules ought to be amended in such a way that the worst that could happen to a Government servant, who resists an illegal order, would be that his promotion might be delayed or he might be shunted to sidelines on unimportant jobs. We do not recommend the same type of protection for Government servants which they enjoyed in pre-independence government of India but do wish to emphasise that the pendulum has swung too much in the opposite direction. This is particularly true of senior civil servants who serve, virtually, at the pleasure of Government. Security of tenure is part of the price to be paid for an honest, upright and impartial bureaucracy.

Our last recommendation is likely to raise many eyebrows. It may also appear to contradict our foregoing recommendation regarding security of tenure. The proposal that is being made is indeed a desperate remedy for a hopeless situation.

The present arrangements of bringing the corrupt and dishonest officials to book are totally inadequate and very dilatory. In rare cases in which corrupt officials are actually prosecuted, legal proceedings drag on for years and with very few convictions. Such prosecutions have no deterrent effect whatsoever. On the contrary, in the eyes of the public, the long drawn-out

legal proceedings often transform the villain into a victim.

The remedy to this situation may be to allow private individuals or a group of persons, to petition the High Court to order a judicial inquiry against any Government servant who, in the opinion of the petitioners, is dishonest, corrupt or lives beyond his means. The petitioners will be required to submit an affidavit, along with a gist of evidence that he wishes to produce before the enquiry officer, to the Registrar of the High Court. If the court considers that a prima facie case exists against the Government servant concerned, it shall order a judicial enquiry by an officer of appropriate status, but not lower than an additional sessions judge. When such an enquiry is ordered by the court, the government servant concerned shall be removed immediately from his post and sent on leave. Such enquiries should not be unduly encumbered by procedural laws.

If the inquiry officer finds that charges have been proved, the Government servant concerned shall be dismissed from service and the Government shall be obliged to institute criminal proceedings against him. Government may also consider forfeiture of his property in full or in part. When the inquiry only establishes a strong suspicion of corruption against the Government servant, he shall be retired from service with all the pensionary benefits to which he may be entitled.

In case the charges are proved to be totally false and malicious, the Government servant shall be honourably acquitted and Government shall prosecute the petitioners for bringing false charges against one of its employees. The affected Government servant shall be free to claim damages from the petitioners.

In order to avoid a spate of petitions against corrupt officials, the proposed procedure may be restricted, initially, to officials of Grade 17 and above in general but also holders of specified appointments in selected departments like police, customs and income tax etc. In the case of police it should apply to all SHOs.

Some persons may consider our suggestion to be impracticable because, in their opinion, not many people are going to take the trouble of collecting evidence against corrupt officials. Perhaps they are right, but we believe that even one successful action against a corrupt official by the people themselves shall have more salutary effect than a hundred prosecutions by Government. Moreover, since nothing has been done and nothing is likely to be done by Government in the present circumstances, let the Parliament give the authority to the people by passing the necessary legislation. If we, the people, do not act even when we are given the authority by the parliament, then we deserve what we have got.

PAKISTAN

OFFICIAL TALKS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS OF KALABAGH DAM

Karachi DAWN in English 25 Sep pp 1, 8

[Text]

LAHORE, Sept 24: The 3.5-billion-dollar Kalabagh Dam will on its completion, provide large volume of additional irrigation water and electricity to all the four provinces of Pakistan.

The Chairman of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Lt.-Gen. Ghulam Safdar Butt, in an interview to APP, described the Kalabagh Dam as a project of great national importance and emphasised that it would ensure continuous development of all sectors of the national economy. He said there was no alternative to this project.

The WAPDA Chairman said the combined benefit of the Dam would be to the tune of one billion dollars per year, which would be besides its contribution towards industrial expansion and increase in agricultural production.

He said the project, which had a history of 30 years of preparation of feasibility reports by different international organisations, on-site investigations and preparation of detailed drawing and tender documents, was now ready for launching and notices for pre-qualification to various contractors were expected to be issued during the current month.

SALIENT FEATURES: Explaining salient features of the proposed Dam, the WAPDA Chairman said it would be an essentially power generating project, which would also make 7.6 million acres feet of irrigation water available for use in all the four provinces.

It would, thus, be different from Tarbela and Mangla, as both were essentially irrigational projects. He said it was totally baseless that the Dam would, in any way, deprive any province of its share in Indus water. On the contrary, each province would get additional water to the extent of its share in accordance with the distribution arrangements.

Lt.-Gen. Butt said the power house at the Dam would produce 2,400 megawatts of electricity after the completion of its first phase, while its generation will rise to 3,600 megawatts. It would be fed into the national grid, to be available to all provinces. Creation of water reservoir at Kalabagh would also allow a re-regulation of water releases from Tarbela Lake, which would mean an increase in power generation from Tarbela power house by 70 to 30 per cent.

COMPARATIVE STUDIES: He said comparative economic studies showed that a thermal power project of the size of the Rs. 40 billion proposed power house at Kalabagh would cost to begin with, and a recurring expenditure of Rs. 10 billion every year for the import of oil or coal.

The WAPDA Chairman categorically denied that the Kalabagh Dam would have any negative impact on the Mardan SCARP Project. He said the maximum level of Kalabagh reservoir would be 925 feet above sea-level, while that of Swabi and Pabbi ranged between 1,000 feet. In fact, three big drains,

from Mardan SCARP area would flow into the Kalabagh reservoir.

Lt.-Gen. Safdar Butt said no other comparable alternative site on Indus was available for the construction of a Dam at this stage. The next site under consideration was at Basha, upstream of Tarbela, which had been identified in the ranking study of hydel developments and pre-feasibility studies had been carried out. At least, 10 more years would be needed for detailed investigations and establishing technical feasibility and project planning of a Dam at this site, he added.

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS:

The WAPDA Chairman said the environmental effects of the Kalabagh Dam had also been studied in great detail and arrangements had been made to either resettle the affected population or to provide protection to certain areas with the construction of dykes etc. He said 72 per cent of the 1,60,000 acres of land, to be submerged in the reservoir was wasteland. Of the 39,000 acres of *Burani* area, 30,000 acres were located in the Punjab while the remaining 9000 acres in the Frontier Province.

The reservoir would submerge only 6,600 acres of irrigated land, out of which 3,800 acres were in the Punjab while the remaining acres in the NWFP.

The Dam would affect a population of 68,600 out of which 55 per cent belong to the Punjab.

He said all the affected villages would be removed to a higher level, where all the civic facilities like roads, schools, hospitals and mosques would be provided at the expense of the Federal Government.

Of the 95 new villages to be established in this connection, 49 would be located in the Punjab, while the remaining in the Frontier Province. Eighteen existing villages would be provided protection with the construction of dykes.

DRILLING SITES: Gen. Butt said that some areas of the Toot Oilfield would also fall under the reservoir and the concerned authorities had been advised in this connection. He said the drilling sites could either be protected through dykes, or the oil there could be pumped out through underwater drilling.

PAKISTAN

SEVERAL PUBLICATIONS FORFEITED

Karachi DAWN in English 25 Sep 85 p 2

[Text]

LAHORE, Sept 24: The Punjab Government has proscribed the following publications under the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963:

The book entitled "Rabrey", written by Mr Sabir Raza, published by Qirtas, Balai Manzil, Habib Bank, Bazar Goal Kutchery, Faisalabad, and printed by Mass Printers, Faisalabad.

The Urdu monthly "Ansarullah" for the month of June, 1985, published by Chaudhry Muhammad Ibrahim, Darul Sadar South, Rabwah, and printed by the Zia-ul-Islam Press, Rabwah.

The Urdu monthly "Pakeeza International," for the month of January, 1985, published by Sabih Mansoor from Toronto, Canada.

The Urdu monthly "Khalid," Rabwah, for the month of June, 1985, published by Mubarak Ahmad Khalid, Darul Sadar South, Rabwah, and printed by the Zia-ul-Islam Press, Rabwah.

The issues of Urdu weekly "La-

hore," dated April 13 and 27, May 11, 18, and 25, and June 1 and 8, 1985, published by Saqib Rizvi, 113-B, Balwant Mansion, Beedon Road, Lahore-6 and printed by Pakistan Printing Works, 43-Rattigan Road, Lahore.

The issues of Urdu weekly "Al-Nasar" dated April 4 and May 3, 17, 1985, published by the London Mosque, 16, Gressenhall Road, London, and printed by Muzaifur A. Khokhar and Muhammad Hasan.

The booklet entitled "Wafat-i-Nabi Sallallah-o-alaih-i-Wasallam" and the leaflet Nijat Ki Sirf Eik Rah Heh, written by ex-Captain Dr Masooduddin Usmani, M.B.B.S., Touheed Road, Keamari, Karachi.

The poems captioned "Majlis-i-Ahrar" and "Qissa Sahiwal," written by some Qadianis.

The leaflet "Imam-i-Masoom Hazrat Husain Radhallah Anhu ka Martaba-i-Zeeshan Hazrat Masit Maood Ki Nazar Mein," published by some Qadianis.

CSO: 4600/38

PAKISTAN

OFFICIAL TALKS ABOUT PROJECT TO CHECK WATERLOGGING

Karachi DAWN in English 24 Sep 85 p 2

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Sept 23: Lt. Gen. Ghulam Safdar Butt, Chairman WAPDA, has disclosed that to check the menace of water logging and salinity in D.I. Kan, a new Command Area Development Project, has been established at a cost of rupees 640 million.

Addressing a Press conference at D.I. Khan on Sunday, he said that the establishment of the Project was necessitated to check the spread of water logging and salinity due to Pharpur Canal. Work on the project had been initiated and a sum of rupees 60 million had been provided for its first phase.

He said that the 5.3 billion dollar Kalabagh Dam Project was aimed at meeting the power shortage in the country. On completion 24 hundred megawatt electricity would be produced in the first phase, while 36 hundred megawatt electricity would be produced in the second phase of the Project.

He assured that load shedding

would be comparatively decreased during the next year due to additional production of 650 megawatts of electricity.

The WAPDA, Chairman also assured that the first phase of the Chashma right bank canal would be completed by June next year and added that the required funds for this purpose have been released. New tenders would be invited for, this purpose shortly, he said.

He refuted the reports of theft of cement from the stores of the Chashma Right Bank Canal and said that these reports were due to some misunderstanding. He also said that due to two years delay in the construction of CRBC, the expenditure of the project had increased by rupees 160 million.

He assured that as many 5,000 cusecs water would be provided to the NWFP after the completion of CRBC.—APP.

CSO: 4600/38

PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

CREATION OF 12 PROVINCES DEMANDED--Mir Nabi Bukhsh Zehri, a Senator from Buluchistan, has suggested creation of 12 provinces in the country which, he thought, would help overcome problems confronting people living in existing units of federation. Addressing a news conference in Quetta on Monday, Mir Nabi Bukhsh said that each of existing provinces should be divided into three separate provinces having lieutenant governors and assemblies to run their affairs with decentralised powers. He hoped that with such an arrangement, prevailing sense of deprivation among people would come to an end. Mir Nabi Bukhsh Zehri while referring to Indemnity Bill said that members of the assembly should consider it thoroughly before reaching an amicable settlement in the best interest of the country. National assembly, he added, was expected to send this bill to the Senate in such a form that the country could benefit from it. Senator Nabi Bukhsh Zehri also expressed concern over decision of the government to shelve integrated mineral project of Saindak. He said that this project was feasible and added that he would soon meet the Finance Minister to impress upon him the importance of this project. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 25 Sep 85 p 2]

BAN ON NDP LEADER--Mr. Abid Zubairi, a leader of the banned NDP, was today served an order of the Punjab Government, banning his entry into the province for a period of 90 days. He said he would file an appeal against the order as he was neither a member of MRD's Central Action Committee nor actively participating in any political activities. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 25 Sep 85 p 6]

END

CSO: 4600/38

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

12 DEC 85